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This study examines the way in which European Union (EU) membership has impacted 
upon historically precedented understandings of UK parliamentary sovereignty. The 
position adopted is critical of other approaches within a neo-Diceyan, popular sovereigntist 
and common law paradigm which have accorded too little significance to the past 
historical precedents defining Parliament’s sovereignty and its institutional inter-
relationships. By overlooking historical constitutional forms, the gravity of the impact of 
EU membership on the UK constitution has often been misunderstood by those 
approaches.  
 
By adopting a broadly political constitutionalist position, the thesis proposes an alternative 
explanation of UK parliamentary sovereignty as the ‘rule of the recognised helm’. It seeks 
to achieve that objective by adapting the approaches of the ‘rule of recognition’ while 
incorporating the medieval, political view of sovereignty as operating under the ‘helm’ of 
the ship of state, responsible for the government of the realm. The thesis establishes that 
the operation of the ‘rule of the recognised helm’ is dependent upon a uniquely conditioned 
political history characterised by eight crucial historically precedented ‘historical 
constitutional forms’ defining UK parliamentary sovereignty, from the thirteenth century 
through to the contemporary Parliament.  
 
The main contention is that under EU membership, successive governments, through 
Parliaments, have adopted practices which whilst preserving the fundamental rule, are at 
odds with those past constitutional precedents. Three key EU case studies – of the 
Financial Transactions Tax, of the freedom of movement of persons and of the Working 
Time Directive – are employed as evidence that the UK’s helm of state has, since 1973, 
incorporated EU institutions which unsettles those political precedents of parliamentary 
sovereignty. On the other hand, the fourth case study, of Parliament’s place since the UK’s 
holding of the EU Referendum in 2016 constitutes a new constitutional resettlement, a 
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Chapter 1: the impact of EU membership on the UK’s governing competences and 
parliamentary sovereignty 
 
The transition of Britain to its modern, post-war democratic form after two World Wars 
and the drawing to an end of an Empire brought about some significant changes to its 
political arrangements. It remains a ‘settled polity’ and it has been a full democracy for the 
past 100 years (Gamble, 2016). Internally, within Westminster, Parliamentary sovereignty 
remains the supreme principle of the UK constitution. It makes Parliament the supreme 
legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law; in that system, Acts of 
Parliament cannot traditionally be challenged in the courts. The Westminster system has 
been deeply embedded in the idea of accountability, which made it possible for the 
electorate collectively to hold the government of the day to account (King, 2015, p. 19). 
The constitution as a whole continues to be expressed as “partly written and wholly 
uncodified” (UK Parliament, 2017). Its representative institutions and political traditions 
stretch back to the seventeenth century (Gamble, 2016).  
 Britain’s place in Europe has formed, for many, a substantial part of its new post-
imperial role. The role for Britain in Europe was ambiguous and difficult to express. To 
establish that role, politicians in Parliament passed the European Communities Act 1972, 
enabling the UK’s entry to the European Union (EU) in 1973. It voluntarily limited the 
application of its parliamentary sovereignty. This and other laws reflected major political 
developments both within and outside the UK since the 1970s. Those laws include: 
 
• the devolution of powers at Westminster to bodies like the Scottish Parliament and 
Welsh Assembly;  
• the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporating the European 
Convention on Human Rights into UK law;  
• the decision to establish a UK Supreme Court in 2009, which ends the House of 
Lords function as the UK's final court of appeal.  
 
With those changes, the UK has become less united by the activities of its multinational 
state than it was in the past. It has moved from being the most centralised state in Europe 
towards a more devolved system where the other nations of the UK are no longer 
subordinate to London, Whitehall and Westminster for their policies (Gamble, 2016). 
Under EU arrangements, the constitution is potentially shifting away from the traditional 
Westminster model, in which ministers in government continue to lead their Departments 
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through the executive and propose and draft Government bills for the UK population, with 
the consent of the House of Commons. With the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law and the decision 
to establish a UK Supreme Court in 2009, it has widened the scope of a judiciary only 
previously required to give effect to the statutes of Parliament. Inside Westminster, the 
same two major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, who were the major parties in 
1945, are still the same major parties (Bogdanor 2011), run along adversarial lines (King, 
2015, p. 18). As a subject, Europe split both of the major parties. For example, the Labour 
Party, in the 1980s, with a breakaway party of the Social Democratic Party; and then the 
Conservatives significantly in the 1990s. Recent events have highlighted how uneasy a 
subject it continues to be, including the holding of the EU Referendum of 2016, the 
majority vote to ‘Leave’ in that referendum, in addition to the vigorously scrutinised 
Article 50 and ‘exit’ negotiations being pursued under a Conservative Government. Britain 
had long failed and continues to dispute reconciling itself with being in Europe (Bogdanor, 
2011), neither being of Europe, nor run by Europe (Gamble, 2016). 
 
UK membership of the EU 
 
Britain’s contemporary EU membership impacts upon its governmental competences only 
in so far as the EU has specific exclusive, shared, supporting or special competences to 
pursue certain actions or laws, in accordance only with the UK having shared or pooled 
those fields of legislative competence in certain policy areas through successive European 
treaties. It was to be the “most intimate and intense involvement” of foreign governments 
in the making of governmental decisions (King, 2015, p. 25). In the post-war European 
political and economic landscape, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
formed from a Treaty, possessed supranational characteristics with the objective of 
creating interdependence through a common market of coal, coke, iron ore, steel and scrap 
so that one country could no longer mobilise its armed forces without others knowing, 
which eased tensions after the Second World War (European Union, 2014; Nugent, 2006, 
p. 138). Britain was not a signatory to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, which was signed by six countries (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands) on 18 April 1951. Later in the 1950s, Britain remained absent 
from signing the Treaties of Rome on 25 March 1957 with the objective to set up the 
European Economic Community (EEC) (and the European Atomic Energy Community, or 
Euratom). The European Economic Community marked an extension of European 
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integration to include general economic cooperation – which included the guidelines for 
establishing a common market in manufactured goods and a Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) (Dedman, 2010, p. 82). It embodied a degree of supranationalism in decision-
making (Nugent, 2006, p. 47) and again, Britain was not a signatory to the European 
Economic Community at that point. Britain was in general, opposed to a continental 
European Economic Community, particularly through the establishment of supranational 
European institutions, and potentially detrimental to her export interests and undermining 
her claims of leading Europe (Berger, 2013).  
The intentional limiting of national sovereignty by Treaty for the purposes of 
enabling international cooperation was in line with a number of constitutional provisions 
set up after the Second World War (Chalmers, 2013, p. 5). In spite of Labour and 
Conservative Governments having no intention of being part of a supranational European 
organisation (Geddes, 2013, p. 47), and during the time of the UK’s original decision not 
to be part of the Treaty of Rome, it became recognisable to both Britain’s leaders and 
people that economically the European Community was doing far better and being on the 
outside while high tariffs were “enormously disadvantageous” (Geddes, 2013, p. 56; Wall, 
2008; King, 2007, p. 92). Against the British favoured intergovernmental regional trade 
organisation, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the EEC “became the 
predominant organisation” (Geddes, 2013, p. 53). A further Treaty, the merger Brussels 
Treaty, was signed on 8 April 1965. It led to the creation of a single Commission and a 
single Council to serve the then three European Communities (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) and 
was later repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
In the meantime, the UK submitted its first application in 1961 to join the EEC, 
under Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, but the application had been vetoed 
by the French President, Charles de Gaulle (Geddes, 2013, p. 54). The UK made a further, 
second application in 1967 under Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson but had been 
blocked again by the French President. Shortly after, a Conservative government was 
formed in Britain under Prime Minister Edward Heath in June 1970. Heath had been 
seeking for the right terms to be negotiated on the European Economic Community and 
committed the UK to join in its long-term interest (Norton, 2011, p. 55). It was eventually 
the European Communities Act 1972 under Heath which domestically permitted the UK 
specifically to join the European Economic Community. The UK required the European 
Communities Act 1972 in its own domestic law in order to become a member. A series of 
significant, new treaties and treaty amendments to the European Communities Act have 
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been agreed since that Act and the changes in UK law necessary to give effect to the new 
treaties have been made under amending Acts. The result of the European Communities 
Act 1972 was that future Parliaments were, unless and until they expressly repealed it, 
bound by its terms. Politically, the original European Communities Act 1972 received 
public endorsement through a post-ratification referendum in 1975, with a two-to-one vote 
in favour of continued membership on a 64 per cent turnout (Geddes, 2013, p. 65). The UK 
only joined, along with Denmark and Ireland, the European Communities on 1 January 
1973, raising the then number of member states to nine. 
It was not until the 1980s that the Single European Act (SEA) entered into force (1 
July 1987), with the intention of deepening European integration. The Act sped up 
decision-making in preparation for the single market to be established by December 1992 
and reforming the institutions in preparation for new members joining. It permitted the 
strengthening of EC institutional structures through the extension of qualified majority 
voting over all internal market legislation in the Council – thereby undermining any one 
country’s veto over proposed legislation – and the creation of co-operation procedure to 
give the European Parliament more influence (European Union, 2014; Geddes, 2013, p. 70; 
Dedman, 2010, p. 114-5; Wall, 2008, p. 49; Nugent, 2006, p. 81). But the British view that 
the Single European Act sufficed to ‘complete’ the single market, and that further treaties 
were not required simply did not prevail in reality (Marshall, 2013, p. 17). Treaty revision 
subsequently became a “virtual non-stop process since the mid-1980s” (Dedman, 2010, p. 
166).  
 Less than five years later, when the Treaty on European Union (TEU), popularly 
known as the Maastricht Treaty, was signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 
1 November 1993, its objective was to prepare for European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and introduce elements of a political union, including political features of 
citizenship and a common foreign and internal affairs policy. It established the “European 
Union” and introduced the co-decision procedure, giving the European Parliament more 
say in decision-making (Bux, 2017; Hix and Høyland, 2013, p. 172). New forms of 
cooperation developed between the UK and other EU governments, for example on 
defence and justice and home affairs (Novak, 2017; European Union, 2014). The Treaty 
itself was a milestone on the road to a potential federation (Gowland et al., 2010, p. 118) 
and the UK’s political debate over the Maastricht Treaty demonstrated that popular and 
parliamentary groups increasingly contested the Crown and Parliament’s powers assenting 
to the competences set out within the European Treaties. Accordingly, the UK’s 
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Conservative government under John Major secured two significant opt-outs on the 
Maastricht treaty, including on deferring a decision on participating on the final stage of 
economic and monetary union (EMU) and the Social Chapter (Gowland et al., 2010, pp. 
103-4).  
  Later, under Tony Blair’s New Labour government, when the Treaty of Amsterdam 
entered into force on 1 May 1999 (Novak, 2017), its purpose was to reform the EU 
institutions in preparation for the arrival of future member countries. It increased the use of 
the co-decision voting procedure. The EU’s absence of appetite for reform at this stage 
reflected the reaction to Maastricht and its quest for deeper integration (Gowland et al., 
2010, p. 151). It extended qualified majority voting, with national vetoes remaining only 
for a small core of articles (Dedman, 2010, p. 173). That Treaty made “sufficient progress” 
to enable enlargement to occur in 2004, and 2007, but it was clear “even before the ink was 
dry that a further treaty reform would be required” (Smith, 2012).  
  The EU had subsequently and painstakingly drafted a Constitutional Treaty 
establishing a single text document – a “constitution for Europe” – in 2004 (Nugent, 2006, 
p. 120-8) which was signed but never ratified. That non-ratification was, in part, a 
consequence of an increased division emerged between the European bureaucratic elites 
and citizens over European integration who had no immediate access to an EU with a 
significant democratic deficit (Haller, 2009). Irrespective of the popular opposition in the 
UK to the subsequent Constitutional Treaty “as a massive step towards the creation of a 
federal superstate” (Gowland et al., 2010, p. 172), and the rejection of that Treaty by 
referendums in France (55 per cent) and the Netherlands (62 per cent) and the proposed 
pledge of a referendum in the UK, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was 
reworked through an “amending” Treaty of the Treaty of Lisbon (see Smith, 2012; Reh, 
2009). 
  The subsequent Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 with the objective 
of making the EU more democratic, more efficient and better able to address global 
problems. The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the power of the European Parliament, led to the 
change of voting procedures in the Council, provided a permanent president for the 
European Council, a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and a new EU 
diplomatic service (European Union, 2014; Dedman, 2010, p. 177; Lisbon Treaty, 2007). 
The EU gained ‘legal personality’ under the Lisbon treaty, giving it rights under 
international law to adopt laws and Treaties. The Lisbon treaty clarified powers and 
competences in the Treaties. It permitted an enhanced role of national parliaments, 
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particularly with reference to an ‘early warning system’, whereby the national legislatures 
gained the right to monitor whether initiatives for EU decisions comply with the principle 
of subsidiarity (Neyer, 2014, p. 125; Miller, 2012; Raunio, 2009, p. 318; EU Committee, 
2008). All EU Treaties are only effective in the UK by virtue of the European 
Communities Act 1972, which is amended by Parliament each time. 
  The single market is the EU’s main economic foundation (Pelkmans, 2016), 
enabling the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. The trade within the 
single market, agriculture, environmental protection and competition policy are key areas 
in which the Union predominates and in which the competences of national governments 
have been substantially reduced or removed entirely (King, 2007, p. 107; Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2013). In terms of the single market between the 28 
European countries, the EU has become a major world trading power. The EU's economy, 
in terms of goods and services (expressed as GDP), is now bigger than that of the US. 
 The UK participates in the EU’s other main objective which is to promote human 
rights both internally – through the introduction of EU citizenship – and around the world. 
Indeed, since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (annexed to the Treaty) brings all these rights together in a single text. The Charter 
dates back to a European Council meeting in Cologne in 1999 and agreement by 
Convention in 2000, aspiring for fundamental rights to be consolidated into a charter 
(Nugent, 2006, p. 113). The EU’s institutions and all EU governments are legally bound to 
uphold them when applying EU law. The Charter is indeed directly effective in the UK 
with supremacy over inconsistent national law, albeit it does not apply to all areas of 
national law (European Scrutiny Committee, 2014). 
 The EU launched a single European currency, the euro, in January 1999. The euro 
is the common currency of most (19) EU countries – the UK has, again, very significantly, 
opted out of the euro, but the principle of which meant the UK was not required to 
participate in the third stage of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and 
consequently introduce the euro (Gowland et al., 2010, p. 103). It is notable, however, that 
for the EU itself, the euro, which is used every day by some 338 million Europeans, is said 
by the European institutions to be the “most tangible proof” of cooperation between EU 
countries (European Union, 2014).  
 The EU is a unique economic and political partnership now between 28 European 
member states. It possesses a unique institutional set-up. The EU’s broad priorities and 
direction are set by the European Council, bringing together the UK and other national 
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heads of state or government and the Commission President and Council President 
(European Union, 2014). The UK’s directly elected Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) who represent European citizens are elected to the European Parliament along with 
those from all other member states. It is in the interests of the EU as a whole rather than of 
the UK alone, that objectives are promoted by the European Commission, whose 
commissioners are appointed by national governments. In basic terms, there are three main 
institutions through which the UK becomes directly or indirectly involved in EU 
legislation, namely: (i) the Council of the EU represents the UK and all EU governments of 
the member states whereby the Presidency of the Council is shared by the member states 
on a rotating basis; (ii) the European Commission, which represents the interests of the EU 
as a whole, and; (iii) the European Parliament represents the UK’s and the other EU’s 
citizens and is directly elected by them. The UK participates in EU institutions through the 
“Ordinary Legislative Procedure” (once known as the ‘co-decision’ procedure) for policies 
and laws that apply within the EU. In principle, the Commission proposes new laws, and 
the Parliament and Council adopt them. The Commission and the UK and EU member 
countries then implement them, and the Commission ensures that those laws are properly 
applied and implemented (European Union, 2014). The acquis communautaire is the 
whole body of EU law all member states including the UK must subscribe to, including the 
European Court of Justice decisions. Two other institutions play important roles, including 
the European Court of Justice which upholds the rule of European law and the Court of 
Auditors checks the financing of the EU’s activities. 
  The powers and responsibilities of all of these institutions are laid down in the 
Treaties (see Box 1.1), which are the foundation of everything the EU does. They also lay 
down the rules and procedures that the EU institutions must follow. The Treaties are 
agreed by the Heads of Government of all the EU countries – in the UK’s case, the Prime 
Minister –and ratified by their parliaments (and sanctioned by national populations by 
referendum if necessary). The highest form of law is the Treaties themselves which not 
only set out the “constitution of the EU” and deal with substantive issues but a number of 
competences which provide for rights directly effective in the UK’s and all other national 






BOX 1.1: The EU Treaties 
• Treaty of Lisbon (signed: 13 December 2007; entered into force: 1 December 2009) 
provided more power for the European Parliament, change of voting procedures in 
the Council, a permanent president of the European Council, a new High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and a new EU diplomatic service. 
• Treaty of Nice (signed: 26 February 2001; entered into force: 1 February 2003) 
provided for methods for changing the composition of the Commission and 
redefining the voting system in the Council. 
• Treaty of Amsterdam (signed: 2 October 1997; entered into force: 1 May 1999) 
provided for amendment, renumbering and consolidation of EU and EEC treaties 
and increased use of the ordinary legislative procedure. 
• Treaty on European Union (TEU) – Maastricht Treaty (signed: 7 February 1992; 
entered into force: 1 November 1993) provided for the establishment of the 
European Union and introduction of the co-decision procedure, new forms of 
cooperation between EU governments over defence and justice and home affairs. 
• The Single European Act (signed: 17 February 1986; entered into force: 1 July 
1987) provided for the extension of qualified majority voting in the Council 
(making it harder for a single country to veto proposed legislation) and; creation of 
cooperation and assent procedures. 
• Merger Treaty – Brussels Treaty (signed: 8 April 1965; entered into force: 1 July 
1967) provided for the creation of a single Commission and a single Council to 
serve the then three European Communities (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) and repealed 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
• The Treaties of Rome (EEC and EURATOM treaties, signed: 25 March 1957; 
entered into force: 1 January 1958) provided for the extension of European 
integration to include general economic cooperation. 
• Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the founding treaties 
being amended in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland and UK joined. 
(European Union, 2017; Novak, 2017; Lisbon Treaty, 2007) 
 
The EU is based on the rule of law, but the rule of law, within the EU, only exists in so far 
as member states and the EU acts within the powers conferred on them by the legally-
binding treaties that have been approved voluntarily and democratically by all EU member 
states, including the UK. For example, if a policy area is not cited in a Treaty, the 
Commission cannot propose a law in that area, including direct taxation, health provision 
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in the NHS, defence and welfare. The Treaties set out supranational EU objectives, rules 
for EU institutions, how decisions are made and the relationship between the EU and its 
member countries.  
 
EU membership impact on UK governing competences 
 
The European Communities Act 1972, in practice, meant that EU law became part of UK 
law by virtue of that Act (Miller, 2015). EU law takes precedence over existing UK law, 
which must be amended if it is found to conflict with EU law. The Act, as amended over 
time, allows EU specified instruments to become part of UK law without the need for 
separate enactment of each and every EU instrument. In one specific section – Section 2(1) 
– the Act gives the authority for Treaty provisions and directly applicable secondary 
legislation (e.g. regulations) automatically to have legal effect in UK domestic law without 
further enactment (Miller, 2015). In terms of Westminster implementing EU law, in some 
areas, additional implementing measures are required, particularly in the field of 
agriculture, which for the UK means implementation by Statutory Instrument (SI). 
Directives and decisions which are not directly applicable can be enacted either by primary 
or secondary legislation in the UK.  
  The UK is wholly isolated in the EU in operating under the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and in which the constitution is interpreted as only “partly 
written and wholly uncodified” (UK Parliament, 2017) – all other member states have 
adopted some form of written constitution.   
  The UK Parliament is and always has been well aware that when it joined the EC:  
(i) priority would be accorded to EC law where the EU has competence;  
(ii) it was inherent in the EC regime that functionally the priority must be given 
to EC law;  
(iii) the European Communities Act 1972 placed a duty on national courts to 
override national law in the event of a conflict (Craig, 2011, p. 116);  
(iv) Parliament may still derogate from EU obligations expressly and the EU 
only maintains supremacy in areas of the law where it is applicable (Craig, 
2011, p. 118). 
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Despite political controversies, or perceptions of ‘awkwardness’, the UK voluntarily 
belongs through the EU Treaties to the EU system of rules. The end result of the Treaties is 
that there is a division of competences with the EU. The Union therefore only has the 
competences conferred upon it by the EU Treaties. The Treaty of Lisbon sets out for the 
first time and very precisely, the division of competences between the EU and member 
states, by distinguishing between three main categories of competence:  
• exclusive competences;  
• shared competences, and;  
• supporting competences.  
 In the past, there had been disputes over competence between the EU and member 
states and so the Lisbon Treaty set about clearly defining them. The Treaty of Lisbon 
ended the European Community and replaced it with the EU, and it is the EU which 
exercises the competences conferred upon it. The Lisbon Treaty, or Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), distinguishes between three categories of 
competence as categorised above and in brief they are as follows (Rossi, 2012).  
  The ‘exclusive competence’ means that the Union – and therefore not the UK or 
other member states – have exclusive competence in the fields of the:  
(a) customs union;  
(b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market, which does not relate to the UK;  
(c) monetary policy for the member states whose currency is the euro;  
(d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries 
policy and;  
(e) common commercial policy.  
The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international 
agreement (Article 3, TFEU). The EU alone is able to legislate and adopt binding acts in 
these fields. The UK and the other member states’ role is therefore limited to applying 
these acts, unless the EU authorises them to adopt certain acts themselves. 
  The shared competence specifies that the EU has shared competence with the 
member states, including the UK, which applies in the following fields:  
20 
 
(a) internal market;  
(b) social policy, for certain aspects defined in the Treaties;  
(c) economic, social and territorial cohesion;  
(d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological 
resources;  
(e) environment;  
(f) consumer protection;  
(g) transport;  
(h) trans-European networks and;  
(i) energy;  
(j) area of freedom, security and justice;  
(k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this 
Treaty;  
(l) to a certain extent, in areas of research, technological development and space, 
and;  
(m) to a certain extent, in the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian 
aid and conducting a common policy (Article 4, TFEU).  
The EU and member states, including the UK, are authorised to adopt binding acts in these 
fields. However, the UK may exercise its competence only in so far as the EU has not 
exercised, or has decided not to exercise, its own competence. 
  The EU also has ‘supporting competences’ (Article 6, TFEU). The Union has 
supporting competences “to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the 
actions of the member states” on:  
(a) protection and improvement of human health;  
(b) industry;  
(c) culture;  
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(d) tourism;  
(e) education, vocational training, youth and sport (Article 6, TFEU).  
The EU has no legislative power in those fields and may not interfere in the exercise of 
these competences reserved for member states, including the UK. 
  The EU has some other ‘special competences’ in certain fields so that the UK and 
other member states coordinate their economic, social and employment policies within the 
Union. Member states whose currency is the euro are a special case within that field 
(Rossi, 2012: 101). The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) (under Article 24 
TEU) is in an unsettled position – the EU has competence in all fields connected with the 
CFSP, but subject to unanimity/veto, yet it goes as far as defining and implementing this 
policy through the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, whose roles and status have been recognised by the Treaty of Lisbon. Yet, on the 
other hand, the EU may not adopt legislative acts in this field and the Court of Justice of 
the EU does not have competence to give judgement in this area.  
  The exception to the competences conferred by the Treaties is the “flexibility 
clause” (Article 352 TFEU), which enables the EU to act beyond the power of action 
conferred upon it by the Treaties in specific circumstances. However, the specific 
reduction or extension of EU competences is a step which requires a revision of the 
Treaties, which domestically and institutionally carries with it its own crises. 
  EU membership influences the UK perhaps most importantly through the 
provisions and consequences of the Single Market (Pelkmans, 2016), in which the EU’s 
‘four freedoms’ of goods, services, capital and people are guaranteed. In terms of intra-EU 
migration rules, EU nationals between member states do not require a visa to enter another 
member state, and no time limit may be placed on their stay (under the Free Movement 
Directive, EU Directive 2004/38/EC). Having ceded that competence, the inability of the 
UK to impose limits on immigration from the EEA remains a controversial aspect of EU 
membership in the UK, particularly since the expansion of the EU to Eastern Europe from 
2004, which has driven a rise in net migration (Thompson and Harari, 2013) and, played a 
significant role in the majority referendum decision of the British people to leave the EU in 
June 2016 (Curtice, 2017a; Sobolewska and Ford, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Wilkinson, and 
Hughes, 2016).  
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  The EU has a major exclusive competence to negotiate trade and investment 
agreements with countries outside the Union. It is a customs union with a common external 
tariff on imported goods and therefore the UK’s membership of that union significantly 
affects the UK’s trade relations with non-EU members throughout the world. The Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) affects consumer prices and membership impacts upon common 
external tariffs levied on imports. Single Market law seeks to eliminate the differences in 
the way markets function between the UK and all EU member states – or creating a ‘level 
playing field’ – including on product standards for goods, and rules on consumer 
protection, to health and safety legislation, and competition policy. The UK does not 
operate with the euro currency and is not a member of the 19-member eurozone area. By 
sharing a single currency, those euro area countries must also coordinate their economic 
and fiscal policies much more closely than other EU countries such as the UK. 
Nonetheless, the EU is the largest economy in the world, although constituting only 7 per 
cent of the world’s population. The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is the EU’s 
instrument for managing viable fisheries and aquaculture. Although mired in controversy 
for decades in the UK and which had largely “failed” as the health of fish stocks and 
fishing businesses deteriorated as bureaucracy increased, the CFP has been recently 
reformed.  
In terms of the national competences over UK policy, Westminster does retain 
control over key areas of government – including direct taxation, health provision in the 
NHS, defence, welfare, and other vital areas:  
• Taxation: Competence on direct taxation remains primarily with the UK and other 
member states, although by indirect taxation, the UK is subject to Value Added Tax 
(VAT), excise duties and other indirect taxes and other issues, including the 
constraints on exercising their competence in line with the fundamental freedoms 
(HM Treasury, 2013).  
• Public spending: The UK’s public spending is the responsibility of the Government 
and is expected to amount to £772.8 billion in 2016-17 (‘Total Managed 
Expenditure’) (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2017). In the meantime, its net 
contribution to the EU budget in 2015/16 stood at £10.8 billion (HM Treasury, 
2016) while the majority of EU funding received and spent by the UK is through 
the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), paying subsidies to farmers, 
and through European Structural Funds (Keep, 2017; Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, 2013). 
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• Labour and social law: The UK maintains, unlike some other EU members, that 
member states regulate their labour market and their social systems according to 
their own needs and political priorities (Thompson and Harari, 2013).  
• NHS: The EU is generally limited to supporting the competence of improving 
health in the NHS and the EU has, for example, an extremely limited role in social 
care (Department of Health, 2013).  
• International development: The EU is only one of a number of multilateral 
organisations through which the UK channels its aid spending. In 2012-2013, for 
example, the UK spent 43 per cent of its aid budget through multilateral channels 
(including the United Nations) to address specific issues and spends the remainder 
of its aid budget bilaterally (Department for International Development, 2013).  
• Foreign policy, defence and security: common foreign security and defence policy 
decision-making is pursued by unanimity in the Council through member states’ 
government ministers. Where all significant decisions are made by unanimity, each 
member state has a power of veto, particularly over the deployment of EU military 
operations and civilian missions. Each member state also retains full sovereign 
control of its troops, civilian personnel and other security assets (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2013). 
• Education: the UK, like other EU governments, has a “strong political desire” to 
make its own laws regarding education and training, externally entering into other 
bilateral and multilateral international agreements, provided it is not precluded by 
overriding EU competence in other areas (Department for Education, 2014). 
However, that does not mean UK parliamentary sovereignty is unaffected by EU 
membership. The fundamental rule in a legal and political system which is dependent on a 
uniquely conditioned political history has defined the sovereignty of Parliament. Under EU 
membership, governments through Parliaments, have learned practices at odds with past 
constitutional forms, while not altogether abandoning the underlying fundamental rule.    
 
The EU challenge to parliamentary sovereignty  
 
It is said that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty – or what the classical, iconic 
scholar of this concept, A. V. Dicey in 1885 referred to as “the very keystone of the law of 
the constitution” (Dicey, 1964, p. 70), is defined as:  
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“The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, 
namely, that Parliament . . . has, under the English constitution, the right to make 
or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by 
the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament” (Dicey, 1964).  
Parliamentary sovereignty has, throughout the centuries, undergone major challenges and 
developments, which has left the UK with the Westminster Parliament it has today and 
another new (albeit, often similar) set of challenges. Those modern challenges – including 
devolution and human rights legislation consistent with the European Convention on 
Human Rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 and often understood generally as 
‘constitutional change’ – affect parliamentary sovereignty and include the challenge posed 
by membership of the EU under the terms of the European Communities Act 1972 and its 
subsequent amendments.  
 Given the understanding of the challenge posed by the EU to parliamentary 
sovereignty, examined widely across academic literature – crossing disciplines from 
constitutional law, political science and philosophy – what is necessary is to interrogate 
that definition of parliamentary sovereignty and then ask how it is interpreted in the 
context of EU membership affecting that doctrine. To do so can illuminate political and 
constitutional understandings of the UK’s core constitutional doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty – and therefore how it has been impacted upon by EU membership since the 
passing of the European Communities Act 1972.  
 The European project began as a purely economic union, i.e. a common market as a 
customs union, but British reservations always existed on that very point alone, insisting 
that there was an obvious intention towards political union – and that supranational 
governance carried with it domestic consequences for the doctrine of the sovereignty of 
Parliament (see Geddes, 2013, pp. 24-6). For example, the earliest legal attempts to 
challenge UK entry into the EEC in 1971 were made on the grounds that had been 
recognised by some groups as an abuse of treaty-making power by the executive thereby 
undermining the sovereignty of Parliament (Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 117; Blackburn v 
A-G [1971]).  
On the unique and very direct legal and political issue of the EU, there is a tension 
between the political exercise of the sovereignty of Parliament and the claimed supremacy 
of a complex EU legal and political order. The uniqueness of the EU institutional set-up, 
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the primacy of EU law, and of direct effect for claimable EU rights in national courts 
(Nugent, 2010, p. 213) characterise that order. Yet, Dicey’s traditional definition provides 
for a principle whereby “…no person or body is recognised by the law of England as 
having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament” (Dicey, 1964). That is, 
in part, challenged under the European Communities Act 1972 – and as set out later under 
the controversial Factortame [1990] case law (Tomkins, 2003). The Court of Justice of the 
EU does have a supreme right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. 
Parliament may still disapply, override or derogate from EU obligations if it wishes 
(Bingham, 2010; Tomkins, 2003) and EU law only maintains supremacy in areas of the 
law where it is applicable, but the challenge to practical, everyday Westminster 
sovereignty doctrine is nonetheless present.  
 This study examines the way in which EU membership has impacted upon 
historically precedented understandings of UK parliamentary sovereignty. By according 
insufficient significance and weight to previous historical understandings, the gravity of 
the impact of EU membership on the UK constitution has often been misunderstood if not 
underestimated by other approaches. By adopting a broadly political constitutionalist 
position, and as a departure from Hart’s (1997) rule of recognition, this thesis proposes an 
alternative explanation of UK parliamentary sovereignty, as the ‘rule of the recognised 
helm’. It seeks to achieve that objective by adapting the approaches of the ‘rule of 
recognition’ while incorporating the medieval, political view of sovereignty as operating 
under the ‘helm’ of the ship of state, responsible for the government of the realm. The 
thesis establishes that the operation of the ‘rule of the recognised helm’ is dependent upon 
a uniquely conditioned political history characterised by eight crucial historically 
precedented ‘historical constitutional forms’ defining UK parliamentary sovereignty, from 
the thirteenth century through to the contemporary Parliament of today. The main 
contention is that under EU membership, successive governments, through Parliaments, 
have adopted practices which while not abandoning the fundamental rule, are at odds with 




The research questions which arise are as follows: 
• How can the research literature understand the impact of EU membership on the 
UK’s doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty?  
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• Can the concepts of the ‘rule of recognition’, understood in the UK context as 
‘What the Crown in Parliament enacts is law’, and the adaptation of legal theory as 
a ‘rule of the recognised helm’, help to answer the EU-UK sovereignty impact 
question?  
• How can political science best understand the conflict or impact of EU membership 
on the UK’s doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in accordance with the UK’s 




It is possible that those research questions could become confused or left unanswered if the 
issue of the EU is not first addressed. This study concentrates on how parliamentary 
sovereignty has been impacted upon by EU membership and not its relationship to other 
features of constitutional change, such as devolved bodies (particularly Scotland) within 
the UK and or the relevance of human rights legislation (particularly, the Human Rights 
Act 1998).  
  That relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and the EU is an entirely 
unique and very direct legal and political arrangement. It has no true resemblance to the 
nature of the conflict between the sovereignty of Parliament vis-a-vis the devolved 
assemblies or human rights legislation as decided through the modern role of the courts – 
which is why the latter two case studies are not the subject of this thesis. The debate over 
devolved assembly powers is not strictly a legal conflict in the first stage as much as a 
politically-led one which might be better understood as concerns over the trust between 
electors and their chosen/acknowledged Parliament. Devolution is often theorised as 
seemingly presenting a major practical challenge to parliamentary sovereignty (Blick, 
2012, p. 37; Bogdanor, 2009a, p. 112). At the same time, the British devolutionary 
settlement is in many ways continuous with previous arrangements in that administrative 
autonomy for the subnations has already been part of the Westminster system (Gifford, 
2010, p. 327). Westminster retains ultimate supremacy (specifically, section 28(7) of the 
Scotland Act 1998), yet as an issue of political obligation will only legislate on devolved 
issues with the approval of the Scottish Parliament (Bradley, 2011, p. 60; Tomkins, 2003). 
Even following the Scottish independence referendum of September 2014 – in which 
political independence was ultimately rejected – Bradley (2011) has been entirely accurate 
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in demonstrating that under devolved arrangements, the claim to a political reality is more 
important than legal power – particularly if support for the Scottish Parliament as its main 
representative body develops to such a point, with political opinion and national sentiment 
putting it beyond the recognition of a mere ‘subordinate legislature’. The central governing 
problem lies not necessarily in the law itself but in a form of political agreement to not 
legislate for Scotland in a domestic system devised by Westminster – unlike the European 
governing arrangements conceptualised by a voluntary, legal and political framework for 
collective action in which the UK is conjoined. The UK sovereignty-EU relationship 
cannot be understood in those terms and this thesis will not focus on devolution.  
  As for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in relation to the Human Rights 
Act 1998, as Anthony Bradley writes, it “…has often been seen as a massive obstacle in 
the way of any significant increase in the formal protection given to human rights in UK 
law.” (Bradley, 2011, p. 61). However, the European Court of Human Rights is not part of 
the EU architecture – which is the key reason why it is not the subject of this thesis. There 
is some relevance however of the European Court of Human Rights because as well as 
strengthening the ability of courts to protect human rights, it empowered the courts to 
pursue judicial review with the power to strike down invalid legislation. In this thesis, there 
will be, through example, an examination of the European Court of Justice and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights which will, in part, overlap with the power of the European Court 
of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the 1998 Act 
only allowed that subordinate legislation not compatible with Convention rights could be 
quashed or disapplied. So primary legislation such as Acts of Parliament which were not 
compatible with Convention rights remained in force but the High Court would issue a 
‘declaration of incompatibility’ where ministers would be expected to remedy or make 
amendments to remedy the Act in order to remove the incompatibility. Courts and tribunals 
had to act in accordance with Convention rights and must take into account Strasbourg 
Court decisions. Ministers in Parliament in charge of a government Bill must issue a 
statement of the Bill’s compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Bradley, 2011, p. 64). So whereas the courts cannot strike down the Acts of Parliament in 
that context, EU legislation has direct legal supremacy and European institutions can 
politically act in accordance with that legal power. This thesis is inherently focused on the 
politics of sovereignty (or absence of it) and the feature of the European institutions as 
political actors relative to parliamentary sovereignty, which is both legally and politically 
direct. There is no need to refer to a ‘declaration of incompatibility’, nor judicial review, in 
this thesis because parliamentary sovereignty is considered in the context of the political 
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power exercised by EU institutions, with their respective powers, and the role of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) since it provides the EU with the most ultimate and direct 
supremacy of EU law, direct effect in the courts, an official Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and with overarching jurisdictional power. 
  The challenge of EU membership sets itself apart from other constitutional 
challenges. It entails government ministers delegating more powers to EU institutions with 
which it engages through the Council of Ministers and European Council. It entails an 
elevation of national judicial architecture in its relationship with the Luxembourg court 
system. It entails perhaps most importantly a decline in the ability of national parliaments 
to scrutinize the executive branch of their national governments effectively. EU 
membership impacts upon Parliament’s sovereignty because the European Parliament’s 
effective powers understood in the context of the post-Lisbon Treaty provisions has meant 
that national parliaments now operate within a new ‘tricameral’ model in which national 
parliaments constitute a lower order, third chamber in a reconfigured representative system 
for the EU (Cooper, 2015; Cooper, 2013; Miller, 2012).  
However, that does not apply to the UK, for almost without exception, “national 
parliaments are unequivocally considered the ‘losers’ in European integration because of 
their severe loss of competencies” (Sprungk, 2013, p. 298, contra Rizzuto, 2003). This 
thesis is only concerned, therefore, with the impact of EU membership – including the 
political supremacy of EU institutions, with the direct supremacy of EU law, direct effect 





The following chapter (Chapter 2) reviews the definition of parliamentary sovereignty 
which can be better framed by reassessing the original definitions of ‘sovereignty’ as a 
ranking of principles, in which the fundamental/ultimate rule located at the helm trumps all 
others on a continuing basis. The description of sovereignty as an ultimate rule which 
permits the steering, direction or control of the powers of the Crown to govern the realm is 
helpful. It sets out the power of law-making and ensuring the execution of the laws it has 
made, within the territory of the Government of the United Kingdom. However, that 
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provides a contemporary understanding with only a basic guidance for a definition, 
because classical descriptions of sovereignty intrinsically suppose both that: 
(i) sovereignty is intrinsically historical and that;  
(ii) sovereignty must mean not only law-making but a form of ‘governing at the 
helm’ of the ship of state, in which politics and law are historically co-
dependent.  
However, legal and political theory inherits, in the contemporary mainstream, a neo-
Diceyan tradition which divorces Parliament’s sovereignty from its historical precedents 
and customs and divorces the highest law-making authority from the highest political 
authority. In other words, the ultimate rule recognising that a sovereign entity exists is 
divorced from the very political ‘helm’ of the state in which it is said to be located.  
  Yet, Herbert Hart’s legal theory came very close to addressing those concerns by 
asserting that ‘What the Queen in Parliament enacts is law’ is a social ‘rule of recognition’ 
in the UK legal system because it states the conditions any rule must satisfy in order for 
that rule to impose obligations as valid law and settlement (Hart, 1997). By modifying the 
rule of recognition to embrace a form of sovereignty, it is possible to recognise the 
relevance of medieval sovereignty at the ‘helm’ of the medieval state, which meant that the 
law and the law-making sovereign were “mutually conditioned”, contingent, reciprocal and 
interdependent at the helm, even though the sovereign retained the power to govern the 
realm (Kantorowicz, 1957, pp. 153, 155). By embracing an alternative political 
constitutionalist model, the rule of the recognised helm, it becomes necessary to compare 
and refute other leading legal and political theories which place popular (Bogdanor, 2016; 
Bogdanor, 2012; Bogdanor, 2009a) and legal (e.g. Allan, 2013; Allan, 2011) limitations 
upon legislative supremacy.  
Those theories open the way both for inaccurate notions that the voluntary 
European Communities Act 1972 substantively and legally limited Parliament, not to 
mention the neo-Diceyan weakness of simply equating parliamentary sovereignty with 
legal supremacy. Political constitutionalism, in this sense, offers an alternative explanation 
of Parliament’s sovereignty in the UK constitution because ‘the rule of the recognised 
helm’ is both a fundamental rule of government and it is a helm which defines political 
actors, their uncodified relations and conventions between the executive, the legislature, 




  Chapter 3 follows up on the claim that a ‘rule of the recognised helm’ is essential to 
understanding parliamentary sovereignty, as both a legal and political concept, by 
explaining how that essential sovereignty deferred to Parliament has been made 
historically operable at different stages. If there is to be a Hartian ultimate rule which 
provide the conditions another rule must satisfy in order for that rule to impose obligations 
as valid law (Hart, 1997) and political settlement, it must be necessary to provide the 
historically precedented conditions of the social rule. The second chapter is devoted to the 
innovative development and explanation of eight historical constitutional forms for that 
purpose: 
(i) ‘What the Crown-with-magnates enacts is law’ (1200-1350) 
(ii) ‘What the Crown-with-Commons enacts is law’ (1350-1532) 
(iii) ‘What the Crown-through-Parliament enacts is law’ (1533-1602) 
(iv) ‘What the Crown-with-disputed Parliament enacts is law’ (1603-1687) 
(v) ‘What the Crown-in-regulating Parliament enacts is law’ (1688-1689) 
(vi) ‘What the Crown-in-mixed constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ (1690-
1790s) 
(vii) ‘What the Crown-in-Parliamentary Cabinet enacts is law’ (1800-1972) 
(viii) ‘What the Crown-through-Parliamentary political elite with external bodies 
enacts is law’ (1973-present) 
Each historical constitutional form illustrates a different meaning attributed to the rule of 
the recognised helm, from its first form to its eighth contemporary form, in an episodical, 
partly-discontinuous approach. In terms of sovereignty understood as the modern Crown in 
Parliament, law and the electorate, the concept of parliamentary sovereignty has been left 
with an entrenched quandary in the eighth historical constitutional form: an executive-led 
Parliament delegates its law making capacity to other bodies / institutions who then impose 
external control, steerage and direction upon that law, so that those representatives who are 
elected to the House of Commons by the political community to make law no longer have 
that practical capacity, since its everyday capacity or competency, but not ultimate right, 
was voluntarily ceded under the European Communities Act 1972. An elective, delegated 
Parliament is in a political sense a contradiction. Parliament retains its ultimate sovereignty 
because it has the power to terminate or change that membership by repealing or amending 
the European Communities Act 1972 (Tomkins, 2010), or, for example, opting out of the 
single currency, and yet the 44-year everyday practice of choosing not to terminate or 
change substantial aspects of its Parliament-diminishing EU membership has been 
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imagined to leave that doctrine intact. Parliament is sovereign not because it is a principle 
to be weighed against others via judicial interpretation but because it is a historically 
institutionalised rule of the recognised helm which is dependent upon the customs, 
conventions and politics of past historical precedents. 
The incorporation of the EU into the recognised helm does not mean that the UK 
cannot voluntarily opt-out of other policies central to the EU. The Maastricht Treaty had 
incorporated a commitment to proceeding to European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) by 1999 at the latest – but for the UK’s purposes, John Major negotiated an opt-out 
on this policy. Gamble (2012, p. 473) describes the Maastricht Treaty as part of “the new 
impulse to integration” during the 1980s, committing the European member states to ever-
closer “European Union” and to the introduction of a single currency. The UK did not 
accede to the single currency and its opt-out clause was one of the conditions given which 
had to be met if the British government were to give its approval to the Treaty as a whole. 
The opt-out was at least, in part, designed to assure that the UK’s domestic incorporation 
of the Treaty respected the UK’s parliamentary sovereignty (Adler-Nissen, 2011, p. 1094). 
The UK therefore follows an independent monetary policy. It uses the pound sterling, not 
the euro currency. It maintains a floating exchange rate regime against the euro. The 
Conservative Government under Major defended the opt-out primarily on an economic 
basis – rather than an issue of constitutional or political principle – that if the UK were to 
“move to a single currency and it was to be successful, you would need proper 
convergence of the economies across Europe” (Major, 1994). Those convergence criteria 
could not be met at that time. Similarly, the subsequent New Labour government in 2003 
assessed whether the euro was in the UK’s economic interests by setting out ‘five 
economic tests’ concerning the convergence between the economies of the Eurozone – 
which, again, were not met and again, confirmed the original opt-out decision. The UK’s 
broader political debate over the Maastricht Treaty was an exemplary case in the history of 
the EU Treaties on the basis that the UK Parliament disputed the Crown-in-Parliament’s 
own powers relative to the competences set out within the European Treaties. In Britain, 
this was met by widespread public opposition and parliamentary rebellion when the 
governing Conservative party was “torn apart by the civil war” over the Maastricht Treaty 
(Gamble, 2012). In the course of events, the UK’s ‘awkwardness’ had been accommodated 
through ‘variable geometry’ (Geddes, 2013, p. 62), affirming that the UK proceeds with a 
form of ‘flexible engagement’ (Geddes, 2013, p. 255). In this instance, the UK’s Major 
government secured two opt-outs on the Maastricht treaty: (i) deferring a decision on 
participating on the final stage of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and; 
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(ii) the Social Chapter (Gowland et al., 2010, p. 103). They are often described as John 
Major’s “negotiating triumphs” (Gamble, 2012). The political controversy and the events 
surrounding the UK’s opting out of the single currency are relevant because MPs in 
Parliament disputed its own sovereignty on the basis of the principles of competences 
which it was being asked by its incumbent Government to transfer to the European 
institutions. The opting out of the single currency illustrates that Parliament has a hand at 
the recognised helm, albeit it is not the only hand. The 44-year practice of incorporating 
the EU into the recognised helm does mean the UK can voluntarily and politically opt-out 
of other policies central to the EU, including the ability to opt out of the single currency.  
 Chapter 4 argues that Parliament has become practically less sovereign because, 
since 1973, the UK’s governing helm has had the EU institutions incorporated into it – this 
has led to a fusion of the executive with EU machinery, the dilution of the domestic 
legislature and the fusion of the judiciary with the Luxembourg court system, which 
impacts upon and unsettles the political strength of parliamentary sovereignty. That 
explanation of parliamentary sovereignty impacts upon the sixth of the eight historical 
constitutional forms, reflected in the views of Sir William Blackstone (1765), Edmund 
Burke (1774) and Montesquieu (1748) in the eighteenth century, in which the status of the 
ultimate rule in the sixth historical constitutional form of ‘What the Crown-in-mixed 
constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ required balance against its political custom of the 
mixed constitution to support the rule. The mixed constitution has generally been 
employed in relation to the British constitution, when it is said that the monarchic, 
aristocratic Lords and democratic Commons powers were able to check one another (Kors, 
2012; Jenkins, 2011; Gagarin, 2010; Lieberman, 2006; Bellamy, 1996, p. 441; Blythe, 
1992, p. 12), while retaining the benefits of each in a balanced constitution (Blackstone, 
1765, pp. 50-2; Lieberman, 2006, p. 318). The contemporary, changing relationships 
between the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the electorate have altered 
remarkably because of the interaction with the EU (Jack et al., 2011, p. viii). By 
recognising the contemporary relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and the 
tripartite mixed constitutional model in contemporary constitutional arrangements, 
contrasts can be made with Vernon Bogdanor’s (2009a) constitutional state theory, or 
Martin Loughlin’s (2010) theory in which a tripartite structure has given way to complex 
arrangements of other executive bodies. By drawing on those contrasts, it is proposed that 
the case study of the EU-level Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) is a demonstration that the 
EU institutions incorporated into the UK’s recognised helm has, through this unsettling of 
the historical precedented mixed constitution model, impacted upon and unsettled 
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parliamentary sovereignty. After all, on the very issue of taxation itself, the 1689 Bill of 
Rights establishes for the House of Commons a sole right to authorise taxation and the 
level of financial supply to the Crown.  
 Chapter 5 develops the argument that Parliament has become practically less 
sovereign because the UK’s helm of state has had European Parliament-level 
parliamentary representation competing over it, not for individual interests, but over its 
capacity to collectively represent its electors. In the sixth constitutional form, the ultimate 
rule required balance against its political conditions, including collective representation, to 
support the rule. That the UK Parliament has become less sovereign due to the distorting of 
its capacity to collectively represent is consistent with the European Parliament 
exemplifying a high level of specialist ‘functional’ representation, a shared neo-corporatist 
emphasis with the central EU institutions, its reliance on ‘constitutionalisation’ as a means 
to strengthen its representative linkages and a role of party and management of political 
partisanship. The case study of the Working Time Directive lays bare that the UK 
governing helm of state has had European Parliament-level parliamentary representation 
competing in its capacity to collectively represent its electors. That competition produces 
an unsettling of Westminster’s historically precedented capacity to collectively represent 
its electors as strongly embedded within previous historical constitutional forms, thereby 
diluting the strength of parliamentary sovereignty.  
  Chapter 6 goes on to argue that Parliament is effectively less sovereign because the 
recognised helm has had EU-level fundamental rights schemes incorporated into it. The 
historical precedents of Bracton (in the first historical constitutional form) present a 
constitution in which governing at the helm is presented as legally distinct but politically 
contingent upon its capacity to determine and respect fundamental rights. Under EU 
membership, EU fundamental rights schemes protected by the courts become 
constitutionally elevated, entrenched in codes of written and legal form. As such, rights are 
expressed as unchallengeable instruments above politics – complete with EU legal 
supremacy, direct effect and ECJ jurisdiction – relative to the historically precedented and 
minimalist protection afforded by Parliament. The submission of the domestic legislature 
to the courts, along with a final binding effect upon the executive, impacts upon and dilutes 
the strength of parliamentary sovereignty. This chapter appeals to the political 
constitutionalist tradition, addressing the primacy of political legitimacy and democratic 
parliamentary majorities over constitutional entrenchment and the contemporary narrow 
determination of rights by courts. Notably, the case study of the EU free movement right 
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makes evident that the recognised helm has had EU rights incorporated into its 
constitution, leading to the elevation of the judiciary as a rights-adjudicating court system 
as it fuses ever-closer into the Luxembourg court system. This has meant the dilution of the 
domestic legislature as a rights-providing institution. The deep political claims made to the 
constitutional and institutional entrenchment of the rights themselves, irrespective of 
political legitimacy, combined with the disappearing consensus between the arms of state 
and community in protecting rights has progressed this continued legislative decline and 
judicial advance in the UK, impacting upon the resettling of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 Chapter 7 holds that Parliament becomes practically less sovereign when the UK’s 
helm of state has had EU-level decision-making incorporated into it. It directly reduces 
parliamentary ultimate decision-making power over political decisions as exercised by the 
Government-in-Parliament on behalf of its electors. Where the UK Parliament has become 
less sovereign due to the incremental removal of parliamentary power over policy and law, 
it provides an executive-legislature gap. David Cameron’s Prime Ministerial-led 
renegotiation ahead of the EU Referendum provided significant evidence of the executive-
legislative gap under EU membership. Since the EU Referendum of June 2016, 
Parliament’s ultimate power to decide on the UK’s EU relationship permits the executive 
to pursue a constitutional resettlement, if it so chooses, addressing the historical dilution of 
parliamentary powers. In so doing, as the UK seeks to un-incorporate EU-level decision-
making by pursuing a policy of leaving the EU, the barebones of parliament’s potential 
regaining of its ultimate decision-making power which reaffirm Parliament as sovereign 
are evident (contra Mabbett, 2017). Such a step signifies the realignment of Parliament 
with a historically precedented basis in which the operation of Parliament’s ultimate 
decision-making power over political decisions was maintained by the Government-in-
Parliament on behalf of its electors. The historical constitutional forms, as precedents, 
present a British constitution in which governing at the helm is presented as dependent 
upon both historical constitutional form six and eight accumulatively acting as guides for 
ultimate decisions on vital issues being taken by consent in the deliberative assembly in the 
recognised helm. They are both dependent upon Dicey’s principle of government by 
consent. This has been interwoven into the contemporary powers of Parliament to 
outsource that decision-making capacity over political decisions. By considering the UK’s 
holding of referendum on the EU, several developments suggest a major, if not enhanced 
role for politics in determining the character of Parliament’s sovereignty. This suggests the 
holding of the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU has enhanced, not 
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eroded, the principle of representative government (McKibbin, 2017, p. 385) and 
Parliamentary sovereignty.  
So, the next chapter turns to a review of the definition of UK parliamentary 
sovereignty which can be better framed by reassessing the original definitions of 
‘sovereignty’ as a ranking of the most fundamental/ultimate rule located at the helm 
trumping all others on a continuing basis. It is a notion of sovereignty in Parliament which 
permits the steering, direction or control of the powers of the Crown to govern the realm; 
and intrinsically supposes both that sovereignty is historical and that it enables both law-
making and ‘governing at the helm’ of the ship of state, in which politics and law are 
historically co-dependent. It seeks to consider UK parliamentary sovereignty as both a 
fundamental rule of government and a broader helm which defines political actors and 






Chapter 2: the meaning(s) of sovereignty, parliamentary sovereignty and the ‘rule of 
recognised helm’ 
 
The central argument of this chapter begins by reviewing the definition of parliamentary 
sovereignty and examining the locating of the ultimate rule permitting the steering, 
direction or control of the powers of the Crown to govern the realm. It is intrinsically 
historical and means not only law-making but a form of ‘governing at the helm’ of the ship 
of state, in which politics and law are historically co-dependent. Parliament’s sovereignty 
in the UK constitution is approached as ‘the rule of the recognised helm’. It is both a 
fundamental rule of government and as a helm which defines political actors, their 
uncodified relations and conventions between the executive, the legislature, the judiciary 
and the electorate in their tacit consent/recognition of a rule providing for sovereignty.  
It is first considered that the definition and explanation of parliamentary sovereignty 
can be better understood by turning to classical and original definitions in which 
sovereignty implies: 
• supremacy as a ranking of principles or rules;  
• government at the helm as a steering, direction and control over the governance of 
the realm;  
• imperium, as the commanding power of government to legislate and execute laws;  
• its continuation/succession and;  
• its territory, or dominium.  
The sovereignty of Parliament is, in that brief sense, a ranking of principles, in which the 
fundamental/ultimate rule located at the helm trumps all others on a continuing basis to 
permit the steering, direction or control of the powers of the Crown to govern the realm by 
the power of law-making and ensuring the execution of the laws it has made, within the 
territory of the Government of the United Kingdom. However, that provides a 
contemporary understanding with only a basic guidance for a definition, because those five 
features suppose that (i) sovereignty is intrinsically historical and that; (ii) sovereignty 
must mean not only law-making but a form of ‘governing at the helm’ of the ship of state, 
in which politics and law are historically co-dependent. Government (or, gubernaculum) at 
the Crown’s helm of the ship of state, is the ability to steer, direct and control that which is 
necessary for the governance of the realm. The classical concept of gubernātiō is 
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“steering; direction, control” but most importantly, gubernaculum is seen as the “helm of 
the ‘ship of state’ (Morwood, 2005), expressed as raw political sovereignty ‘at the helm’. 
  Yet, legal and political theory inherits in the contemporary mainstream, a neo-
Diceyan tradition. That tradition has, on the one hand, dealt so precisely with the axiom of 
legal supremacy – to make or unmake any law – as understood by the common lawyer and 
the courts. It has, on the other hand, enabled the national Parliament, judges, and courts to 
inhabit a sphere of quasi-silence on the primacy of its political institutions, including 
parliamentary primacy itself, and deeper arrangements defined in the national 
constitutional character (e.g. Russell, 1987, p. 545). It divorces Parliament’s sovereignty 
from its historical precedents and customs and divorces the highest law-making authority 
from the highest political authority. In other words, the ultimate rule recognising that a 
sovereign entity exists is divorced from the very political ‘helm’ of the state in which it is 
said to be located. 
  What is absent in Dicey and what is required in a theory of Parliament’s 
sovereignty is the assumption of an ultimate rule directing and steering government, 
through Parliament, and which can be recognised by others as providing the capacity to 
enable government. Hart came close to that understanding by asserting that ‘What the 
Queen in Parliament enacts is law’ is a ‘rule of recognition’ in the UK legal system 
because it states the conditions any rule must satisfy in order for that rule to impose 
obligations as valid law (Hart, 1997). Yet, even where Hart argues for a rule of 
recognition, it becomes almost purely a legal rule for validating law even though it is 
referred to as social (Perry, 2015, p. 284), thereby eliminating the role of the helm of state 
in making Parliament sovereign. 
Hart’s rule of recognition requires some political modification. Such an amendment 
must seek to embrace a form of sovereignty which is both intrinsically historical and in 
which politics and law are interdependent at the helm, even though the sovereign retained 
the power to govern at the helm of the ship of state. This is to refute other leading legal and 
political theories, not merely the neo-Diceyan inheritance of the English lawyers. 
Constitutional state theory, under Vernon Bogdanor’s (2009a) approach, for example 
abandons rule-recognition in favour of a rearranged, modern, popular constitutional state. 
From Bogdanor’s ‘popular sovereignty’ perspective, the modern theory of a popular 
constitutional state directly seeks to affirm the primacy of electors as delegating their 
representatives in the representation process at the expense of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, when the electorate should be considered as steering and directing that 
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sovereignty. The direct ‘popular sovereignty’ representation attempts to misconstrue what 
it perceives as the old, faded, doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  
  The need for a ‘political’ theory also develops out of the refutation of radical 
common law constitutionalism for favouring the sovereignty of the law of the courts over 
the law of the democratic, sovereign decision-making of Parliament. The common law 
tradition holds parliamentary sovereignty is founded on a common law foundation – and 
this has a strong relationship with the proposition that parliamentary sovereignty has been 
limited by EU law (Allan, 2013). It turns on the incorrect assumption that the power of the 
law of the courts explicitly makes Parliament sovereign. There is a recognition of certain 
limits as substantive limitations upon legislative supremacy, which opens the way both for 
inaccurate notions that the voluntary European Communities Act substantively and legally 
limited Parliament, not to mention the neo-Diceyan weakness of simply equating 
parliamentary sovereignty with legal supremacy.  
  The school of common law radicalism has nevertheless continued to pursue its 
questionable abandonment of rule of recognition based on the earlier theories of the moral 
constitutionalist tradition of Dworkin (1977) and neo-Dworkinian theory for asserting that 
Hart’s ultimate rule should be assigned a metaphorical weight relative to other principles, 
on the basis of widening the scope of judicial interpretation, and can therefore ultimately 
be rejected. Against that background, it might be considered that parliamentary 
sovereignty’s form, and the restriction and extension of powers which enable that form, 
demonstrate that it is not an exercise in legal logic or the recognition of fundamental 
principles of morality, according to moral theory, as those factors may mediate the 
sovereignty claim, but the claim itself is rooted in political condition (Loughlin, 2010, pp. 
236-7). 
  Political constitutionalism can offer an alternative explanation of Parliament’s 
sovereignty in the UK constitution. In the constitution, ‘the rule of the recognised helm’ 
becomes necessary because it is both a fundamental rule of government and it is a helm 
which defines political actors, their uncodified relations and conventions between the 
executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the electorate in their tacit consent/recognition 
of a rule providing for sovereignty. Why should it otherwise be necessary to equate the 
recognition of the rule of Parliament’s sovereignty with only the law of Parliament i.e. 
statute (Dicey, 1964) or increasingly the recognition of statute by the common law of the 
courts (Allan, 2011, 2013) or increasingly by the people (Bogdanor, 2009a)? The central 
place of representative, parliamentary government which affirms the ultimate rule 
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adequately expresses the supreme role of the legislature, as elected and steered by the 
people, but also a subsidiary role of the judiciary, and their elected government, in 
providing recognition to the rule. Understanding parliamentary sovereignty in terms of a 
political constitutional model of the state enables it to be viewed through an explanatory 
framework within which to make sense of our constitutional self-understandings (Gee and 
Webber, 2010), be it political or legal. If government is by definition the agency authorised 
by law to issue laws, the rule of law can barely constrain the rule of persons (Bellamy, 
2007). Such a model reaffirms the essential and elective nature of political institutions, 
including Parliament, acting through very ordinary political and legislative processes to 
determine its sovereignty.  
    
The five principles of the meaning of sovereignty 
 
The meaning of sovereignty itself is important to unbundle before one can begin with the 
meaning of parliamentary sovereignty. If sovereignty could be generally conceived of as 
the continued supremacy to rule over a given territory, there are identifiable features of that 
sovereignty formula that have occupied a primacy within that concept. The five following 
concepts are fundamental to my unbundling of the concept of sovereignty. The narratives 
of sovereignty are found within a rich interweaving of its medieval and modern forms, 
usually to provide political stability and anchorage.  
  Firstly, supremacy is central because what legal and political theorists such as Hart 
have attempted to identify is the ultimate rule, where assessing the ‘rule of recognition’ 
will provide the criteria by which the validity of all other rules are judged. That ultimate 
rule provides a rule of recognition providing the criteria by which the validity of other 
rules in the legal system is assessed (Hart, 1997, pp. 102-3). Supremacy, in a general sense, 
has simply meant “the state or condition of being superior to all others in authority, power, 
or status: the supremacy of the king” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017). Theories of 
sovereign authority have long rested upon the claims of supreme and absolute authority in 
the polity (Bartelson, 2011).  
  Secondly, specific priority in understanding sovereignty is also given to the 
meaning of government at the recognised helm. With reference to Henry de Bracton’s 
medieval constitutionalism, he essentially divided the total act of the Crown’s government 
as gubernaculum from the claims of fundamental law, jurisdictio (McIlwain, 1947, p. 86). 
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That is, Government is separated from law. As Vile argues, the limitations placed upon the 
Crown by subjecting him to a fundamental law which he did not himself make provided 
the basis for a legislative power which was independent of the will of the King. That went 
hand in hand with the idea of an executive power in the King, to ensure that the law was 
put into effect (Vile, 1967: 23). While the distinction made by McIlwain has often been 
thought of as less than convincing (Corwin, 1941, p. 535), it is the gubernaculum that is 
primary feature. It is the Crown’s helm of the ship of state, which steers, directs and 
controls that which is necessary for the governance of the realm. It is often overlooked that 
the proper classical concept of gubernātiō is “steering; direction, control” and most 
importantly, gubernaculum is seen as the “helm of the ‘ship of state’ (Morwood, 2005) – it 
is raw political sovereignty. That ‘taking of the helm’ is often recognised as government 
being exercised by a given political actor or set of actors, be it the Crown, officials or 
governments, and irrespective of Hart’s narrow contemporary emphasis on law (as 
opposed to habit, obedience, coercion, etc), focused on how they are seeking to maintain 
that position. Sovereignty becomes a necessary feature of politics, in principle and as 
exercised.  
  Thirdly, one of the classical and Roman forms of sovereignty (Imperium) has been 
that the power of government to legislate and execute laws (Fellmeth and Horwitz, 2009) 
and ultimately, the “Latin word for a command, which grew to signify the right to give 
orders, and so to mean supreme power…” (Morwood, 2005). Imperium of the Roman 
Empire is characterised as the unlimited discretionary authority to issue commands 
carrying the binding, statutory force of law (Lee, 2016, p. 18). For Hobbes, imperium itself 
is rule (Hoekstra, 2013, p. 1095-6). When observing the capacity to make law in the 
transformation of the sovereign structure in England, then the UK, in the past seven 
hundred years, constitutional theorists are attempting to indicate the structure of office and 
institutions of the sovereign, for example, from: 
• the Crown; 
• the Crown-consulting-Parliament;  
• the Crown-ruling-with-Parliament;  
• the Crown-ruling-through-Parliament;  
• the Parliament-rules-with-the-Crown;  
• the Crown-in-Parliament;  
• the Parliament-rules-through-Parliament; 
• Parliament-rules-through-Parliament and external agency/body. 
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It only tells us about the nature of office. But detailed analyses of sovereignty require more 
than that. How have they maintained their sovereignty, as exercised – as edict, norms, 
moral guidance or laws? Modern sovereignty came to rest not on law generally or the legal 
order itself (as Allan, 2010, p. 27, maintains) but legal sovereignty established through 
Parliament and its enactments. It is possible to concede – with Bodin (1576) and Hobbes 
(1651) – that in that modern form, law is the major requirement. The notion of sovereignty 
invariably depends upon supreme authority combined with a supreme law and a supreme 
law-making capacity (i.e. a parliament). Lords Scarman and Hailsham’s questioning over 
the modern executive-in-Parliament’s total control over law (Scarman, 1992; Hailsham, 
1976) are even approached as the problematic “imperium of Executive Government” 
(Kirby, 2006, p. 466). So strong is the claim to law-making as the basis of sovereignty that 
legal theorists (for example, Law and Martin, 2009) tend to define sovereignty merely in 
terms of that which has ultimate authority to impose law on everyone else in the state and 
to alter any pre-existing law.    
  Fourthly, the role of sovereignty as continuation, or succession of political 
authority, is of relevance since in contemporary legal and political theory, Hart's 1961 
legal exposition of sovereignty, The Concept of Law, provides a necessary explanation 
of legal sovereignty on the assumption that it must be characteristic of a legal system to 
possess a continuity of law-making power by a set of rules bridging the succession from 
one law-giver to another law-giver in advance (Hart, 1997, p. 53). Where a new Parliament 
begins to legislate, it is clear that there is a definite and established rule providing him or 
her – as a (new) line of persons – the right to do this when it is their turn. It is often 
recognised that a fundamental aspect of the rule of sovereignty, including for Dicey (1964) 
and Hart (1997), is that ‘no Parliament can bind its successors’. The Crown-in-Parliament 
is preserved throughout changes of successive legislators – by it resting on generally 
accepted fundamental rules. That general acceptance is dispersed between officials and 
ordinary citizens. In doing so, they collectively affirm the continuation of sovereign power.  
  Fifthly, sovereignty is also defined with strong reference to territorial boundaries 
(Bartelson, 2011; Holland, 2010; Ruggie, 1993). One of the foundational claims to 
sovereignty is that of the concept of territory, or dominium, meaning the state’s claim to all 
the territory where it is located (Grant and Barker, 2009). Dominium has been defined as 
“the power of a state to exercise supreme authority (absolute sovereignty) over all persons 
and things within its territory” (Law, 2017). The state possesses the only legitimate voice, 
diplomatic influence and arms for the community within its territory to assert its 
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sovereignty. Nothing else can. A convincing analysis presented by Spruyt (1996) asserts 
that sovereignty changed the structure of the international system when political authority 
was based on territorial exclusivity. The key elements of the modern state, internal 
hierarchy and external autonomy, in the Late Middle Ages, were responsible for this 
development. It is therefore defined by territory which for Spruyt is bound up with 
centralised decision-making authority.  
  It is a thorny problem to explicate a complete and parsimonious theory of 
sovereignty in the abstract when assessing parliamentary sovereignty but it might aid the 
explanation of parliamentary sovereignty to accept in general terms the criterion set out in 
Box 2.1.  
 
Box 2.1: Sovereignty 
(i) implies supremacy as a ranking of principle;  
(ii) confers gubernaculum as steering, direction and control over the governance of 
the realm;  
(iii) consists of imperium, the commanding power of government to legislate and 
execute laws;  
(iv) relates to its continuation/ successors; 
(v) its territory, or dominium. 
 
 
The sovereignty of Parliament is, in this sense, a ranking of principles and, in which the 
fundamental/ultimate rule located at the helm trumps all others on a continuing basis to 
permit the steering, direction or control of the powers of the Crown to govern the realm by 
the power of law-making and ensuring the execution of the laws it has made, within the 
territory of the Government of the UK.  
  The working definition is conditional and dependent upon the five features of 
sovereignty discussed above. The features themselves reflect the assumption that one form 
of sovereignty should not be viewed as operating linearly from antiquity to medieval and 
modern forms. The features explain both that: 
• Sovereignty is intrinsically historical. Sovereignty is predicated on a competition 
between rules in which a more supreme ultimate rule (or set of rules) permits 
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government and which can be recognised by others, including its competitors, as 
providing that capacity to enable government.  
• Sovereignty requires a form of ‘governing at the helm’ of the ship of state to steer, 
direct and control the realm. Sovereignty requires a power of government to 
legislate and execute the laws, an authority buttressed by a supreme law in which 
politics and law are frequently co-dependent. It is also identified that the succession 
of law-making power and definition of territorial boundaries are instrumental 
political features in defining sovereignty and understanding its parameters. More 
concisely, the definition of sovereignty prioritises both the provision of a 
fundamental rule of recognition, in addition to government at the helm, in which 
law and politics are historically co-dependent.    
 
The meaning of Parliamentary sovereignty: the right to make or unmake any law  
 
It is to Dicey’s credit and his long-serving definition that it dealt so precisely with the 
axiom of legal supremacy as understood by the common lawyer and the courts. Yet, by 
dismantling the power of command behind law-making as well as government of the 
realm, as the political, institutional arrangement at the ‘helm of state’, Dicey (1964) 
effectively discarded the political sovereignty which left him only with barebones theory of 
legal supremacy, not parliamentary sovereignty. On a legal basis, the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, as defined by the seminal work on this concept, A. V. Dicey 
(1835-1922) referred to that sovereignty as defined by 
• A positive limb, expressed as the “… right to make or unmake any law whatever” 
and; 
• A negative limb, expressed as “that no person or body is recognised by the law of 
England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.” 
(Dicey, 1964, pp. 39-40).  
Dicey (1964) confusingly refers to the doctrine as both the “dominant characteristic of our 
political institutions” and yet it is only “a legal fact, fully recognised by the law of 
England” (Dicey, 1964, p. 39). He accepts it affirms the unlimited legislative authority of 
Parliament, although by practicality and common sense, he accepts it does not e.g. there 
are some tyrannical laws which could not pass (Dicey, 1964, p. 41). For Dicey, the 
supremacy over any competing legislative power in his definition applies only to the 
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Crown, each House of Parliament, the constituencies and the law courts in the English 
constitution – certainly, not the European Communities or Union, which did not exist in 
Dicey’s age.  
For Dicey, all judicial legislation is subordinate and cannot be considered to be 
inconsistent with the supremacy of Parliament primarily because judges, following 
precedents, do not claim to exercise any power to repeal a statute whilst Acts of Parliament 
on the other hand may override the law of judges (Dicey, 1964, p. 60). Moral law cannot 
limit it because morality cannot invalidate an Act of Parliament before a court. For Dicey, 
even Royal prerogative powers can be regulated or abolished by Acts of Parliament 
(Dicey, 1964, p. 64). One central feature of parliamentary sovereignty for him is that one 
Parliament, by its enacted laws, cannot bind its successors. Dicey accepts the sovereign 
power is invested in Parliament but is critical and dismissive of sovereignty’s political 
dimension, as opposed to its strict legal sense (Dicey, 1964, p. 73). Even though Dicey is 
considerate of representative government, and that the will of the electors will always in 
the end “assert itself as the predominant influence in the country”, he considers this only as 
a “political, not legal fact” (Dicey, 1964, p. 73). The courts take no notice of the will of the 
electors in making judicial decisions (Dicey, 1964, p. 73-4). It is notable, however, that 
Dicey assigns a sort of convenient, symbiotic, equivalence between the sovereignty of 
Parliament and the “the rule or supremacy of law” securing the rights of the individual 
(Dicey, 1964, p. 184, Chapter XIII), which can leave legal analysts in some confusion in 
the modern context.  
Dicey’s principle presents legal supremacy under the form of parliamentary 
sovereignty. It is not coincidental that most contemporary, neo-Diceyan legal scholarship 
refers to parliamentary sovereignty as legal supremacy of the Acts of Parliament. Dicey is 
critical of sovereignty’s political dimension because despite his embracing approach 
toward representative government and the rule of law, it cannot consider politics as 
relevant to Parliament’s sovereignty. That is chiefly because any constraint upon it must be 
recognised by the courts only, otherwise on Dicey’s terms, it does not exist. The 
elimination of politics and conventions helps to explain the confusing parity Dicey 
provides for parliamentary sovereignty and the supremacy of the rule of law (Francis and 
Morrow, 1994; Russell, 1987). To its credit, Dicey’s theory affirms an ultimate rule – the 
Crown in Parliament’s right to make or unmake any law – in the legal system (positive 
limb), supreme to other bodies (negative limb) in the eyes of the law of England. It is 
dismissive however of Parliament’s sovereignty enabling a co-dependence between law 
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and the politics of commanding and governing, because it is simply not concerned with 
government at the helm, merely the role of politics in its service to statute.  
 Parliament does retain the theoretical power to make or unmake any law, consistent 
with the positive limb of Dicey’s definition, even if it runs contrary to Community law and 
even where there may be political difficulties in pursuing that path. However, the negative 
limb provides that nobody may override or set aside an Act of Parliament. The difficulty 
here is that although that remains true in English law, the EC case law of the Court of 
Justice has since the early 1960s established that wherever there is a conflict between 
national law and Community law, EC law would prevail. It is therefore questionable as to 
whether, in all circumstances, a political body in England could not set aside an Act of 
Parliament. Parliament can still make or unmake any law whatsoever but it is only under 
English law (not EC law) that nobody may override or set aside a statute (Tomkins, 2010). 
To reclaim the ‘fullness’ of its sovereignty, its ultimate sovereignty, it could choose to 
repeal or further amend the European Communities Act 1972. There are in fact many 
examples of draft parliamentary Bills and amendments in Westminster which expressly 
negate the effect of the EU rule, although none have yet been enacted (Tomkins, 2010). 
The Repeal Bill under Theresa May’s post-2017 Conservative Government, if enacted, will 
end that supremacy of EU law in the UK by repealing the European Communities Act 
1972 (May, 2017a).  
  The modern British constitution’s rule of parliamentary sovereignty with respect to 
EU law – as expressed through the ongoing judgements of the courts (such as Lord 
Denning in Macarthys Ltd. v Smith [1980], Lord Diplock in Garland v BR Engineering 
[1983], Lord Bridge in Factortame [1990] and Lord Justice Laws in Thoburn [2002]) all 
confirm the ‘entirely voluntary’ nature of the UK entering into that arrangement under the 
European Communities Act 1972. The courts only act in such a way only because 
Parliament, through its legislative authority, told them to – if Parliament under that same 
authority told them not to do so, then they would obey that too (Bingham, 2010, p. 164). 
That entirely voluntary nature describes a pooled sovereignty which can be reclaimed. The 
theory demonstrates the quandary of the neo-Diceyan definition – it accurately accepts on 
the one hand the voluntary nature of Parliament in making or changing European 
arrangements via Acts of Parliament, whilst also, on the other hand, enabling the dilution 
of the role of national institutions and politics (including Parliament) and the politics of 
people as part of that.  
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 The neo-Diceyan definition has enabled the national Parliament, judges, and courts 
to inhabit a sphere of quasi-silence on the primacy of its political institutions, including 
parliamentary primacy itself, and deeper arrangements inhabiting the national 
constitutional character in the structure between the executive, the legislature, the judiciary 
and the electorate. Of considerable interest is one ECJ case confirming the supremacy of 
EU law in relation to principles of national fundamental rights and national constitutional 
character, Internationale Handelgesellschaft v Einfuhrhund Vorratsselle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] (see also Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 127). While it confirmed, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, that “the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of 
law, cannot because of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however 
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal 
basis of the Community itself being called into question”, it made a deeper political point 
about national constitutional character in relation to fundamental rights and EU – that “the 
validity of a Community measure or its effect within a member state cannot be affected by 
allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the 
constitution of that state or the principles of a national constitutional structure” 
(Internationale Handelgesellschaft v Einfuhrhund Vorratsselle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970]). Respect for fundamental rights, in other words, is not only integral to 
the principles of EU law protected by the Court of Justice but precedes consideration of the 
constitution of a state.  
Dicey knowingly divorced constitutional law from customs and conventions 
because the latter were not enforced by the courts (Allan, 2013; Dicey, 1964). Although 
Dicey accepted certain political customs, principles and rules as “the conventions of the 
Constitution” which regulate relationships (Russell, 1987, p. 545), he subverted them as 
non-legal additions to the constitution. For example, that the Prime Minister cannot remain 
in office without the support of a majority in the House of Commons is a constitutional 
convention only. The neo-Diceyan view suffers from seeking to divorce Parliament’s 
sovereignty from its historical precedents. It attempts to divorce the highest law-making 
authority from the highest political authority. The nineteenth century constitution was less 
focused on establishing clear links between sovereign power and individual rights (Francis 
and Morrow, 1994, p. 23). In other words, the consensual ultimate rule recognising that a 
sovereign entity exists is divorced from the very ‘helm’ of the state in which it is said to be 
located. Of course, law and law-giving are undeniable features but parliamentary 
sovereignty has no sovereign aspect if it does not first accept that its sovereign power is 
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lodged within its entrenched, widely recognised and organised pattern at the helm of the 
governing state.  
 
The meaning of Parliamentary sovereignty: the ‘rule of recognition’  
 
Sovereignty is predicated on a competition between rules in which a more supreme, 
ultimate rule permits government and which can be recognised by others as providing the 
capacity to enable government. Given the limitations of the neo-Diceyan view, this thesis 
moves towards Hart’s view which, like Dicey before him, refuted the earlier approach of 
John Austin that law consists of orders backed by threats. The legal system consists of 
social rules, according to Hart (Hart, 1997), but it is important that Hart is held to account 
on how those rules are genuinely social (Perry, 2015). He discards of sovereignty as 
explained by Hobbesian or Austinian habit of obedience because he believes that cannot 
explain rules themselves (see Shapiro, 2001, p. 156). Yet Hart does assert that ‘What the 
Crown in Parliament enacts is law’ is a ‘rule of recognition’ in the UK legal system 
because it states the conditions any rule must satisfy in order for that rule to impose 
obligations as valid law (Hart, 1997). Because of uncertainty, the static character of rules 
and inefficiency as basic defects in the primary rules of obligation, they are necessarily 
supplemented by secondary rules (Hart, 1997, p. 94). Hart’s reductionism is attributable to 
his distinct legal positivist approach which by its very definition, is a doctrine which holds 
not only that that what counts as law in any particular society is fundamentally a matter of 
social fact, rule or convention but that there is no necessary connection between law and 
morality (Leiter and Coleman, 2010). In the US, the rule is the constitution itself. Instead 
of using moral or political benchmarks, for assessing the validity of law, it is assessed and 
consensually accepted that private persons and officials are given the authoritative criteria 
for identifying primary rules of recognition (Hart, 1997), although some legal theorists 
assume the rule of recognition is upheld only by senior law-applying officials (see Shapiro, 
2001 contra Postema, 2008, p. 49; Goldsworthy, 1999). The rule of recognition affirms 
something fundamental about the operation of Parliament’s sovereignty.   
  Hart argues for a rule of recognition. This becomes almost purely a legal rule for 
validating law even though it is referred to as social (see Perry, 2015). It thereby eliminates 
the role of the recognised helm directing and commanding law-making. In a complex legal 
system, for Hart, law requires the union of primary and secondary rules – whereas primary 
rules impose obligations, secondary rules provide rules through which we can introduce, 
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modify or end those primary rules. Within secondary rules, Hart argues for a ‘rule of 
recognition’ – which is the rule that states the conditions any rule must satisfy in order for 
that rule to impose obligations as valid law (Hart, 1997, p. 94). That rule of recognition 
will provide some features which by that rule are a “conclusive affirmative indication” that 
it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts; even though in 
Hart’s words, little is said of the social pressure it exerts. It is explained as “Wherever such 
a rule of recognition is accepted, both private persons and officials are provided with 
authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules of obligation” (Hart, 1997, p. 100).  
By avoiding Hart’s legal reductionism, it seems reasonable to defend the operation 
of legal rules as social rules (Perry, 2015), requiring the consensus of state officials and 
private persons (Sciaraffa, 2011; Galligan, 2006, p. 65; Goldsworthy, 1999; Hart, 1997). In 
spite of Hart acknowledging the rule of recognition as a social rule, it is then treated as 
anything but social or political. In this specific sense, Tucker (2011) made a similar 
observation but it is not obvious that this results in an indeterminacy of the rule of 
recognition. It is not credible that contested norms/conventions result, as Allan (2013, p. 
54) proposes, in the ultimate rule being viewed as indeterminate. It is possible therefore to 
share Hart’s preoccupation with law as a social rule (Perry, 2015) and that a complex legal 
system requires a rule of recognition maintained by officials and private persons. It is 
possible to accept his expression of the rule of recognition while not sharing the neglect of 
parliamentary structure of law and state, which underpins the rule.  
  Legal and political theory should strive to explain the broader political and legal 
space and boundaries within which law is made and constrained, not merely law per se. 
While Hart’s amended version of legal positivist doctrine in terms of its normative and 
systematic assumptions of law does recognise law as social fact, that equally means 
acknowledging facts as social. The rule of recognition is an apolitical abstraction in 
explaining parliamentary government if it is not a rule of the recognised helm, for which 
we must first have some primacy accorded to the role of precedents and conventions 
existing within previous historical constitutional forms. The rule of recognition otherwise 
implies an abstract rule recognised as sovereign rather than the collective institutional 
framework of the state which operates within the rule.  
 Hart’s rule of recognition can be usefully modified politically. Such an amendment 
must seek to embrace a form of sovereignty which recognises and determines the ultimate 
rule. Hart’s original formula is one that requires recognition because in parliamentary 
terms it requires consent. It cannot exist as a standalone definition. Hart’s rule as ‘What the 
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Crown in Parliament enacts is law’ is a “rule of recognition” in the UK legal system. It 
states the conditions any rule must satisfy in order for that rule to impose obligations as 
valid law (Hart, 1997) and it confirms that ‘recognition’ is vital. On recognition, Postema 
(2008, p. 49) acknowledges that Hart himself recognized both that the fundamental rule of 
recognition must be accepted and practiced by law-applying officials, and also, that “the 
behaviour of most of the population governed by these norms must be in broad conformity 
with the system of legal norms traceable to the rule of recognition”.  Postema (2008) also 
observes that Hart was ‘silent’ about the status of the second condition and the relationship 
between the two ‘recognition’ conditions, which is central to the content of this thesis. By 
accepting Hart’s primary rule, this thesis argues that the secondary condition or sub-rules 
relate to recognition of rules by others which Hart did not consider or allude to.  
The silence however on legitimately expressing ‘recognition’ as consent by 
Parliament, public and officials explains the problem of understanding rules as social. 
Recognition is complex but it is meaningful to maintaining sovereignty (both internally 
and externally). It is broadly more constitutive of statehood and fulfils an inherently 
conservative function where it presupposes a world populated by distinct and bounded 
political communities (Bartelson, 2016, pp. 313, 319).  
Fundamentally, when fully expressed, the Hartian rule of recognition does strongly 
help to clarify the meaning of parliamentary sovereignty. It affirms the sovereignty 
conferred by an ultimate rule in an order of legal rules but in the absence of the power to 
command or govern through which the state organises its structure between the executive, 
the legislature, the judiciary and the electorate. What Hart had in fact acknowledged, but 
did not express, is a rule of the ‘recognised helm’, which addresses the political and legal 
space and boundaries within which law is made and constrained. The rule of the 
recognised helm combines the features of two existing theories – one of them is 
contemporary (Hart) and the other is traceable to a medieval understanding of sovereignty 
(Bracton).  
  The legal assertion that there is ‘sovereignty in Parliament’ implies specific steps 
are taken by Parliament to act and to legislate, namely Hart’s rule, ‘What the Crown in 
Parliament enacts is law’. Although the contemporary Parliament has broad functions in 
politics – to provide the government and thereafter support it, to scrutinise the work of 
government and to enable the government to raise taxes, not merely debating and passing 
all laws – it nonetheless returns to, and pursues Hart’s rule, in providing for a 
parliamentary process. In that process, a proposal for a new law, a Bill, that is presented for 
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debate in Parliament can be introduced by the House of Commons or House of Lords first 
(except in the case of Finance Bills) and when both have agreed on its content, then the 
reigning Crown approves it – it receives Royal Assent and becomes an Act of Parliament 
(UK Parliament, 2014). Understandably, the powers of the House of Lords are, to an 
extent, limited by the Parliament Acts. Since the monarch in modern time retains an 
important symbolic role – after administration of justice was removed from 1689 onwards 
and subsequent depoliticization – the everyday practical implementation of the Act of 
Parliament is the responsibility of ministers and their relevant government departments. 
The ‘Crown’ powers previously exercised by the reigning monarch have meant, in the 
present day, that ministers of the executive now exercise the majority of those powers. The 
powers of the Crown are in present times exercised by the executive through and on the 
advice of ministers accountable to Parliament (Jack et al., 2011) – in other words, only in 
so far as the executive retains the confidence of the legislature. That is what makes statute 
law. With the assertion of the authority to legislate also comes the capacity to take that law 
away i.e. by repeal, so that Parliament at all times retains a right to legislate as well as the 
reflexivity to take away that legislation without losing its successive and inherent function 
to make law. 
 
The meaning of Parliamentary sovereignty: the ‘rule of recognition’ and the contemporary 
British state  
 
There have been serious and substantive attempts by British constitutional theorists to 
describe the advanced, modern, political state architecture as eliminating the existence of 
the rule of recognition. On Bogdanor’s (2009a) argument by drawing a distinction between 
the old, traditional parliamentary sovereignty and the transition toward popular 
sovereignty, he asserts that there is a new British constitution with the Human Rights Act 
at its heart, EU membership since 1973, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish and regional 
devolution and the formation of a quasi-federal (rather than unitary) state, with a reformed 
House of Lords as primary features of the new constitution. In the view of constitutional 
state theorists like Bogdanor, parliamentary sovereignty is questionably being consigned to 
history, the next step being a central written constitution (Bogdanor, 2009a). The rule of 
recognition has been swept away. Bogdanor adopts a similar perspective to other ‘messy 
constitutionalists’, again, combining many of the features of the above, such as Anthony 
King, arguing there is a new British constitution under which “the British parliament is no 
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longer sovereign”, it is “a legal fiction … far more fictive than legal”, but accepting we 
have ended up with a constitutional ‘mess’, often citing the development of the EU (King, 
2007, p. 99; see also Mabbett, 2017).  
  However, although Bogdanor’s primary argument asserts that the Human Rights 
Act has created a ‘cornerstone’ of a new constitution (Baranger, 2010), by giving more 
power to courts vis-a-vis Parliament, he displaces the old principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty, a keystone of a framework underpinning the ‘old’ constitution. From 
Bogdanor’s ‘popular sovereignty’ perspective, the modern theory of a popular 
constitutional state directly seeks to affirm the primacy of electors as delegating their 
representatives in the representation process at the expense of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. Rather than viewing the electorate as steering and directing the exercise of 
parliamentary sovereignty in the recognised helm, it makes the people themselves 
sovereign. For Bogdanor, on the British model, those who enjoy the right to make political 
decisions are empowered to do so by virtue of the representative mandate they have 
received from the electorate. The direct ‘popular sovereignty’ representation attempts to 
misconstrue the parliamentary relationship between electors and trustees.  
The next step in moving away from Hart’s rule of recognition in Bogdanor’s 
(2009a) constitutional state is towards an entrenched and written constitution. A 
substantive aspect however of this move is “a quasi-federal territorial separation of powers 
between Parliament and the European Union” (Drewry, 2012, p. 533). While it is clear that 
Parliament has delegated a swathe of law-making powers to the EU, the suggestions of 
steps toward a written constitution seem unproven. It appears that the entrenchment of EU 
law has not led to the decaying of parliamentary sovereignty, as Bogdanor holds, in line 
with the radical version of the common law tradition. He argues EU law has become 
entrenched and not merely incorporated (Bogdanor, 2012, p. 184) but that has remained 
significantly contested because Parliament can only impose upon itself, not substantive 
limits, but limitations of “manner and form” i.e. courts only accept as law that which has 
been made in the proper legal form. The constitutional state view has, in other words, led 
to an exaggerated view of the binding nature of EU obligations. For Parliament to impose 
substantive limits upon itself it would have to alter its wider rule of recognition (see 
Goldsworthy, 2012, contra Bogdanor, 2012). An alternative view presented in this thesis is 
that the existence of the Hartian rule of recognition is dependent upon historical 
precedents. While it is disputed that the European Communities Act is viewed as directly 
affecting the Hartian rule of recognition in the UK, as Bogdanor asserts, how can that 
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occur by the legal entrenchment of that Act? It was a voluntary Act, passed by Parliament 
in 1972, and amended in similar vein, all perfectly consistent with the rule of recognition. 
So equally would its repeal by parliamentary enactment, for example, through the Repeal 
Bill. It might be accepted that a rule of recognition can be indirectly changed, but only by a 
change in the underlying historical precedents which determine the UK constitutional 
structure. The Hartian rule of recognition is as much political as legal. The fundamental 
point about parliamentary sovereignty is that the restriction and extension of powers which 
enable that form are not an exercise in the recognition of other, deeper, more fundamental 
principles of morality or common law principles which Bogdanor (2009a) strongly relies 
upon, because as Loughlin (2010) notes, those factors may mediate the sovereignty claim 
but the claim itself is rooted in deep-seated political conditions (Loughlin, 2010, pp. 236-
7).  
 
The meaning of Parliamentary sovereignty: the ‘rule of recognition’ and the common law 
 
Radical common law constitutionalism has provided a rationale for the abandonment of a 
rule of recognition when explaining parliamentary sovereignty and a brief response to that 
theory is necessary. In the law court system itself and legal constitutionalist circles, the 
meaning of the Diceyan definition has in recent years been widely questioned by common 
law constitutionalist radicals, including at the highest level by Government ministers 
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2010, p. 40; European Scrutiny Committee, 2010; 
Goldsworthy, 2010, pp. 14-5). Senior judges such as Lord Steyn maintain that “…the 
supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution. The judges 
created this principle …” (Lord Steyn (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Pierson [1998]). Lord Hope states, “Step by step, gradually but surely, the English 
principle of the absolute sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke and 
Blackstone is being qualified . . . The rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate 
controlling factor on which our constitution is based . . .” (Jackson v Attorney General 
[2006]). The radical common law tradition holds parliamentary sovereignty is founded on 
a common law foundation (Holdsworth, 1937) – and this has a strong relationship with the 
proposition that parliamentary sovereignty has been limited by EU law (see Young and 
Gee, 2016).  
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It mistakenly asserts that legal supremacy in the British constitution is understood 
as a rule of the common law, which, was created and may be altered by the courts. It 
assumes that the judges become superior to Parliament (Goldsworthy, 2010, p. 15). This 
“minority” view held among a “small handful of judges” (Young and Gee, 2016, p.15) 
explicitly asserts, however incorrectly, the power of the courts in making Parliament 
sovereign. This argument must be scrutinised because: 
• the law of judges is not a substitute for politics; 
• it misinterprets the historical foundation(s) of parliamentary sovereignty as having 
singular common law roots and; 
• political decisions in a parliamentary democracy ought to be made by 
representatives who can be removed (Tomkins, 2010; Griffith, 1985). 
Rather than consider a broader ‘rule of the recognised helm’ in explaining parliamentary 
sovereignty, common law radicalism asserts that Parliament’s sovereignty is to be treated 
as a product of, or controlled by, judge-made common law (Allan, 2013; Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2010, p. 40; Jackson v Attorney General [2006]; Lord Steyn 
[1998]). Dicey’s definition of parliamentary sovereignty and the contemporary 
employment of that definition in the neo-Diceyan tradition is accepted in the mainstream, 
albeit with increasing reservation in law and legal theory and “hotly contested” by the 
jurisprudence common law arguments of TRS Allan (2013). Common law interpretation to 
this extent only fails in its understanding that ultimate parliamentary sovereignty has not 
ever historically been comprehensively understood as the creation of that system 
(Tomkins, 2010; Goldsworthy, 1999, pp. 247-8).  
While a narrow band in the legal literature on the subject appears to accept some 
form of limitations as undermining the ultimate rule in its very character, it is not obvious 
that all those conditions merely become limits or boundaries upon legal or political 
supremacy (contra Allan, 2013, p. 140). As with Bogdanor (2012), there is an 
amplification of ‘manner and form’ limits, in which courts only accept as law that which 
has been made in the proper legal form, as substantive limitations upon legislative 
supremacy. This has opened the way both for inaccurate notions of the voluntary European 
Communities Act 1972 substantively and legally limiting Parliament, not to mention the 
neo-Diceyan weakness of simply equating parliamentary sovereignty with legal supremacy 
(e.g. Bradley, 2010; Allan, 2010). The Act, it is claimed, enabled Parliament to bind its 
successors (Allan, 2010; Wade, 1996). Given Hart’s understanding of the official 
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consensus to maintain the rule, it is not credible, or at least, very radical, to suggest that all 
the various contested norms, customs and connections should result in the ultimate rule 
being viewed as ‘indeterminate’ (e.g. Allan, 2013, p. 154; Tucker, 2011). Most historically 
precedented, political conditions or constitutional conventions have a reflexive, not 
necessarily conditional or causal role, in altering the rule (for example, see a legal 
positivistic account of that view in Jaconelli, 2005). Furthermore, there is little to no 
evidence to suggest that there has been a contemporary, measurable change in the 
consensual understanding of British legal officials that judges do not have the authority to 
declare a statute invalid (Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 253). That challenge to a form of judicial 
sovereignty is, however, not to deny the role and status of political sovereignty, or 
understanding how historical precedents have shaped parliamentary sovereignty.  
The rule of recognition does not derive its validity from judicial interpretation of 
the underlying principles of a political theory, as Allan maintains – which would place 
judges in a politically superior place to Parliament in the constitution – but from its 
capacity to express the conditions which will enable all other rules to impose obligations as 
valid law, consistent with its historically precedented political conventions. The assertions 
by judges of deeper principles of political morality behind the rule of recognition, 
including principles derived from EU case law, not only represents the discourse of judicial 
supremacy – as against parliamentary sovereignty. It also conflates common law principles 
(e.g. liberty and justice) as being more fundamental than the most ultimate rule. As 
Tomkins suggests, legal constitutionalism has viewed law as an activity that is not only 
distinctive from but also superior to politics (Tomkins, 2005, pp. 11-14). That ‘politics bad, 
law good’ approach favours the courts. It has failed to acknowledge ‘the political’, or its 
supremacy. The arguments of Loughlin (2010), Tomkins (2005; 2013), Griffith (1979; 
1985), Bellamy (2007) and others are crucial to political theory for different reasons but 
primarily because they address the centrality of politics – of contestation, of parliamentary 
dispute, of wider disagreement – in the UK’s constitutional regime. 
 This approach will not address the specific debate about the direct legal issues 
implied in the UK legal sovereignty-EU debate, focusing on the repeal or invalidating of 
one Act of Parliament with another (Craig, 2011, pp. 112-3), which in itself is more 
aligned to the question of the role of judicial decision-making in the application of Acts of 
Parliament and the doctrine of ‘implied repeal’, which will only be considered here in 
passing. These debates have been widely represented by the traditionalists such as H.W.R. 
55 
 
Wade (1996) in contrast to the ‘New View’ of Sir I. Jennings (1957), RFV Heuston (1964) 
and G. Marshall (1957). 
  It should be briefly considered that the school of common law radicalism with its 
questionable abandonment of rule of recognition asserts that Parliament’s sovereignty is to 
be treated as a product of, or controlled by, judge-made common law and has advanced 
several arguments originally introduced by the moral constitutionalist tradition. ‘Moral 
constitutionalists’ such as Ronald Dworkin (1977, p. 24) and neo-Dworkinian theory have 
asserted that Hart’s ultimate rule of recognition, as a rule, does not exist in an ‘all or 
nothing’ fashion; the legal system instead consists of legal principles which should be 
assigned a metaphorical weight relative to other principles, on the basis of broadening the 
scope of judicial interpretation. Allan’s interpretation is ‘broadly consistent’ with 
Dworkin’s view of interpreting law in balance with its moral justification (Allan, 2013, pp. 
20, 340; Loughlin and Tschorne, 2016, pp. 13-4). It thereby subverts parliamentary 
sovereignty by mischaracterising the pre-existing Hartian relationship which exists 
between rules and conditions. Although this thesis will respond throughout to Allan’s 
(2013) arguments, it departs from Dworkin’s theory, which unlike Hart’s, believes that 
legal principles rather than rules (Hart, 1997) and rather than sovereigns (Hobbes) are the 
foundations of the legal system. Dworkin held that judges must look to how they interpret 
principles, including value judgements, rather than simply obey rules when applying the 
law. Dworkinian theory generally takes a substantive leap in divorcing principles (moral or 
political) from the ultimate rule. It has been adapted for example to explain parliamentary 
sovereignty more as a principle than a rule, to be balanced against competing principles 
(McGarry, 2012) as if it were some flexibly-based principle balanced against higher 
justifying moral principles (Dworkin, 1977). It has subsequently been connected with the 
common law position, through its assertions that courts do not judge Acts of Parliament 
simply in balance against any other principles but on the basis of judge-decided competing 
principles derived from the common law (McGarry, 2012, p. 598). Nevertheless, Dworkin 
helpfully recognised that Hart concedes that an ultimate rule can impose obligations as law 
enacted by particular institutions e.g. parliament, but rules established by custom also 
(Dworkin, 1977, p. 41). Customs can count as law even before the courts recognise it 
(Dworkin, 1977, p. 43). In theory, then, certain political conditions and customs e.g. 
previous historical precedents, which are not necessarily legally binding could then provide 
the conditions for the ultimate rule.  
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  The Dworkin conviction that a fundamental rule derives its legal validity from a 
broader, underlying political theory is entirely plausible. However, it is a leap to then adopt 
a theory which requires a look beyond constitutional rules to judge-decided deeper 
underlying principles when applying the law. It is an even greater leap still to reject the 
rule of recognition (i.e. parliamentary sovereignty) for being inconsistent with those deeper 
principles. Politically, the UK constitution does not designate judges (unelected) to cherry-
pick supposedly deeper underlying principles of the rule of law to diminish the rule of 
parliamentary sovereignty and with it, the selective weakening of the capacity to represent 
the wishes of the electorate. They have not constitutionally had the power conferred upon 
them and are not likely to at any future point; but in practice, the incorporation of EU 
procedure into the UK constitution has enabled the judiciary to at least attempt to achieve 
such powers.  
  But ultimately Dworkin cannot accept a reconsideration of the rule of recognition. 
Loughlin (2010) rightly points out that the parliamentary sovereignty form and the 
restriction and extension of powers which enable that form demonstrate that it is not an 
exercise in legal logic or the recognition of fundamental principles of morality, according 
to moral theory, as those factors may mediate the sovereignty claim but the claim itself is 
rooted in political condition (Loughlin, 2010, pp. 236-7). Dworkin’s theory is no doubt 
useful to common law judges assessing interpretation, but it is not useful for political 
theory to have dismissed the role of the rule of recognition according Parliament its 
sovereignty simply on the basis that the rule must be exercised in balance, or mediated, 
with other deeper, moral principles.   
 
Political constitutionalism: returning to the rule of the recognised helm 
 
The rule of the recognised helm is necessary because it is a fundamental rule of 
government which is recognised and practised by persons serving a purpose in the 
institutions of the state architecture. It is not fundamental because it simply exists – it must 
be recognised by them as providing for valid law and political settlement. It is not 
fundamental because it is recognised by only the parliament, courts or people or 
government but consensually recognised and steered by all of them. As a departure from 
Hart’s (1997) rule of recognition, it is a helm which defines the relationship of political 
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actors, and those of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the electorate, in their 
tacit consent/recognition of a rule providing for sovereignty. 
Why should it be necessary to equate the recognition of the rule of sovereignty with 
only the law of Parliament (Dicey, 1964) or increasingly the recognition of statute by the 
common law of the courts (Allan, 2013) or increasingly by the people (Bogdanor, 2009a)? 
The central place of representative, parliamentary government which affirms the ultimate 
rule of ‘What the Crown in Parliament enacts is law’, at the very least, begins to express 
the supreme role of the legislature, as elected by the people, but also a subsidiary role of 
the judiciary, and their elected government, in providing recognition to the rule.  Why put 
substantive limits on the institutional location which parliamentary sovereignty is 
recognised by, given that: 
• Dicey (1964) recognised Parliament as foundational, but only in so far as it made 
law, and not in terms of its political primacy.  
• Allan (2013) overstates the courts as having a leading role in establishing 
Parliament’s sovereignty.  
• Bogdanor (2009a) describes the people under the Human Rights Act 1998, through 
ever-growing local government and regional, devolved and federal units, as holding 
the key to where sovereignty is located.  
It is unnecessary to hold one sole actor as key to recognising the rule of Parliament’s 
sovereignty, when the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the electorate must each 
play their part in upholding the rule. The rule of the recognised helm ought to express a 
more fundamental rule to be practised by persons possessing a purpose in the institutions 
of the state.  
  The conceptualisation of politics, historical conventions, precedents and political 
conditions in relation to the rule of the recognised helm is vital to an alternative, new 
approach and the content of this thesis. Loughlin (2010) recognises that importance when 
concluding that in the British system, an investigation into constitutional understanding 
requires an investigation into the constitution of the state. The quest for constitutional 
understanding requires both analysis of the rules of positive law within an appreciation of 
the conditions of droit politique (Loughlin, 2010, p. 272). It is possible to understand the 
constitution of the state as droit politique (Loughlin, 2010, pp. 231-7) in which the 
constituent elements of the public sphere embedded in historical customs, precedents and 
practices sustain the ordering of the state. The droit politique has a generative function in 
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which the directing ideas sustain the institutions of government and institutions make legal 
and constitutional rules (Loughlin, 2010, p. 233, in citing the French public lawyer 
Hauriou’s idea, although Hauriou denies legal rules can make institutions). It provides the 
key to understanding the constitution of the state. Understanding parliamentary sovereignty 
in terms of a political constitutional model enables it to be viewed through an explanatory 
framework within which to make sense of our constitutional self-understandings (Gee and 
Webber, 2010), be it political or legal. 
  To move towards a rule of the recognised helm, Hart’s ultimate rule of 
parliamentary sovereignty must consider the positive and political nature of the rule of 
persons within the helm of the state. The medieval state, which will be interpreted in 
Chapter 3, examines how in Henry de Bracton’s view, sovereignty at the helm was bound 
to moral duty but ultimately, the law and the law-making sovereign remaining mutually 
conditioned, reciprocal and interdependent at the helm, even though the sovereign power 
retains the power to govern the realm (Kantorowicz, 1957, pp. 153, 155). This has a deeper 
relevance to a modern constitution with multiple actors, from agencies, the EU through to 
enhanced judicial bodies. In contemporary political theory, Richard Bellamy (2007) 
persuasively makes the point that if government is by definition the agency authorised by 
law to issue laws, the rule of law can barely constrain the rule of persons. For Bellamy, at 
some point, some body of persons, judges or politicians, must decide for example if a 
government has breached rules (Bellamy, 2007, p. 56). After all, Parliament in the form of 
the Commons reflects the people. Bellamy’s view is certainly attractive because it 
addresses the ‘circumstances of politics’ in a theory of political constitutionalism. On the 
other hand, it overlooks Hart's ultimate rule as a fundamental rule on which it is assumed 
there is already an acknowledged consensus between officials/persons within those 
different institutional parts (as described by Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 253; Hart, 1997).  
  In the demotion of the commanding power over the law and of governing at the 
helm of state in explaining parliamentary sovereignty, much is being dismissed of how 
parliamentary sovereignty exists in the political constitution. This thesis reaffirms the 
relevance of the political constitution to parliamentary sovereignty because the legal 
definition of parliamentary sovereignty: 
• marginalises those who exercise political power to hold to account through political 
institutions i.e. namely, Parliament.  
59 
 
• is dismissive of that which is ‘political’ characterized by divisive debate, conflict, 
disagreement, messiness, and as-yet unresolved chaos.  
• gives great weight to judicially enforceable limits on the legislature which fail to 
recognise the deeper politics of rights claims, nor see that law is neither separate 
nor superior to politics (Griffith, 1979).  
• Is dismissive of the procedures in which political decisions should be taken by 
politicians as responsible and accountable representatives, not judges, simply 
because they are electable and removable at the ballot box and are accountable to 
Parliament throughout their tenure (Griffith, 1979).  
• Provides insufficient recognition that both law and politics are to be understood by 
deference to ‘the circumstances of politics’, so that there is a common framework 
or decision or course of action on a disputed matter, despite disagreement about 
what the best possible decision might be (Waldron, 1999).  
• Overlooks the role of political life in the British often adversarial, political system 
and political party competition, and the use of majorities to provide settlement 
and/or agreement, as more defining features of the political constitution, explained 
by theorists such as Bellamy (2007) and Tomkins (2013).  
The centrality of the political constitution proposed by Bellamy (2007), Tomkins (2013) 
and to an exaggerated degree, Griffith (1979), is a fundamental point because at the heart 
of UK parliamentary sovereignty is the capacity of voters at free and fair general elections 
to elect their chosen representatives to the elective part of Westminster, the House of 
Commons, and thereby to have MPs decide on the laws and policies by which they are to 
be governed. In pursuance of that task, electors primarily affirm that stabilising Hartian 
social rule of the constitution within the wider political system. Directly and practically, in 
polling stations, they enable constituency representatives to represent their general wishes 
in accordance with manifestos, as open to all UK voters. In that exercise, they also affirm 
their individual freedom of choice within the political system to choose their 
representatives and the policies and laws which will affect their everyday lives, and 
ultimately answer the question of who governs the UK. It is their power to choose and send 
to Westminster an elected representative (and therefore perhaps remove an incumbent one) 
to make law in accordance with their general wishes. That sovereignty adheres to older, 
medieval understandings of the state particularly where it relates to stability and the 
maintenance of the balance of power as well as more modern ideas of parliamentary 
democracy and of guaranteeing individual and political freedom. 
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  Whereas Tomkins (2013) puts ministerial responsibility to Parliament at the heart 
of the political constitution, it is Bellamy’s emphasis on the legislature’s law-making 
function, legislative votes by majorities, and institutionalised party competition (Bellamy, 
2007) which is more fundamental to the political constitution in which parliamentary 
sovereignty operates. The claims Bellamy (2007) makes to that being 
a democratic constitution or reinforcing ‘political equality’ can be more difficult to justify. 
It does reaffirm the essential and elective nature of political institutions, including 
Parliament, acting through very ordinary political and legislative processes to determine its 
sovereignty. Finally, by recognising in this thesis that there is a legal rule of recognition 
although it exists within a deeply political helm of the state, I share Loughlin’s (2010) and 
to a degree, Tomkins’ (2013) concern for a ‘polarized opposition’ between a political and 
legal constitution and by developing the idea of a rule of the recognised helm also intend to 
move beyond that concerning dualism. 
 The following chapter (Chapter 3) will develop the claim that a ‘rule of the 
recognised helm’ is essential to understanding parliamentary sovereignty, as both a legal 
and political concept, by explaining how that essential sovereignty deferred to Parliament 
has been made historically operable in different historical constitutional forms. If there is 
to be a Hartian ultimate rule which provide the conditions another rule must satisfy in 
order for that rule to impose obligations as valid law and political settlement, it must be 
necessary to provide the historically precedented conditions of the social rule. The third 
chapter is devoted to the innovative identification and explanation of eight historical 
constitutional forms for that purpose, beginning with ‘What the Crown-with-magnates 
enacts is law’ (1200-1350) through to today’s constitutional form, ‘What the Crown-
through-Parliamentary political elite with external bodies enacts is law’ (1973-present). 
Today’s Parliament retains its theoretical sovereignty because it has the power to terminate 
or change that membership by repealing or amending the European Communities Act 1972 
(Tomkins, 2010) and yet the 44-year practice of choosing not to terminate or change 
substantial aspects of its Parliament-diminishing EU membership has been thought to have 
left parliamentary sovereignty intact. Parliament is sovereign, then, not because of general 
judicial or popular ‘say so’ but because it is a historically institutionalised rule of the 
recognised helm which is dependent upon the customs, conventions and politics of past 




Chapter 3: The eight historical constitutional forms defining the rule of the present 
day ‘recognised helm’ 
 
In making the claim that a ‘rule of the recognised helm’ is essential to understanding 
parliamentary sovereignty, as both a legal and political concept, it is necessary to also draw 
the necessary conclusions of how that essential sovereignty deferred to Parliament has 
been made workable at different stages. After all, if there is to be a Hartian ultimate rule 
which provide the conditions another rule must satisfy in order for that rule to impose 
obligations as valid law and political settlement, it must be necessary to provide the 
historical conditions of the social rule. Below, it is briefly set out how a series of eight 
historical constitutional forms describing prominent historical features help to frame 
multiple forms of the rule providing for parliamentary sovereignty: 
(i) ‘What the Crown-with-magnates enacts is law’ (1200-1350) 
(ii) ‘What the Crown-with-Commons enacts is law’ (1350-1532) 
(iii) ‘What the Crown-through-Parliament enacts is law’ (1533-1602) 
(iv) ‘What the Crown-with-disputed Parliament enacts is law’ (1603-1687) 
(v) ‘What the Crown-in-regulating Parliament enacts is law’ (1688-1689) 
(vi) ‘What the Crown-in-mixed constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ (1690-
1790s) 
(vii) ‘What the Crown-in-Parliamentary Cabinet enacts is law’ (1800-1972) 
(viii) ‘What the Crown-through-Parliamentary political elite with external bodies 
enacts is law’ (1973-present) 
This thesis innovatively identifies eight historical constitutional forms for that purpose, 
each of which illustrate the different meanings attributed to the rule of the recognised 
helm, from its inception to its contemporary context, in a partly episodical, partly 
tangential but partly continuous approach. The ‘Crown’ powers previously exercised by 
the reigning monarch have been passed, in the present day, to the ministers of the 
executive who now exercise most of those powers; the Crown powers are now exercised 
by the executive through, and on the advice of, ministers accountable to Parliament (Jack 
et al., 2011) and in so far as the executive retains the confidence of the MPs in the House 
of Commons. 
  In terms of sovereignty involving the modern Crown in Parliament, law and the 
political community, it is then argued that the modern concept of parliamentary 
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sovereignty has been left with an entrenched quandary in the meaning of its today’s eighth 
historical constitutional form. An executive-led Parliament delegates a part of its law-
making capacity to other bodies / institutions who then impose external control, steerage 
and direction upon that law, so that those representatives who are elected to the House of 
Commons by the political community to make law no longer have that practical capacity, 
since its everyday capacity or competency, but not ultimate right, was voluntarily ceded 
under the European Communities Act 1972. An elective, delegated Parliament is in a 
political sense a contradiction. Parliament retains its ultimate sovereignty because it has the 
power to terminate or change that membership by repealing or amending the European 
Communities Act 1972 (Tomkins, 2010) and yet – despite the growth of popular and 
parliamentary British Euroscepticism (Curtice, 2017b; Geddes, 2016, p. 265; Gifford, 
2014; Gifford, 2008) – so far, the 44-year practice of not terminating or changing 
substantial aspects of its Parliament-diminishing EU membership has been imagined to 
have left that doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty intact.  
Finally, the helm can better be understood, by adapting Bracton’s view, in which 
sovereignty at the helm of the medieval state in relation to the law remains “mutually 
conditioned”, reciprocal and interdependent at the helm (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 153, 155). 
Historical constitutional forms provide for precedent, by which it is meant that the 
fingertips of past, historical precedents are pressed into the old, dry sponge of UK 
constitutional history by past political customs and constitutional conventions, to be 
compressed, reshaped and reconfigured in reflecting those precedents. Historical 
constitutional forms characterise features of sovereignty and parliamentary sovereignty 
which are not simply accrued or aggregated – they thrive, survive, part-survive or 
completely decay or die, but nonetheless they all provide precedent and convention. The 
historical conditions of the ultimate rule of the recognised helm can be understood, on 
Locke’s grounds, as customs which are reasonable, and that they support the authority of 
reasonable legal rules and that there are good reasons for them (Grant, 2012). The rule of 
the recognised helm therefore exists on the basis that the powers of the executive, the 
legislature, the judiciary and the electorate are incorporated through their precedented 
inter-relationships. Those features, as conditions, give the rule existence providing for 
valid law and political settlement. The conditions are the therefore crucial, but by no means 
causal or restrictive, to the rule. Parliament is sovereign not because it is a principle to be 
weighed against others via judicial interpretation but because it is an institutionalised rule 
of the recognised helm which is dependent upon the customs, conventions and politics of 
past historical precedents.  
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  The specific periodisation of the historical constitutional forms have not been 
inherited from any one political/constitutional theorist, or historian, in particular. It is 
however notable that historiographers, political theorists and genealogists have often and 
similarly, for example, distinguished between ‘parliamentary’ sovereignty in the early 
Stuart period and post-1688 settlement, between and after the 1530s or even between the 
pre- or post-European Communities Act 1972 explanations, as each has been bound by 
substantive and observable constitutional changes. The historical constitutional form 
conveys the inter-relationships between different types of historical interpretations and the 
ways in which specific ‘new’ understandings evolve, however unevenly, tangential, 
episodic or discontinuous from older notions. The historical constitutional forms provide 
the features at the recognised helm which only exist in that cohesive structure on the basis 
that the powers of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the electorate are 
incorporated through those historically precedented inter-relationships. The arms of 
government exist with different functions but the overlapping relationships between the 
institutions explain the sovereignty formed in Parliament, incorporating the closeness or 
distance in relationships between the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the 
electorate. 
Historical constitutional forms are employed to explain the changing, dislocated 
forms of parliamentary sovereignty which enable further exploration of the relationship 
between different types of historical interpretations and the ways in which specific ‘new’ 
understandings evolve – progressively, unevenly or tangentially – from older notions. Each 
historical form itself summarises features within broad historical thresholds insofar as a 
‘threshold’ itself does not denote a prescribed teleology. It is not accepted that those 
conditions or the ultimate rule itself represents an accrual, or aggregation, or cumulative 
end-point of a teleological process. It is far more significant than that – the conditions of 
the ultimate rule provide legal and political precedent.  
  It has been generally indicated, but never formally established by legal and political 
theorists or historians that sovereignty can be understood as a historical constitutional form 
of positive powers, which themselves can be contested in definition during the period and 
this thesis takes the lead from those historians and political theorists. By focusing upon 
‘unbundling’ the historical conditions and conventions that parliamentary sovereignty 
adheres to and performs within a historical form, the classical divide between European 
centralisation versus Westminster centralism can be called into question (see Prokhovnik, 
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2007) and will, in subsequent chapters, help to later understand parliamentary sovereignty 
in relation to EU membership.  
 Consistent with Quentin Skinner’s contextualism (Perreau-Saussine, 2007, p. 118), 
the analytical features contained within the historical constitutional forms are only true for 
the historically situated political actors within the immediate circumstances in which they 
hold those beliefs or ideals. This contextualism can liberate political theory from the 
strictly legal hegemonic account of parliamentary sovereignty and how it should be 
understood (see Lane, 2012, p. 74, on Skinner; Perreau-Saussine, 2007, p. 107; Skinner, 
1965). The philosophical ideas are inseparable from the historical context in which they 
occur (Skinner, 2002, contra Clarke, 2013) and by subscribing to a hermeneutic approach, 
it seeks to attain an objective truth of a given feature in relation to texts (see Burns, 2011). 
The historical constitutional forms explain what practical work the concept is doing and it 
thereby underpins the historical normative basis and political contingency upon which its 
authority is often based. It is ever-changing work in progress. The constitutional forms 
contain a conceptual system of discourses, which are open-ended and open to the 
possibility of constant modification (consistent with Prokhovnik, 2008), permitting 
contestability between the features and other forms, the unexpected, the unintended and 
malleable political formations. The features of the constitutional forms, partially identified 
by historians and theorists, are at the same time irretrievably bound to the understanding of 
the present (see Bartelson, 1995). An attempt to embrace a more favourable innovative, 
hermeneutic approach which views historical forms as providing for past historical 
precedents (which can be present) can provide a more formal and deeper level of 
theoretical explanation of both the historical and contemporary forms of parliamentary 
sovereignty.  
  On the matter of historical precedents expressed as conventions, those 
‘constitutional conventions’ are, as Jaconelli (1999) observes, social rules which govern 
the relationships between institutions of government, Parliament and political parties; they 
are constitutional in character, non court-enforced and form the interrelationships of the 
constitution. Although it is not always obvious that we can simply ascertain the binding 
status or power of a convention on a rule simply via their legal status before the courts, as 
Jaconelli (1999; Jaconelli, 2005) argues, it can be assumed that the relevance and powers 
of historical political precedents – otherwise understood in the neo-Diceyan tradition as 
conditions, constitutional conventions and non-binding, political constraints – to social 
rules does rely on the changing nature of customs and historical circumstances.  
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  In focusing on the practical mode of organisation, the historical constitutional 
forms also seek to answer the question – what is sovereignty and where is it located in each 
historical form? What is its function? The constitutional form conveys the relationship 
between different types of historical interpretations and the ways in which specific ‘new’ 
understandings evolve, however unevenly or tangential, from older notions. For example, 
in seeking a historical understanding of sovereignty in Early Stuart England, as a set of 
discernible constitutional forms of themes and values, the historian Alan Orr (2002) 
assesses sovereignty in terms of a practical definition, as a historical cluster of positive or 
‘state’ powers, which themselves can be contested in definition (Orr, 2002, p. 475). Orr 
himself does so to reconsider the concept of sovereignty at the centre of discussion on the 
origins of the English Civil War. In my view, approaching parliamentary sovereignty can 
be understood through historical constitutional forms, recast in eight unique narratives, so 
that each form can be characterised as having internal conceptual connections between its 
meanings during a defined period. That does not infer a comfortable relationship. The 
forms can often reflect the political contradictions and dilemmas within a contested 
political environment.   
 The historical constitutional forms respond to Bogdanor’s (2009a) claim that 
constitutions have the objective of ‘providing organisation’ (Bogdanor, 2009a, pp. 53-54), 
and to that extent forms specify the organisational and relational features of the English or 
British ‘constitution’ during the different periods. They clarify the functions of the 
institutions of government and the relationship between them. In each historical form, we 
specify the interactions within the British constitution which confirms the sovereign 
powers between political actors and their relationships, particularly in relation to the 
institution of Parliament.  
 While theories of the British constitution should seek to understand parliamentary 
sovereignty relative to the whole constitution (as the common law tradition maintains; see 
Allan, 2013, p. 23), the constitution can be understood more widely in this sense as a 
palimpsest. The idea of the ‘palimpsest’ in its general understanding is one of “a 
manuscript written on a surface from which an earlier text has been partly or wholly 
erased” (Beal, 2008; Baldick, 2008). In the times before paper, it was common in the 
Middle Ages given the high cost of parchment and vellum. The notion of a reuse of 
parchment in which the original script was reworked can appeal to analysts and critics of 
the British constitutional form – it has never been destroyed, introduced in a whole new 
form, but merely rewritten, redrafted and reworked. The constitutional palimpsest conveys 
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a process of paradigm-shifting political change, just as Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific 
revolutions in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions understands how normal science, as 
the rule, is undermined by revolutionary science, as the exception, after enquiries and 
realities expose anomalies in the normal science (Kuhn, 1970). The shift in paradigms 
results from anomalies undermining normal science and revolutionary science becomes the 
normal science. When David Marquand (1999) assesses Britain’s apparent move away 
from its “old constitution”, it is asserted that it never was “the crystalline monolith of 
Dicey’s imagining” but instead, it “… was a palimpsest of sometimes discordant myths, 
understandings, and expectations, reflecting the changing values and preoccupations of 
succeeding generations.” (Marquand, 1999, p. 3) In so far as critics can accept that 
understanding of change being reworked in a palimpsest, the concept has some validity. 
While, for Marquand, the Crown-in-Parliament has proceeded in several forms in the older 
forms of the constitution, reflecting Dicey’s “monolithic” view, it is insisted here that 
historical forms are simply passing, in the palimpsest, in my view, into another new phase 
(the eighth constitutional form). The Crown-in-Parliament formulation therefore never 
really belonged only to the old constitution or to Dicey’s monolithic view which, for all its 
faults discussed in Chapter 1, appeared overwhelmingly practical for judges and common 
lawyers and utilised through both the legal and political establishment. Most importantly, 
the eight constitutional forms, including the most recent historical form, reinforce 
Marquand’s view of the constitution as a palimpsest. The principles and features of each of 
the eight constitutional forms described below illustrate the textual redrafting – the 
political pacts and major legislative and political precedents between each of the features 
within the forms – which in many ways help to grapple with the historical substance of the 
constitutional forms.        
 
The making of the present: historical transitions in constitutional conventions and form 
 
Constitutional form one: ‘What the Crown-with-magnates enacts is law’ (1200-1350) 
 
The understanding of sovereignty as gubernaculum, government through the helm of the 
ship of state, can be first understood from the vantage point of the period of medieval 
kingship in the centuries preceding the Reformation in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries (Harding, 1993; Kantorowicz, 1957; McIlwain, 1947), if not more broadly to the 
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reign of Anglo-Saxon monarch Athelstan (924-39) (History of Parliament Trust, 2015, p. 
12). That characterisation is expressed as divine monarchical sovereignty-with-magnates – 
divine in its claim to power and right but in consultation with magnates. In simple terms, 
the unequal theory of the ‘Crown rules’ model only ever really existed as an alternate 
model of unequal power – ‘the Crown rules by consulting with magnates’. The Crown’s 
sovereignty within the helm of the ship of state is checked by barons (originally, the ‘Curia 
Regis’). The ultimate rule sat in equilibrium with particular political conditions to bolster 
the rule.  
  Sovereignty provides a ranked ultimate rule, conferring supremacy on the 
acknowledged God-ordained power of the Crown, which existed within an embracing 
condition – the elevating of the magnates to create a more powerful authority than the 
Crown could possess alone. The word ‘parliament’ is itself first used in England in the 
thirteenth century to describe the broad meetings of the monarch’s counsel with barons, 
bishops and prominent royal servants, advising the Crown on law-making, administrative 
matters and to assist in judicial decisions (Payling, 2013; Jack et al., 2011). The divine 
power behind the Crown-magnate power concept described in this historical constitutional 
form can be explained, in the writings of the judge Henry de Bracton (1210-1268), that the 
Crown is held under God and under the law, understood as moral duty, consistently 
pursued in accordance with his own goodwill, reinforced by baronial counsel, but 
importantly acted upon under the threat of divine retribution (see Van Duffel, 2004, pp. 
157-8; Goldsworthy, 1999; Nederman, 1988; John Wyclif, 1378 in Nederman and Forhan, 
1993, p. 223; see Baumer, 1940, p. 57; McIlwain, 1910, p. 97). The capacity to govern 
through the Crown’s sovereignty at the helm of the medieval state, was only bound to 
natural and divine law as moral duty – but “above the law” in his status as Crown, by 
prerogative power, unconstrained by positive law (Goldsworthy, 1999; Kantorowicz, 1957, 
p. 149). Ultimately, for Bracton, the law and the law-making Crown were “mutually 
conditioned”, reciprocal and interdependent at the helm, even though the Crown retained 
the power to govern the realm (Kantorowicz, 1957, pp. 153, 155). 
  The Crown was the undoubted pinnacle of a legal system, the heart and essence of 
the English political system – and his law “eternal like the stars” (Van Duffel, 2004, p. 
156; Bradford, 2011) – but it is with the combined role of the earls that his power is really 
buttressed. As Donald Hanson maintains, “… the answer of the great twelfth and thirteenth 
century law books to fundamental questions was that such matters lay with the monarch 
and the magnates of the realm” (Hanson, 1970, p. 180). Parliament developed out of the 
medieval convention of baronial counsel, it was the ‘Crown’s Parliament’, the Crown 
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being forced to accept its importance (on the former point, see Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 28; 
on the latter point, see Bradford, 2011). Sovereignty had already developed through 
political institutions, depersonalised from the physical persons embodying political 
authority (Bartelson, 2011). That ‘royal’ power exercised by the sovereign which allowed 
the Crown to do as she pleased insofar as it was consistent with fundamental law, was an 
earl-reinforced power of the Crown, not any ‘joint’ parliamentary power as such. Such a 
view does not conform to a divine-right theory of the Crown because under medieval 
kingships, it was only possible to affirm a ranked ultimate rule, conferring supremacy not 
merely on the Crown, as such, but the buttressing of the Crown’s ultimate authority by the 
earls. Magna Carta of 1215 began to codify the means by which the Crown should seek 
counsel (Nelson, 2015a). Simon de Montfort’s parliament of 1265 shows knights and 
townspeople could be called upon to advise on questions of the realm in the Crown’s name 
(Nelson, 2015b; History of Parliament Trust, 2015, p. 21). This reflected a broader 
structure of authority and not solely with the Crown, nor sovereignty within Parliament per 
se. 
  Sovereignty performed a function within the helm of the ship of state. Sovereignty 
was exercised through the use of baronial counsel to raise taxes for ‘defence’ of territory 
and pass law to dispense justice (Bradford, 2011). The sense of sovereignty as the power of 
the Crown to command and make law, is not given primary status as the conditioned 
Crown-earl sovereignty is primarily achieved through the instrumental control of wealth 
and nobility and political actors within that realm. That control is pursued in order to 
defend or gain territory and achieve war through taxation and only secondarily, enable law 
to satisfy those assenting barons from the shires and boroughs. Sovereignty did require the 
perceived claim to ‘unified’ representation (not democratic) and was developed by the 
1260s into the ‘quid pro quo’ principle of the Crown maintaining broader consent and 
representation from localities because of the necessary taxation for Crown revenues and 
war (Payling, 2013; Norton, 2013, p. 18; Bradford, 2011; see also Payling, 1999, p. 241). 
 The formula in the first constitutional form of ‘What the Crown-with-magnates 
enacts is law’ (1200-1350) in balance with overtly political powers, is at odds with the neo-
Diceyan view. It is overtly concerned with political power. The sovereignty is affirmed by 
a ranked ultimate rule, that is a supremacy of the acknowledged Crown-with-magnates. 
That sovereignty by its ultimate rule performed a function within the helm of the ship of 
state – it was exercised through the consent of baronial counsel to raise taxes for defence of 
territory and pass law to dispense justice (History of Parliament Trust, 2015, pp. 12-17). 
The rule at the helm of the ship of state required the perceived claim to representation for 
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the governance of the realm. The understanding of the commanding power of the Crown to 
make law, is not given primary status because sovereignty is achieved through other means 
and only in its finale, to give law to satisfy those assenting barons from the shires and 
boroughs. 
 
Constitutional form two: ‘What the Crown-with-Commons enacts is law’ (1350-1532) 
 
In the second constitutional form, the characterisation of parliamentary sovereignty which 
developed in the pre-Reformation period is geared towards a petitionable Crown in 
Parliament with representatives. The ultimate rule that the Crown rules with an occasional 
and separate counsel transforms into a Crown ruling with an increasingly relevant 
Commons. It became the high crossroad of power networks, an unparalleled rendezvous 
point, where Crown and Parliament could barter in interests, power and money. 
Fortescue’s (1395-1477) then leading assessment of England’s dominium politicum et 
regale, as government being both political and regal, signifies the essential character of the 
Crown needing to rule with the parliament to gain consent (Koenigsberger, 1978; 
Koenigsberger, 1989). The ultimate rule required particular political features, including the 
representation by petition and impeachment of officers (History of Parliament Trust, 2015, 
p. 20), to make the rule a reality.  
  The meaning of sovereignty as the ultimate rule expressing the legitimate authority 
gained through the conditional exercise of a petitionable sovereign was already well-
formed in the first constitutional form or by 1341 at least (see Norton, 2013, p. 18), and 
developed under extended modes of representation. Those steps tipped the balance from 
monarchical sovereignty to the Reformation’s conditions necessary for some degree of 
parliamentary rule. In this constitutional form, defining parliamentary sovereignty in terms 
of the Crown relative to the fast-developing but poorly-attended Parliament meant a fuller 
Commons and Lords having developed from substantial political changes, including the 
widening basis of county- and town-representing (see Quinault, 2012; Goldsworthy, 1999). 
Shire representatives ‘represented’ those in 1430 with an annual income of at least 40 
shillings and with freehold land (History of Parliament Trust, 2015, p. 24; Payling, 1999, p. 
244). Although not in the English tradition, Marsiglio of Padua’s Defensor Pacis in the 
fourteenth century is a good European example of law-making by a loose quasi-
representation – it provides a basis for the singular authority for the creation, alteration and 
revision of law as the legislator humanus, which is composed of the whole body of citizens 
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(Lee, 2009; Nederman, 1991, p. 23). 
  Sovereignty existed in the sense that Parliament marginally began to exercise its 
own power and influence, for example, through the depositions of monarchs (History of 
Parliament Trust, 2015, p. 20, 22) so that factions of magnates from the realm arranged for 
validation of the removal of a monarch (such as Richard III in 1485) by parliamentary 
assent (Jones, 2012, p. 24). During the constitutional upheavals of the fifteenth century 
involving the depositions of monarchs, leading to fifteenth century monarchs desiring 
parliamentary validation of the title to the throne, there is a great deal of evidence 
testifying to the highest authority attributed to a Parliament representing the entire 
community (Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 31). In discourse, however, neither Parliament nor 
Crown sought to guarantee claims to ‘exclusive sovereignty’ (Baumer, 1940, p. 3).  
  There is an acceptance of the condition that the Crown, within the Parliament, was 
equated with the highest law-making authority, signifying the equalising of government 
with the ability to legislate. The supremacy of the English Parliament in making the 
highest law continued to be accepted and expressed among the essentially conservative 
political, royal and lawyerly elite of the period (Baumer, 1940, p. 3). The prevalence of 
natural or fundamental law also meant that there was no theory of ‘absolute monarchy’ 
(Baumer, 1940, p. 6). Fortescue who served as a Member of Parliament, Chief Justice of 
England and Lord Chancellor, saw that the entire body of the realm according to the laws 
of England was represented in Parliament (Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 41). England enjoyed 
dominium politicum et regale, not merely dominium regale, the government being both 
political and regal and the Crown by himself unable to change the law of the land (Baumer, 
1940, p. 10).  
 The formula in the second constitutional form of ‘What the Crown-with-Commons 
enacts is law’ (1350-1532) in balance with particular political conditions and constitutional 
conventions is inconsistent with the neo-Diceyan view. Sovereignty as an ultimate rule 
expressing the legitimate authority gained through the conditional exercise of a 
petitionable sovereign was acknowledged. It is founded around the extension of 
representation to the 40 shilling per annum landowners. Parliament had developed its own 
power, influence and independence which, although not exclusive, signifies the increasing 
equalising of government as the power to legislate, realised as the Crown located within a 




Constitutional form three: ‘What the Crown-through-Parliament enacts is law’ (1533-
1602) 
 
Although in the Reformation period, the real fundamental question that remained, given 
that the rival Crown versus Church supremacies had been addressed after 1533 was that 
England had been left with a self-regulating Church separated from a Parliament which is 
sovereign (Bogdanor, 1997, p. 225). It confirmed the assumption of legislative sovereignty 
by 1539/40 (see Keir, 1968, p. 117, Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 55). That also confirms 
Parliament’s omnicompetence – that no area involved in the government of realm was 
outside its authority. The sovereign working through the omnicompetent Parliament of the 
sixteenth century helped to define the meaning of parliamentary sovereignty. The 
omnicompetence is important because it conveys how close the Parliament was coming to 
independence and a wide stable of functions, in the service of the power it sought.  
  In the third constitutional form, the ultimate rule that the Crown rules with a 
Commons transforms into a Crown needing to rule through Parliament. The ultimate rule 
of ‘What the Crown-through-Parliament enacts is law’ (1533-1602) required equilibrium 
with the political features, including that omnicompetence, to make the rule a reality. It 
was maintained widely by the political elite of the period that the Crown in Parliament 
indisputably had legal omnicompetence (e.g. Keir, 1968, p. 135; Baumer, 1940, p. 1). 
While sovereignty as government became reducible to the principle of legal competence, 
there was still a strong sense of its operation outside legal controls i.e. despotic. Under the 
Reformation Parliament, Parliament was considered the supreme legislator and not held 
back by other laws or types of law-makers, overriding both the crown and the courts 
(Seaward, 2013). St German’s ‘Doctor and Student’, first published in 1523, argued that 
the Crown in Parliament was omnicompetent, able to legislate on both temporal and 
spiritual matters under the dictum, jus regale politicum – and represented the Church. As a 
defender of parliamentary sovereignty, St German also held that human law was 
subordinate to natural law (as in medieval political theory, and also, Fortescue, Blackstone 
and Austin) which was preserved on the basis that Parliament would never seek to violate 
natural law (Goldsworthy, 1999, pp. 71-2; Baumer, 1940, p. 150-1). The UK Parliament 
(2014) asserts that the omnicompetence meant that “no area involved in the government of 
the realm was outside its authority” (see also Elton, 1986, p. 36) and that is viewed as a 
wholly “unexceptional” view (see also Roskell, 1993; Denton, 1981, p. 88). Sovereignty in 
this constitutional form is invested in an omnicompetent Parliament, wide in its functions 
to the extent that Parliament could do anything except the impossible – an issue which 
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Blackstone (1765) reiterates in his later definition in the eighteenth century.   
  There was an obvious contestation in the interpretation whereby, despite an absence 
of a “deep-seated quarrel” about the supremacy of the Crown and Parliament in general,  as 
Baumer argues, there remained significant division about the nature of the authority 
between Royalist theories supporting Crown-sanctioned statute with the advice and 
assistance of the Lords, Commons and High Court of Parliament and Parliamentarian 
theories in which the Crown, Lords and Commons in Parliament shared supreme 
legislative power and collectively represented the community (Baumer, 1940, pp. 143-
163). Nonetheless, sovereignty was exercised as authority on the tacitly accepted principle 
of the lawful taxation by common consent, in addition to the Crown requiring consent for 
the validity of legislation (latterly, see Baumer, 1940, p. 143). Even in parliamentarian 
theories of the fifteenth and sixteenth century, it was widely assumed that all members of 
the community were represented in Parliament and the consent of Parliament was equated 
with the consent of every man (see John Hooker and Thomas Smith, in Dean, 1998, p. 8). 
The division and competition in Royalist and Parliamentarian arguments, nonetheless, 
strongly suggests that sovereignty as supremacy and provision of an ultimate rule faltered 
not on the primacy of the Crown-through-Parliament but their differing ranking of 
principles relative to the ultimate one.  
  Parliament’s sovereignty was predicated upon a basic acknowledgment of the 
Crown, Lords and Commons in a mixed constitution at the helm of ship of state, 
combining elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. It was an avoidance device 
against an excessive concentration of power which would undermine freedom. It owes 
some debt to the language offered by the Greco-Roman theory of the mixed constitution, 
particularly the second-century BC, Polybius (Gagarin, 2010), as a checking power of the 
political body (Bellamy, 1996, p. 441) and a re-interpretation of Aristotle which produced 
an equating of political rule with a mixed constitution (Blythe, 1992, p. 12). The 
constitutional conventions of the Lords, Commons and Crown within a mixed government 
polity of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic aspects, was a fundamental point in the 
sixteenth century constitution (Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 75).  
  The third constitutional form defined by ‘What the Crown-through-Parliament 
enacts is law’ (1533-1602) – reflected the events and Tudor rule during the Reformation, 
and stood in contrast to the rule and Parliament under the Early Stuarts. The rule in the 
third constitutional form in equilibrium with its constitutional convention of legislative 
omnicompetence, is not a neo-Diceyan view. The Crown-through-Parliament had legal 
omnicompetence and while sovereignty as government was viewed through the lens of 
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legal competence, there was a strong sense of its operation outside strict legal controls i.e. 
a royal despotic power. The supremacy of the ultimate rule exists but the ranking of 
principles relating to the Crown, Lords, Commons and the consenting community as a 
source of power is questioned. There is a wider acknowledging of Parliament’s sovereignty 
as predicated upon the Crown, Lords and Commons in a mixed constitution; the three 
estates are responsible for the governance of the realm.  
   
Constitutional form four: ‘What the Crown-with-disputed Parliament enacts is law’ (1603-
1687) 
 
The fourth constitutional form’s parliamentary sovereignty, formed from great instability 
and uncertainty during the Early Stuart period, reflected the immense turmoil of the 
country at large during the period (see Keir, 1968, p. 231). The ultimate rule operated in 
balance with often irreconcilable political conditions of a ‘divine right’ theory Crown, the 
argument that sovereignty rested with the immemorial, ancient common law constitution 
(Pocock, 1987), and that sovereignty rested with the Crown-in-Parliament, in order to 
make the rule a reality. The sovereignty constitutional form of the ‘unappealable’ 
parliament by the Crown, by common law, or by community, in Early Stuart England and 
throughout the English Civil Wars is perhaps more divided against itself than under any 
other form. Under constitutional form four, the ultimate rule that the Crown rules through 
Parliament, because of civil war challenges to sovereignty, develops tangentially into the 
Crown attempting to rule only with a disputed Parliament. However, it is not until the issue 
is so substantively contested under the fifth form that the principle of the Crown-in-
Parliament is proven so fundamental.  
First, in this constitutional form, given the dispute over supremacy and ranking of 
principle, there was a practical (though widely disputed) reassertion of parliamentarian 
theory (Goldsworthy 1999). It made the assertion that God conferred powers of 
government on the community as a whole – rather than directly on the Crown (Royalist) or 
that there was some ancient common law constitution (common law) (Pocock, 1987, p. 
124). In turn, the community had delegated them to the Crown in so far as he made laws 
and imposed taxes through the consenting Parliament (e.g. Goldsworthy, 1999, pp. 79-
124). The argument for the supremacy of the Crown with Parliament had prevailed after 
the English Civil War and Cromwell’s death although great uncertainty remained in the 
competing Royalist, Parliamentarian and common law narratives. The English Civil War 
74 
 
involving the replacement of the monarch with the Commonwealth of England followed by 
the Protectorate under Oliver, then Richard Cromwell, demonstrated an important facet of 
the constitution: the Crown could no longer govern without parliamentary consent. Even 
within those narratives, there remained disagreement, for example, on whether Parliament 
was infallible, or final, or unappealable, and whether religious tension was still itself the 
basis of the tensions over the Crown with Parliament (Orr, 2002).  
  Second, the competition in political ranking of principle perseveres between the 
three categories for those who made claims to sovereignty. The political theories 
explaining the sovereignty of Parliament in early Stuart England, which are by no means 
mutually exclusive, can be characterised by three different schools, as maintained by 
theorists such as Maitland (1908, p. 298), who believed that in the first half of the 
seventeenth century, there were three categories for those who made claims to sovereignty:  
• the Crown;  
• the Crown in Parliament, and;  
• the law. 
Those three different schools are essentially elaborated upon in this period as (i) Royalist; 
(ii) Parliamentarian and; (iii) common law defences, whereby in the latter, confusingly, 
both Crown and Parliament were said to have derived powers from a supposed ancient 
constitution, consisting of fundamental principles of common law, which regulated the 
balance between the two and was legally superior to both (Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 78; 
Somerville, 1986).  
  Third, Sir Edward Coke in Dr Bonham’s case undermined the previously 
acknowledged ultimate rule by upholding in 1610 that statute could be invalidated by the 
courts on the basis of the common law, right and reason, was a judgement often used to 
support common law theorists. Coke stated,  
“[I]t appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts 
of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of 
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.” (Sir 
Edward Coke, Dr. Bonham's Case [1610])  
The radical common law theorists of early Stuart England incorporated Roman law 
doctrine in which the sovereign’s absolute powers were claimed to be derived from 
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primitive acts of a sovereign people (lex regia) and, therefore, sovereignty need not exist or 
belong to one holder along monarchical lines (Lee, 2016, pp. 289-290).  
Within this fourth constitutional form, the understanding of Parliament is extremely 
divided in the interpretations of the foundational powers underlying the sovereign, of 
common law and the community in Early Stuart England. The unworkable formula in the 
fourth constitutional form of ‘What the Crown-with-disputed Parliament enacts is law’ 
(1603-1687) which required extreme balance with its competing political conditions of 
Crown, common law or Crown with Parliament, overwhelms the legalistic, neo-Diceyan 
definition. There was a dispute over ranking of principle of Crown and common law in 
relation to the supremacy of parliament but parliamentarian theory prevailed in practice 
following the Civil War and the Restoration. Competing claims to sovereignty were made 
for the Crown, the Crown in parliament or the law.  
In contemporary legal and political thought, the recent “renaissance” in those 
divisions between common law theorists (e.g. Allan, 2013; on that renaissance, see 
Tomkins, 2010, p. 4) and traditional legal sovereignist views (e.g. Goldsworthy, 1999; 
Hart, 1997; Tomkins, 2003) continue to feed through into the defence of, and challenges 
to, Dicey’s traditional definition.    
 
Constitutional form five: ‘What the Crown-in-regulating Parliament enacts is law’ (1688-
1689) 
 
Since 1689, the monarchy has owed its title to parliament and the great constitutional 
struggles of the seventeenth century meant that the royal succession could be regulated by 
parliament (Bogdanor, 1997, p. 43). Against the Royalist-absolutist schools was an account 
of parliamentary sovereignty provided in the post-Restoration, pre-Revolution political 
situation. The fifth constitutional form is an unbundling of ‘What the Crown-in-regulating 
Parliament enacts is law’ theorised before the Revolution and crystallised in 1688/9 and 
the political structures which developed out of that ‘first modern revolution’ (Pincus, 
2009). The settlement of 1688 and 1689 resolves the dispute of Crown with Parliament to 
the Crown embedded in and regulated by Parliament. Before the Revolution of 1688, the 
conflict between monarchists, Parliamentarians, the Whigs and of the latter, John Locke’s 
view of parliamentary sovereignty – including the supreme legislative within the 
separation of powers and strongly reliant upon the consent of the political community – 
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illustrates the redefining of that concept and the political arguments up to 1688 and well 
beyond (Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 50). Locke and the English revolutionaries of 1688 
“created a new kind of modern state” – it did not set a precedent for future politics, but 
following calls for a free Parliament, “merely reasserted parliamentary sovereignty” 
(Pincus, 2009, pp. 28, 238-253).   
  This definition and the previous constitutional form are about the omnipotency of 
Parliament and Locke’s legislative is a deliberate attempt to unite the trust of the 
community with that Parliament via a balanced and mixed constitution (on the mixed 
constitution, see Lieberman, 2006, p. 319; Weston and Greenberg, 1981; Weston, 1965); a 
mix which had been an impossibility under a Hobbesian sovereign unity, centred upon the 
requirement for the finality of sovereign authority (Hoekstra, 2013, pp. 1080-1; Bourke, 
1999, p. 108). The Crown is finally under the powers of the legislature (Wade, 1955), the 
courts are denied the power to limit Parliament’s sovereignty (Bradley, 2011; Bradley and 
Ewing, 2010) and the representative claim to Parliament has developed its own 
independence. The ultimate rule was balanced against the political conditions and 
constitutional conventions, including that elective trust relationship, in making the rule a 
reality. That rule-based view of legislating within Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil 
Government, complements his approach toward a Westphalian state (Prokhovnik, 2008, p. 
82; Locke, 1988), governed through the supremacy of the legislature, although 
contemporary Lockean scholars do not accept on the whole the contribution of Locke’s 
view to parliamentary sovereignty (e.g. Franklin, 1981). Locke’s Parliament is a people-
sanctioned ruling legislative power which is consensual, elective, representative, 
majoritarian and in which the electorate publicly participate on the basis of trust. 
Accordingly, his view of sovereignty in action is the entrusting of parliamentary law-
making by majority representation (Second Treatise, 1988, pp. 154, 157, 158).  
  The creation of the fundamental rule resolved the conflict between the Crown and 
Parliament protecting the succession and prerogatives of the Crown from statute which 
crystallised into the Bill of Rights of 1689 and limited the powers of the Crown in relation 
to parliament, and thereby established a parliamentary monarchy (Bogdanor, 1997, p. 5). 
Locke’s understanding of the supremacy of the legislative – which, in England’s case, he 
presented as the Crown, Lords and Commons assembled together – had been predicated on 
several important assumptions, namely that the trust of representatives in the legislature 
means that they must duly act in accordance with the consent given to them.  
  The Lockean and wider liberal tradition referred to sovereignty as being refocused 
through the tighter definition of a people-sanctioned, law-making legislature. Previously, 
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greater ruler sovereignty had been equated with the older tyranny; now, law was required 
to replace the possibility of extra-legal decision-making. By permitting an understanding of 
parliamentary sovereignty within a framework which accounts for those conditions, it may 
allow us to focus on Raia Prokhovnik’s critical observation that “The liberal tradition in 
implicit ways redefines political sovereignty in terms of legal sovereignty, reduces politics 
to the implementation of law, and so works with a depleted notion of what might be called 
ruler sovereignty.” (Prokhovnik, 2008, p. 2)  
  The fifth constitutional form evidenced an omnipotent Parliament operating on trust 
with the sovereign during the events of 1688/89. The formula in the fifth constitutional 
form of ‘What the Crown-in-regulating Parliament enacts is law’ (1688-1689) requiring 
balance with key political conditions, and new constitutional conventions, both affirms and 
reviews the neo-Diceyan definition. The sovereignty is affirmed by an ultimate rule-based 
view of legislating through a Westphalian state governed by the supremacy of the 
legislative. John Locke’s Parliament is theorised as a people-sanctioned ruling legislative 
power which is elective, representative and majoritarian and in which people participate on 
the basis of trust. The creation of the ultimate rule at the helm establishes a parliamentary 
monarchy. Broad political sovereignty is refocused through the lens of legislative law-
making because ruler sovereignty becomes equalised with tyranny and where law replaces 
the extra-legal decision-making inherent to tyranny.  
 
Constitutional form six: ‘What the Crown-in-mixed constitutional Parliament enacts is 
law’ (1690-1790s) 
 
The status of sovereignty as it was stated in the ultimate rule in the eighteenth century 
reflected the 1688/89 settlement, the 1707 Union and the rivalling of popular sovereignty 
with Parliament’s sovereignty. The ultimate rule requires balance against its political 
conditions, including a mixed constitution, to support the rule. The Whiggish ultimate rule 
that the Crown is embedded in and regulated by Parliament prevails and is justified 
increasingly by the balance of monarchical (Crown), aristocratic (Lords) and democratic 
(Commons representing people) powers.  
  The Revolution of 1688 is said to have vindicated the parliamentarian theory of the 
Whigs and, with it, the view that sovereignty was entrusted to the Crown in Parliament 
rather than only the Crown (Quinault, 2012; Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 159; Williams, 1962, p. 
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3; Clark, 1956, p. 150). Eighteenth century theorists appear to be forced to either endorse 
or reassess that premise. The supremacy conferred by the ultimate rule over the legislative 
power, as a power which had been derived from the Crown, was generally accepted by 
legal and political theorists. The most recognised voice on the concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty in the eighteenth century in relation to the laws of England is Blackstone 
(1765). In 1765, he wrote of Parliament that it has sovereign and uncontrollable authority. 
It was an absolute despotic power entrusted by the constitution, and could do anything 
unless of course it was naturally impossible (Lubert, 2010; Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 202; 
Blackstone, 1765). Blackstone adopted from Montesquieu (1748) the idea of a balanced 
tripartite constitution of mixed, separate-but-coordinated powers between the executive, 
legislature and judicial elements (Lieberman, 2006, pp. 318, 335; Lieberman, 1999, p. 22). 
In the eighteenth century, it is said that “… the Whig conception of a sovereign Parliament 
had hardened into an orthodoxy given its classic formulation by Sir William Blackstone in 
1765.” (Jezierski, 1971, p. 96) An Act of Parliament was the execution of the highest 
authority of the kingdom. It could bind every subject, including the Crown, and could not 
be repealed, amended, altered or dispensed with unless Parliament chose to do so. 
Constitutionally close to Blackstone, Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws (1748) has a 
section dealing with the English ‘power checks power’ constitution (Bellamy, 1996, p. 
443) in which the executive and the two branches of the legislative act as checks on one 
another yet the judicial power and tribunals of law are subordinate to the legislation 
(Lubert, 2010; Goldsworthy, 1999, contra Jenkins, 2011, p. 577; Montesquieu, 1748). 
Again, Adam Smith’s jurisprudence lectures in the 1760s emphasise parliamentary 
sovereignty – with sovereignty laying with the Crown and Parliament – “The authority of 
the Parliament in some things, of the King and Parliament in others” and “in whatever 
place there is a sovereign, from the very nature of things the power must be absolute” 
(Bourke, 1999, p. 109). In terms of parliamentary representation, however, during this 
period and up to 1832, the voter is only essentially a yeoman with a freehold estate with a 
value of 40 shillings who collectively formed an electorate of a shire (Baskerville, 1998, p. 
48; Dean, 1998). The acknowledging of the Whiggish constitutional rules resulted from an 
elite political consensus in which the Tories accepted that legislative sovereignty belonged 
to the Crown in Parliament (not the Crown alone) and the Whigs accepted that the people 
could not be trusted beyond a limited political role (Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 176).  
  Another important condition, or convention, for parliamentary sovereignty in this 
context is the idea of a mixed constitution, to preserve political freedom by preventing and 
checking arbitrary acts of power (see also Kors, 2012; Lieberman, 2006, p. 317), initially 
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discussed in constitutional form three in the sixteenth century. Blackstone, Burke and 
many other key political figures in eighteenth century England described the British 
constitution as being a well-balanced combination of different forms of government – 
monarchical, aristocratic and democratic – each balancing out the other (Lieberman, 2006, 
p. 318; Blackstone, 1765, pp. i, 50-2). The meaning of the sovereignty of Parliament for 
Edmund Burke, like Locke, is located within a balanced constitution configured around a 
triangulated trust between the Crown and Parliament (see Craig, 2012, pp. 106-8). The 
mixed constitution was important to Burke, in the 1760s, because “What mattered most to 
him were the chains of trust that existed between these elements and that were crucial to 
the effectiveness of government.” (Craig, 2012, p. 108). The constitution was not perfect 
and historical political circumstances generally reflected a ramshackle system held together 
by a poorly integrated composite state (O’Gorman, 2012). The Prime Minister and Cabinet 
also first appeared (Norton, 2013, p. 20) as an early sign of the growth of government. 
Nonetheless, both Court Whigs and Tories boasted of the equilibrium between the Crown, 
Lords and Commons (Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 200). Judicial review was in this context not 
considered necessary for a system in which the Commons claimed to represent the electors 
and the Crown and the Lords checked that relationship.  
  A reform movement in the last few decades of the eighteenth century attempted to 
challenge parliamentary sovereignty, including the arguments of John Wilkes, Thomas 
Paine and radical Whigs. They had maintained that the people and not parliamentary 
sovereignty prevailed, until this notion itself was discredited by the actions of the French 
Revolution and the fears of a French invasion of England by Napoleon. Nonetheless, 
European conceptions of sovereignty came to rest upon the will of the people (Bartelson, 
2011).   
  The ultimate rule in the sixth constitutional form of ‘What the Crown-in-mixed 
constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ requires balance against its political conditions of 
the mixed constitution to support the rule. The neo-Diceyan approach gives no direct credit 
to the mixed constitution in understanding parliamentary sovereignty. The ultimate rule 
conferred supremacy upon the unlimited and absolute power of Parliament. The rule was 
fixed by a Tory-Whig consensus, with the Crown-in-Parliament, but limited role of the 
people, exercised within the mixed constitution of the Crown, Lords and Commons. For 
theorists such as Edmund Burke, a partition of the mixed governmental powers was 




Constitutional form seven: ‘What the Crown-in-Parliamentary Cabinet enacts is law’ 
(1800-1972) 
 
By the nineteenth century, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty had been taken for 
granted by lawyers and political theorists. The ultimate rule that the Crown is embedded in 
and regulated by Parliament prevails and is justified increasingly by the efficient leadership 
of ministerial Cabinet powers at the centre of the Commons. It is conceptualised as an 
aristocratically elite representative Parliament making law without external direction. The 
ultimate rule requires balance against its political conventions, including its representative 
function and the absence of external direction of government, to support the rule. Sir 
Thomas Erskine May – whose guidelines continue to be utilised today in Parliament in an 
updated form – reported in his first edition of the ‘Treatise on the Law, Privileges, 
Proceedings and Usage of Parliament’ (May, 1844) the legislative authority of Parliament 
was not subject to limits other than when the people should no longer wish to obey and 
therefore resist. More straightforwardly, even with a limited franchise, the people could 
elect a different parliament. The context to the supremacy and ranking of an ultimate rule 
in this constitutional form is one of a mixed, fluid constitution, with a “plastic power of 
self-amelioration”, yet whose Whig reformers thought of their reforms “on a trajectory 
towards democracy” (Saunders, 2011, p. 9). They were, by its fluidity, explaining a 
seemingly stable constitution against the background of major revolution in Europe in 
1848.  
  John Stuart Mill in 1885 expressed a more liberal, representative, community-
bearing, majoritarian-led, Commons-focused theorising of sovereignty, asserting that the 
ideal form of government which Britain held is that in which sovereignty as the supreme 
controlling power is held by the aggregate of the community (see Turner, 2010, p. 29; 
Begby, 2003; see also Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 226). The strong claims to the representative 
Parliament presupposes a process of internal, domestic representation and thereby an 
absence, or limitation, on external direction of government.  
Walter Bagehot’s Victorian study of what he called the English constitution 
recognised the ultimate power within the legislative as the single ultimate authority. His 
executive-in-Commons theory meant that he endorsed legislative sovereignty achieved 
through fused Cabinet-legislative powers as efficient (Bagehot, 2001). In the English 
context, the mixed constitution characterised an ‘equilibrium’ or ‘balance’ in the 
constitution and summed up an essential feature of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
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constitution by a diverse number of political theorists including Montesquieu (1748), 
Blackstone (1765) and Burke (1774). However, for all its sworn primacy, Walter Bagehot, 
his disciples and many other theorists in the nineteenth century insisted not on the 
antiquated doctrine of the mixed constitution (Francis and Morrow, 1994, p. 10) but that 
within the constitution, the Cabinet was the central institution of British government, set 
within the fusion of legislative and executive powers, and not their separation or mix 
(Bagehot, 2001). Bagehot’s Commons had that efficiency and despotic formality to 
conclude an issue without external requirement/ obligation and internationally sovereignty 
was exercised through quietism and restraint (see Clinton, 2003). The interest in efficiency 
made Bagehot and others less concerned with any notion of a balanced, mixed constitution 
of checks and balances or the claims to liberties delivered through an ancient constitution 
(Francis and Morrow, 1994, pp. 10, 23). Internally, Bagehot maintained that the executive 
and legislative powers were not separate: the role of the Cabinet as ministers meeting along 
with Members of Parliament in voting legislation through under minister-instructed party 
lines meant a fusion of centralised powers at the heart of the legislative (Bagehot, 2001). 
At least the British had stable and efficient government (Colls, 2007, p. 518) and he 
underlined the requirement of popular assent and fresh election to establish the absolute 
nature of parliamentary sovereignty. In general terms, the major justification for the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was Parliament’s democratic purpose which was 
essentially expressing the will of ‘the people’ via representation. That mantra of its 
democratic and representative purpose survived in Dicey’s concept. In reality, 
Government, Cabinet, Party and Whips dominated the parliamentary agenda.  
In terms of its emphasis on representation, by loosening the grip of the aristocracy, 
essential nineteenth and early twentieth century reforms radically altered the franchise for 
the Commons – but not the Lords. In particular, the Reform Acts of 1832, 1867 and 1884 
abolished the 40 shilling franchise and broadened the electorate to establish a uniform 
franchise throughout the country (UK Parliament, 2017; Norton, 2013, p. 20). The 
extension in terms of representation meant that changes in 1918 and 1928 enabled the 
female franchise to be brought into line with the standards for men (Norton, 2013, p. 22).  
Like mass industrialization itself, parliamentary sovereignty acquired a ‘cog in a 
machine’ efficiency, acknowledged widely by the political and legal elite. The formula in 
the seventh constitutional form of ‘What the Crown-in-Parliamentary Cabinet enacts is 
law’ (1800-1972) in balance with its political conditions and constitutional conventions, 
naturally supports the neo-Diceyan view. Dicey and his contemporaries confirmed the 
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primacy of the Crown-in-Parliament formula, as the supremacy and ranking of the ultimate 
rule. The characterisation of its development can be described as serving the purposes of 
increasingly efficient government-in-parliament. It therefore had a heighted relevance 
along its previous eighteenth century path of reconciling popular and representative 
sovereignty to parliamentary sovereignty around a legal definition. The intervention of 
Cabinet-style Government, the reliance on party voting among the electorate, adopting the 
party line and ensuring votes in Parliament and the imposition of party discipline through 
the Whips system mediated the role of representatives. It thereby emphasised the 
executive’s leadership of their making law through Parliament although technically, 
without external direction. Those constitutional changes presented Parliament as 
possessing a Bagehotian technical efficiency. Internally, parliamentary institutions were 
restructured, for example in 1911, and in line with the previous constitutional form of the 
nineteenth century, to give the Commons primacy and Lords subordination under the 
principle of asymmetrical bicameralism. Until the early years of the twentieth century, the 
House of Lords had the continued power to stop legislation. However, following a crisis in 
which the House of Lords refused to pass David Lloyd-George’s ‘people’s budget’ of 
1909, the budget was then passed after a general election in 1910, followed again by a 
second general election on the reform of the Lords. The resulting Parliament Act 1911 
removed from the Lords the power to veto a Bill, but permitted them to delay Bills for two 
years. A further Parliament Act of 1949 further reduced the Lords’ delaying powers to one 
year. The political reality of the concept meant that it was at first dependent upon coherent 
and powerful parliamentary parties in the Commons to make policy, as initiators, without 
the Crown, to govern the country and choose the executive. That is a practice which seems 
to have predominated in law, the Cabinet and the Prime Minister’s office throughout the 
eighth constitutional form of the twentieth century, including the passing of the European 
Communities Act 1972, Human Rights Act 1998 and the devolution legislation. 
 
Constitutional form eight: ‘What the Crown-through-Parliamentary political elite with 
external bodies enacts is law’ (1973-present) 
 
The meaning of parliamentary sovereignty in the late twentieth and twenty-first century’s 
confronts specific historical challenges which have arisen, domestically and externally, 
within the recent context of post-war European political and economic development and 
against a historic backdrop of its inheritance. The principle that parliamentary elites rule 
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through Parliament transforms into the principle that Government rules through Parliament 
or partially through external agency or bodies. The ultimate rule is balanced against its 
political conditions supporting the rule. The ultimate rule that the Crown is embedded in 
and regulated by Parliament prevails but justified increasingly and paradoxically by the 
leadership of the Government through Parliament and partially through external bodies. 
  In 2017, the UK Parliament website states publicly of the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty and its general definition:  
“Parliamentary sovereignty is a principle of the UK constitution. It makes 
Parliament the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any 
law. Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can 
pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change. Parliamentary sovereignty is the 
most important part of the UK constitution.” (UK Parliament, 2017)  
They explain how it is “partly written and wholly uncodified.” The UK Parliament’s own 
account is notably frank on the issue of Parliament passing legislation which it describes as 
limiting the application of parliamentary sovereignty, including the devolved bodies (of the 
Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly), 
the Human Rights Act 1998, the UK’s entry into the EU in 1972 and the decision to 
establish a UK Supreme Court in 2009. It carefully adds that those developments do not 
undermine the principle of parliamentary sovereignty on the basis that ‘in theory’, 
Parliament could repeal any of the legislation underpinning those changes (on repeal and 
disapplication of EU law, see European Scrutiny Committee, 2014; European Scrutiny 
Committee, 2013, p. 97; Tomkins, 2003; Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd. v Smith [1980]).  
 Parliamentary sovereignty was conditioned by ongoing internal reforms 
guaranteeing the primacy of executive-led House of Commons, complete with a 
dominating Cabinet and Whips possessing greater primacy. The increasing 
professionalisation of representatives, albeit with greater independence (Norton, 2013, p. 
27), the nineteenth century realities of Cabinet-style Government with the reliance on party 
voting inside and outside Parliament exerted ever-heightened leadership over Parliament, 
even during the substantial constitutional changes of the late twentieth century.    
In terms of the Crown in Parliament, law and the political community, the concept 
of parliamentary sovereignty has been left with an entrenched quandary: an executive-led 
Parliament delegates its law making capacity in certain regards to other bodies / 
institutions who then impose external control, steerage and direction upon that law, so that 
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those representatives who are elected to the House of Commons by the political 
community to make law no longer have that practical capacity, since its everyday capacity 
or competency, but not ultimate right, was voluntarily ceded under the European 
Communities Act 1972. An elective, delegated Parliament is in a political sense a 
contradiction. Yet, as legal analysts, judges and lawyers have tended to oversee the 
ownership and terms of that debate, it has focused purely on the law and the European 
Communities Act, being only a voluntary Act, parliamentary sovereignty has remained 
pristinely untouched by EU membership. That conclusion seems both legally accurate but 
institutionally myopic.  
Parliament retains its ultimate sovereignty because it has the power to terminate or 
change that membership by repealing or amending the European Communities Act 1972 
(Tomkins, 2010) and yet the 44-year practice of choosing not to terminate or change 
substantial aspects of its Parliament-diminishing EU membership has been imagined to 
have left that doctrine intact. The crisis in the absence of politics itself is misinterpreted. 
The tension is in the restructuring of the state and in electoral representation to Parliament 
– the displaced political conditions and conventions which form the historical precedents. 
The legal definition of sovereignty is provided without a satisfactory account of politics 
and institutions, upon which parliamentary sovereignty depends.   
  Parliament has voluntarily established a higher set of European rules by which its 
legislation can be indirectly reviewed or overridden by higher law of a delegated 
body/agency. The neo-Diceyan definition which the UK has retained now possesses a 
meaning exhausted by previous constitutional struggles. The contemporary debate is not 
because of faults that lie at Dicey’s door but it is to a great extent impoverished by the 
absence or non-engagement with the historical precedents discussed in those eight 
constitutional forms.  
 
The making of the recognised helm: placing present hands on the wheel 
 
Having reviewed those eight constitutional forms alongside the neo-Diceyan legacy, it is 
crucial to understand where the current assessment stands. For all its critics, Dicey’s 
definition remains in contemporary legal and political usage 132 years later. It is strictly 
interpreted as the legal supremacy of statute, which means that there is no source of law 
85 
 
higher than or more authoritative than an Act of Parliament, even if it violates international 
law or changes a principle of judge-made, common law (Tomkins, 2010).  
With the advent of significant constitutional changes, there has been a great deal of 
research which in one short phrase appears to throw out the constitutional baby, that is 
parliamentary sovereignty, with the political bathwater. There are various reasons given for 
doing so – namely on the role and interpretation of the European Communities Act 1972 
(e.g. Norton, 2011), Human Rights Act 1998 (e.g. Feldman, 2011) and post-1998 
devolution legislation (e.g. Tomkins, 2007). On Vernon Bogdanor’s argument, for 
example, the old British Constitution is expressed as Hart’s rule of recognition – ‘What the 
Crown in Parliament enacts is law’ (Bogdanor, 2009a, pp. 13, 73-4), with the author 
rejecting its relevance and role in the modern context. However, major political changes – 
now including the Human Rights Act 1998, the European Communities Act 1972 and 
significant devolution – have not simply meant an end to the ultimate rule in any previous 
constitutional form, and there is therefore no reason why it should be the case in the eighth 
form.  
Both Vernon Bogdanor (2009a) and Anthony King (2007) make a substantive leap 
from their understanding of a heavily delegated, mixed political and parliamentary 
structure – King’s constitutional ‘mess’ and Bogdanor’s mixed, quasi-federal constitution, 
both of which cite the development of the EU – to concluding, as King maintains, that 
there is a new British constitution under which “the British parliament is no longer 
sovereign” (King, 2007, p. 99). The contradiction in brief and in my view in the final 
constitutional form is that the ultimate rule is preserved in theory, and yet the executive-led 
Parliament makes law in practice with external steerage and direction, with one major 
example being EU, which is not itself the creation of an Act of Parliament. Representatives 
are elected by the political community to Parliament to make law in an executive-led 
assembly that has voluntarily ceded, by legislation, to delegate that law-making capacity to 
the EU among other bodies.  
  Overall, it is briefly summarised below in Box 3.1, how those series of eight 
constitutional forms describing prominent historical features help to frame multiple 
constitutional forms of the rule providing for parliamentary sovereignty. Each of those 
constitutional forms illustrate the different meanings attributed to the rule of the recognised 
helm, from its inception to its contemporary context, in a partly episodical, partly 
tangential but partly continuous approach. Only eight substantive events triggered an 
alteration of the fundamental rule to produce a new constitutional form: (i) the codification 
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of the Crown seeking counsel from magnates; (ii) a petitionable Crown seeking approval 
from the House of Commons; (iii) the initiation of the Reformation; (iv) the overstatements 
of divine monarchical power and of common law rights relative to the legislature in the 
Early Stuart period, then Restoration period; (v) the revolution and settlement of 1688/89; 
(vi) the settlement of a mixed power checks power constitution; (vii) the vast extension of 
franchise (under the Reform Acts) with an efficient Cabinet-led Commons, and; (viii) the 
vast extension of agencies and bodies, namely the EU, in providing government.  
 
 





‘What the Crown-with-magnates enacts is law’ (1200-1350) 
 • Thirteenth and fourteenth centuries constitutional form of 
sovereignty defined by Crown with magnates. 
 • Sovereignty exercised by Crown as divine power, increasingly 
subject to fundamental law, moral duty and baronial counsel.  
 • The Crown rules by consulting counsel of magnates. 
 • The helm of the ship of state governed by Crown advised by 
counsel. 
 • Perceived claim to representation necessary for taxation for 
Crown revenues. 
 • Sovereignty overtly political, not legal, albeit increasing 
codification of means through which Crown should seek 
counsel.  
 • Crown’s power to govern is mutually conditioned by 






‘What the Crown-with-Commons enacts is law’ (1350-1532) 
 • Late fourteenth century to the Reformation constitutional form 
of sovereignty defined by Crown with the Commons.  
 • The Crown rules with Commons but increasingly bound, not 
only advised by, the Commons activity.  
 • Widening representation through use of petitions, county- and 
town-representing, and impeachment of officers for 40 shilling 
freeholders 
 • Equalising of power at helm of state with capacity to pass law 
i.e. dominium politicum et regale. 
 • Parliamentary validation of title to the throne 
 • Crown’s power to govern continues to be mutually conditioned 
by fundamental law/rights understood as moral duty. 





‘What the Crown-through-Parliament enacts is law’ (1533-1602) 
 • Sovereignty defined after the Reformation is increasingly 
derived from Crown through Parliament (Parliamentarian 
theory), not simply Crown with Parliament (Royalist). 
 • Assumption made of legislative sovereignty after 1539/40. 
 • Reformation Parliament said to gain omnicompetence e.g. jus 
regale politicum, in which no area involved in the government of 




 • Crown did require consent for lawful taxation and legislation. 
 • Crown, Lords and Commons exist within a mixed powers 
constitution. 
 • Crown’s power to govern is mutually conditioned by 
fundamental law/rights understood as moral duty. 
 • Assumption made of parliamentary representation of the 
political community as the consent of every man. Electorate of 




‘What the Crown-with-disputed Parliament enacts is law’ (1603-
1687) 
 • Sovereignty defined in the early Stuart period and the 
Restoration is less derived from Crown-through-Parliament, 
increasingly by Crown-with-Parliament. 
 • The Parliament rules with Crown but disputed foundations of 
Crown, ancient common law or consenting community. 
 • Distinct emphasis, however erroneous, on common law 
constitution as foundation of sovereignty. 
 • Crown’s power to govern is bound, it is claimed, by the assertion 
of an ancient common law/rights, now understood as legal (not 
moral) duty. 
 • With no consensus, the monarchy was finally restored and with 
the assumption of legislative authority of the monarch with 
Parliament. 
 • Continued assumption made of parliamentary representation of 
the political community.  








‘What the monarch-in-regulating Parliament enacts is law’ (1688-
1689) 
 • Theorised before the revolutionary events of 1688/9. 
 • Sovereignty established in the form of a parliamentary 
monarchy. 
 • Crown brought under the powers of the omnipotent legislature. 
 • Courts thereby denied the power to limit Parliament’s 
sovereignty. 
 • Crown power to govern continues to be mutually conditioned by 
fundamental law/rights understood however as moral duty, not 
as a legal duty. The claimed supremacy of an ancient common 
law constitution is limited by the settled supremacy of 
Parliament.  
 • Representative claim to gaining consent through consensual, 
elective, representation and majoritarian Parliament develops its 
own independence. 
 • Broad political sovereignty tied to a tighter definition of legal 
sovereignty. 




‘What the Crown-in-mixed constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ 
(1690-1790s) 
 • The eighteenth-century formulation of sovereignty bolstered by 
a mixed, balanced constitution. 
 • Parliamentary oligarchy has uncontrollable, despotic sovereign 
power combined with commitment to limited government.  
 • Balanced and mixed, ‘power checks power’ constitution of the 
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monarchical (monarch), aristocratic (Lords) and democratic 
(Commons representing people) powers. 
 • Tories concede legislative sovereignty belongs to Crown in 
Parliament. 
 • Whigs concede people cannot be trusted beyond a limited 
political role. 
 • The power to govern continues to be mutually conditioned by 
fundamental law/rights understood however as moral duty, not 
as a legal duty. The claimed supremacy of an ancient common 
law constitution figures heavily in dialogue but is closed off in 
practice by the supremacy of Parliament.  
 • Reform movements to undermine parliamentary sovereignty 
discredited by activities of the French Revolution. 





‘What the monarch-in-Parliamentary Cabinet enacts is law’ (1800-
1972) 
 • The nineteenth century formulation of sovereignty as largely 
exercised by the Crown and parliamentary political elite. 
 • The aristocratic elite rule through an increasingly more 
representative Parliament. 
 • Capacity of Parliament to make law without external direction 
upon nation. 
 • Fusion of ministerial Cabinet powers at the heart of the 
Commons – the Commons having primacy over the Lords, and 
no preoccupation with the balanced or mixed constitution.   




 • Altering of the franchise, significantly and incrementally 
broadening the electorate and ending of the 40 shilling 
freeholder.  
 • Almost solely defined through law, less through politics.  
 • Cabinet government’s efficient power to govern provides no 
settled link between sovereign power as being mutually 
conditioned by the rule of law and fundamental law/rights. The 
serious claim to the supremacy of an ancient common law 




‘What the monarch-through-Parliamentary political elite with 
external bodies enacts is law’ (1973-present) 
 • The twentieth and twenty-first century formulation of 
sovereignty exercised by Government through the political elites 
in Parliament and with external bodies, particularly the EU. 
 • Increased strength for Government ruling through Parliament 
and when applicable, external agency and bodies. 
 • A political elite of ministers elected by a full franchise of the 
people governs through an asymmetrical, bicameral elected 
Parliament in which the Commons decides and the Lords 
advises.  
 • The EU, the devolved bodies, the Supreme Court and the Human 
Rights Act can each claim to enhance executive and judicial 
institutions but limit the application of parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
 • Practical primacy accorded to executive leadership in House of 
Commons through the increased power of Cabinet and Whips. 
 • Government’s power to dominate prevails but now mutually 
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conditioned by fundamental law/rights and under certain 
legislation, even bound as a legal duty. The claimed supremacy 
of the rule of law and a common law constitution features 
heavily in dialogue although is largely closed off in practice by 
the supremacy of Parliament.  
 
 
The ultimate rule credits the actors in the recognised helm. The nature of being ‘at the 
helm’ is the description of the leading, traditional, composite parts of the state. Throughout 
the constitutional forms, there is a Crown, whose prerogative powers are today conducted 
through the powers of the ministers in the executive. They each inherit various descriptions 
throughout different constitutional forms. It is a recognised helm because there is an 
acceptance or consent for those participating actors to fulfil a given purpose within their 
constitutional boundaries. In the first medieval constitutional form, the Crown and 
magnates are at the helm, constrained only marginally at the helm by codified, 
fundamental law (e.g. the Magna Carta). In the late fourteenth century to the Reformation 
of the second form, the Crown and the Commons are at the helm, constrained and 
conditioned only partially at the helm by fundamental law and in some limited manner by 
concerns of the 40 shilling freeholder constituents and county- and town-representing. The 
third constitutional form of sovereignty after the Reformation, defers strongly to the Crown 
and Parliament at the helm to govern in every area of the realm (e.g. over Church) but 
particularly for lawful taxation and legislation. The constraining actors at the helm, again, 
could only be understood in terms of fundamental law and the concerns of the 40 shilling 
freeholder constituents. The fourth form defines the Crown and Parliament at the helm but 
more strongly – potentially, legally – constrained by the judges and the perceived ancient 
common law constitution, and the binding claims of the consenting community as 
foundational to sovereignty and in some cases, with the claim of the Crown reigning 
supreme over Parliament. The fifth form emphasises the settlement between the Crown, the 
Parliament directly linked as representative of the people and in particular, through the 
political parties. The claims of the judicial element over the common law are importantly 
recognised but regulated, unable to exceed the limits of Parliament’s claim to sovereignty. 
The sixth form identifies the Crown (Royal), Commons (democratic), Lords (aristocratic) 
and the judiciary as actors participating and checking within a balanced constitution (Kors, 
2012; Jenkins, 2011; Gagarin, 2010; Lieberman, 2006; Bellamy, 1996, p. 441; Blythe, 
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1992, p. 12). The seventh form of sovereignty recognises the Crown and the parliamentary, 
aristocratic, political elite of the Cabinet in government as the main powers at the helm, 
increasingly conditioned and constrained by the electorate through major changes to the 
franchise under the Reform Acts, but no realistic limitation by common law claims. The 
eighth constitutional form adopts the Crown powers and the parliamentary political elite of 
ministers at the centre of the recognised helm – with only more recent claims by the EU, 
the devolved bodies, the Supreme Court and the Human Rights Act seeking to enhance 
executive and judicial institutions but which can limit the objectives of the Crown powers 
exercised by the ministerial executive and assented to by the parliamentary elite. The 
ministerial power to dominate Parliament’s agenda prevails but it is bound by fundamental 
law/rights doctrines under certain legislation (e.g. namely, the Human Rights Act and the 
European Communities Act), even to the point it is obliged as a legal duty to follow or 
consider that legislation where inconsistent with its own national legislation.   
The recognised helm is therefore the acknowledged and recognised legal and 
political space defining what is permitted to steer, direct and control new or novel inter-
relationships. It is the helm of state which has permitted the incorporation of new inter-
relationships, for example, between the Crown and the magnates of the realm; between 
Papal interference and the Crown, the Church and the community; between the EU and the 
executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the electorate; between the Magna Carta’s 
listed rights and the Crown, the magnates and the people. In each case, competing 
historical claims often insist that sovereignty in or involving Parliament has been lost, 
qualified, eroded, altered or destroyed, with others claiming it is preserved or enhanced. 
However, with the proposition of a recognised helm, there is a more reflexive model. It is 
less prescriptive. It does rely on the acknowledgement, or recognition, of participating 
actors within the constitution.  
The first constitutional form of ‘What the Crown-with-magnates enacts is law’ 
(1200-1350) is a Crown whose sovereignty only makes sense with reference to this inter-
relationship with the counsel of magnates. The exercise of sovereignty is increasingly and 
formally politically bound by a counsel of magnates but more loosely and morally bound 
by fundamental law. The second form of ‘What the Crown-with-Commons enacts is law’ 
(1350-1532) is a form of sovereignty defined by the petitionable Crown with the 
Commons. The exercise of sovereignty is increasingly bound, not only advised by, the 
Commons activity through use of petitions and county- and town-representing and yet only 
minimally, mutually conditioned by morally binding fundamental law. The third form of 
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‘What the Crown-through-Parliament enacts is law’ (1533-1602) is sovereignty derived 
from a Crown through Parliament, not simply a Crown with Parliament. The exercise of 
sovereignty depended upon a Parliament in which no area involved in the government of 
the realm was outside of its authority, but Royal despotic power continued to be exercised, 
since it remained only minimally and mutually conditioned by morally binding 
fundamental law. The fourth form ‘What the Crown-with-disputed Parliament enacts is 
law’ (1603-1687) moves towards a sovereignty formula in which it is less derived from 
Crown-through-Parliament, increasingly by Crown-with-Parliament. Parliament is 
devalued. The exercise of sovereignty is increasingly bound, it is claimed, by the judges’ 
prominent assertion of a mythical ancient common law/rights but now comprehended as 
legal (not moral) duty. In the fifth constitutional form, ‘What the Crown-in-regulating 
Parliament enacts is law’ (1688-1689), in which the Crown is brought under the powers of 
a regulating, sovereign omnipotent legislature. The courts were thereby denied the power 
to limit Parliament’s sovereignty. The claims to the binding nature of supremacy of an 
ancient common law constitution is now limited by the settled supremacy of Parliament. In 
the sixth form, ‘What the Crown-in-mixed constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ (1690-
1790s), is an inherited sovereignty of a supreme Parliament bolstered by a mixed, balanced 
constitution of the monarchical (monarch), aristocratic (Lords) and democratic (Commons 
representing people) powers. The parliamentary oligarchy has uncontrollable power 
balanced with the Crown and the judges and checked by a much-discussed supremacy of 
an ancient common law constitution which is closed off in practice. In the seventh form, 
‘What the Crown-in-Parliamentary Cabinet enacts is law’ (1800-1972), sovereignty is 
mostly legislative, largely exercised by the Crown and parliamentary political elite through 
the Cabinet, bound increasingly by the broadening franchise. The efficient ministerial 
powers to govern provided no settled link or bind on the sovereign power whatsoever by 
the rule of law of the courts. The eighth constitutional form, ‘What the Crown-through-
Parliamentary political elite with external bodies enacts is law’ (1973-present) considers 
sovereignty exercised by political elites in Parliament and through external bodies bound 
increasingly by the EU, the devolved bodies, the Supreme Court and the Human Rights 
Act which can limit the practical exercise of parliamentary sovereignty. The mutually 
conditioning of sovereignty by fundamental law and rights can under certain legislation 
now be constrained by a legal duty to comply with. 
The recognised helm carries with it a substantive implication about the nature of 
power sharing and of sovereignty. It assumes that there are recognised actors and a 
recognised set of inter-relationships, as discussed above. When those actors and 
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relationships between the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the electorate are 
recognised, there is an assumption of jointly, and however competitively, bolstering 
sovereignty at the helm. They wield substantive power in the state and parts of their roles 
and functions are shared. Therefore, it is not necessary to assume that all the constraints of 
fundamental rights charters or of popular power upon sovereignty should be understood 
merely as limitations. Both in the case of fundamental rights and expressions of popular 
power, they can be properly understood as bolstering parliamentary sovereignty. Equally, 
the full exercise of executive power, under the full consent of Parliament, bolsters not 
limits parliament’s sovereignty. Therefore, not all power-sharing at the helm ought to be 
understood as somehow a limitation. Where limitations upon parliamentary sovereignty are 
enacted or created, it can often be understood through the altering of, or introduction of, 
new actors and their inter-relationships at the helm to point that they transgress the 
precedented relationships as understood through previous constitutional forms. The 
significance of power-sharing need not be overstated because, as has already been 
described, actors at the recognised helm can steer and direct other central actors i.e. namely 
the Government acting through Parliament. Steering and directing power does not 
necessarily equal sharing of power. It is mainly the executive, the legislature, the judiciary 
and the electorate who have a hand at the wheel of the ship of state, sometimes having their 
power strengthened while at other points weakening their power in comparison to other 
state powers. 
In the case of the EU, limitations upon parliamentary sovereignty are created 
through the altering and introduction of new EU institutional actors and their inter-
relationships with the EU and national courts, the legislature and member state 
governments and the people. The alteration has been created at the point that the 
constitutional ‘unsettling’ transgresses the precedented relationships as understood through 
previous constitutional forms. The EU contributes, with its competitive hand on the helm, 
to steering and directing the Government and Parliament, giving it a greater role in 
navigating state policies. At the recognised helm, successive governments, through 
Parliaments, have adopted practices which whilst preserving the fundamental rule, are at 
odds with past historical precedents. This process has led to an altering of the relationships 
between the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the electorate with the EU 




When there is friction or conflict between past constitutional forms of the UK 
constitution, it is possible to consider the friction or unbalancing of past constitutional 
conventions as ‘unsettling’. In particular, when a modern constitutional form of the 
constitutional understanding in the eighth stage is in conflict with the previous seven 
historical constitutional forms, an ‘unsettling’ occurs which centres on: 
  
• A shift from one constitutional form to a newer or different one, particularly a past 
historical form and the contemporary eighth constitutional form. 
• The experience of unsettling focuses on the experience in the disturbing of 
historically precedented inter-relationships between the executive, the legislature, 
the judiciary and the electorate. 
• A shift away from or toward a qualitatively and uniquely different constitutional 
form in which one of the defining features (e.g. bringing the executive under a 
more formal accountability to the legislature or bringing the legislative under a 
uniquely new form of accountability to its electorate) has been altered or swept 
away. 
• When there is a shift in one major feature of a constitutional form, it necessitates an 
impact on all or most other powers in the constitution e.g. the Reformation and the 
creation of an omnicompetent Parliament or the incorporation of the EU in 1973. 
• The most substantive form of ‘unsettling’ derives from a change in the fundamental 
rule which underpins the contemporary constitutional form of parliamentary 
sovereignty, for example, after the Reformation, and the events of 1688. 
 
The less substantive form of unsettling, including changes induced by the European 
Communities Act 1972 and its subsequent amendments and post-1997 constitutional 
reforms, derive from the change in some of the features from previous historical 
constitutional forms. The eighth constitutional form deviates strongly from past historical 
forms, particularly through its emphasis on fundamental rights charters adjudicated upon 
by courts in Luxembourg and Strasbourg, the independence and elevation of the national 
judiciary in respect of the legislature and executive, and a body of government derived 
from EU institutions. 
If there is to be an ultimate rule of the recognised helm which must provide the 
conditions another rule must satisfy in order for that rule to impose obligations as valid law 
and settlement, the requisite historical conditions of the social rule must be given. The 
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composite parts of parliamentary sovereignty which have been provided for in the eight 
historical constitutional forms have provided the rule with its criteria. The helm can be 
defined, in Bracton’s view, by sovereignty at the helm of the medieval state being bound to 
moral duty but ultimately, the law and the law-making sovereign remaining “mutually 
conditioned”, reciprocal and interdependent at the helm, even though the sovereign power 
retains the power to govern the realm (Kantorowicz, 1957, pp. 153, 155). Each defining 
moment of parliamentary sovereignty’s historical meaning have a share in the criteria 
provided by the ultimate rule. It is not maintained that conditions have an equal share 
because historical events and the flexible relevance that precedents have to contemporary 
politics, as balanced within the unique historical forms, determine the relevance of, for 
example, omnicompetence or fundamental rights provision to the current meaning of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The conceptualisations of parliamentary sovereignty as 
described within the eight historical constitutional forms find their expression, however 
latent or however pronounced, in that ultimate rule. Without them, the rule of the 
recognised helm is an internal vacuum, an apolitical, legal abstraction and not ‘ultimate’ in 
any sense. The rule of the recognised helm attempts to respond to both the requirements of 
legal positivists in insisting upon rules which provide valid law (e.g. Hart, 1997) and also 
to constructivist and poststructuralist assumptions of sovereignty as historically contingent 
upon political conditions.  
  The conditions of the ultimate rule provide for historically precedented 
constitutional forms of the constitution by explaining the relationship between institutions, 
rules and customs. By precedent, it is meant that the fingertips of past, historical 
precedents are pressed into the old, dry sponge of UK constitutional history by past 
political customs and constitutional conventions, to be compressed, reshaped and 
reconfigured in reflecting those precedents. On the interaction between rules and 
precedented historical customs, even though classical liberal thought, particularly in the 
approach of John Locke, conceived of custom in the negative – as inhibiting individual 
reason – his view on liberal culture was one where customs were reasonable, meaning that 
they support the authority of reasonable rules and that there are good reasons for them 
(Grant, 2012, p. 621). Hart himself, however, rejected habitual obedience or accustomed 
belief in the sovereign in the view of political theorists such as Austin and Hobbes, or 
custom, or obedience, or habit, etc, as the basis for laws as social rules. However, on the 
basis that Hart assumes laws are rules and therefore social, his fuller theory was not as 
parsimonious as first might seem: some place must be given to custom and political 
precedent otherwise there is really no such thing as Hart’s own proposition of laws as 
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social rules. In terms of custom, Edmund Burke, for example, critiqued the brutality of the 
French revolutionaries’ determination to transform political life by their having removed 
historical tradition and constitutional custom (Berkowitz, 2013, p. 52) – custom thereby 
embodied the nation’s inherited and accumulated wisdom relating to their organisation and 
institutions (see also, Pocock, 1987, p. 242). For Burke, sovereignty and the business of 
governing were a matter of convention, customised by inheritance, prescription and simple 
necessity (Radasanu, 2011, p. 18). Locke and Burke are rarely mentioned together in the 
orthodoxy of political theory, but they do help us in this context because historical 
constitutional forms which we employ to characterise features of sovereignty and 
parliamentary sovereignty are not simply accrued or aggregated – they thrive, survive, 
part-survive or completely decay or die, but nonetheless they all provide precedent and 
convention. They are the conditions of the ultimate rule of recognised helm contained 
within Locke’s liberal culture in which customs are reasonable, and they support the 
authority of reasonable legal rules and that there are good reasons for them. While such a 
view is not as custom-based as Burke suggested the constitution was – because he did not 
accept that sovereignty, law and the business of governing are rule-based – nevertheless 
those rules and the ultimate rule are themselves buttressed by historical precedent, as 
conventions and customs upheld, for example, by inheritance. 
 In understanding the rule of the recognised helm, historical understandings 
contained within the eight constitutional forms are pertinent because: 
• Constitutional forms, as historical conditions, give the rule existence.  
• Parliamentary sovereignty as an ultimate rule of the recognised helm acts as a 
workable rule because it provides those conditions any other rule must satisfy in 
order for the rule to impose obligations as valid law and political settlement.  
• Social conditions and customs are crucial, but by no means causal or restrictive, to 
the rule.  
• Parliament is sovereign not because it is a principle to be weighed against others 
via judicial interpretation but because it is an institutionalised rule of the recognised 
helm dependent upon the customs, conventions and politics of past historical 
precedents.  
The following chapter (Chapter 4) will set out that Parliament, since 1973, has become 
practically less sovereign because the fusion of the executive with EU machinery, the 
dilution of the domestic legislature and the fusion of the judiciary with the Luxembourg 
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court system, impacts upon and unsettles a past constitutional form of parliamentary 
sovereignty. That explanation of parliamentary sovereignty impacts upon the sixth of the 
eight historical constitutional forms, reflected in the views of Blackstone (1765), Burke 
(1774) and Montesquieu (1748) in the eighteenth century, in which the status of the 
ultimate rule in the sixth historical constitutional form of ‘What the Crown-in-mixed 
constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ required balance against its political custom of the 
balanced, mixed constitution to support the rule. The contemporary, changing relationships 
between the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the electorate have altered 
remarkably because of the interaction with the EU. A consideration of the case study of the 
EU-level Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) provides some evidence that the UK’s 
recognised helm has, through this unsettling of the historical precedented mixed 
constitution model, impacted upon parliamentary sovereignty. Chapter 5 then goes on to 
argue that Parliament has become practically less sovereign because of the distorting of the 
European Parliament to collectively represent its electors. The case study of the Working 
Time Directive illustrates that the recognised helm has had European Parliament-level 
functional representation competing with the Westminster Parliament to produce an 
unsettling of the historically precedented capacity to collectively represent its electors as 
strongly embedded within precedented political historical constitutional forms. It thereby 
unsettles the political strength of parliamentary sovereignty. Chapter 6 proceeds to describe 
a Parliament that is effectively less sovereign in part because the recognised helm has had 
EU-level fundamental rights schemes, protected by the courts, incorporated into it. The 
case study of the free movement right has illustrated the dilution of the domestic legislature 
as a rights-providing institution, which combined with the disappearing consensus between 
the arms of state and community in providing rights, has progressed a continued legislative 
decline and judicial advance in the UK, impacting indirectly upon the stabilisation of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Chapter 7 then argues that Parliament becomes practically less 
sovereign when the recognised helm has had EU-level decision-making incorporated into 
it, directly reducing parliamentary ultimate decision-making power over political decisions 
as exercised by the Government-in-Parliament on behalf of its electors. David Cameron’s 
Prime Ministerial-led renegotiation ahead of the EU Referendum provided significant 
evidence of the executive-legislative gap under EU membership; yet, since the EU 
Referendum of June 2016, Parliament’s ultimate power to decide on the UK’s EU 
relationship permits the executive to pursue a constitutional resettlement, if it so chooses, 
addressing the historical dilution of parliamentary powers. That step signifies the 
realignment of Parliament with a historically precedented basis in which the operation of 
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Parliament’s ultimate decision-making power over political decisions was maintained by 
the Government-in-Parliament on behalf of its electors.   
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Chapter 4: Parliamentary sovereignty, the precedent of the mixed constitutional 
model and the UK’s membership of the EU  
 
Parliament remains theoretically sovereign in part because the ultimate rule of 
parliamentary sovereignty rests on the precedential and structural basis of the mixed 
constitution in which the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are intermeshed as 
functionally separate but practically inter-related. Yet Parliament is practically less 
sovereign because, since 1973, the UK’s governing helm has had the EU institutions 
incorporated into its government through a fusion of the executive with EU machinery, the 
dilution of the domestic legislature and the fusion of the judiciary with the Luxembourg 
court system, which impacts upon and unsettles the political strength of parliamentary 
sovereignty. That explanation of parliamentary sovereignty impacts upon the sixth of the 
eight historical constitutional forms, illustrating the meaning of the mixed constitution 
attributed to parliamentary sovereignty.  
  Parliamentary sovereignty during the eighteenth century, stated as ‘What the 
Crown-in-mixed constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ (1690-1790s), reflected the 
1688/89 settlement, the 1707 Union and the rivalling of popular sovereignty with 
Parliament’s sovereignty. The ultimate rule in the sixth historical constitutional form 
requires balance against its political custom of the mixed constitution to support the rule. It 
is the sixth episodical moment within a historically discontinuous approach of eight 
potential historical constitutional forms describing parliamentary sovereignty. It is a 
balanced constitution which depends upon government through the mixed monarchical 
(monarch), aristocratic (Lords) and democratic (Commons representing people) powers, 
broadly in the interests of a parliamentary oligarchy. This historically precedented 
constitutional form responds to Bogdanor’s (2009a) claim that constitutions have the 
objective of ‘providing organisation’ (Bogdanor, 2009a, pp. 53-54), and to that extent the 
historical forms of the mixed constitutional model specifies the organisational and 
relational features of the British ‘constitution’.  
  For modern purposes, as the contemporary classical guide to parliamentary practice 
and procedure, Erskine May, prefaced by the former Clerk of the House of Commons, Sir 
Malcolm Jack, states “The flexibilities inherent in the United Kingdom’s constitutional 
arrangements mean that the relationships between the principal elements, the Crown, the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary, are not immutable, but even so the rate and 
extent of change, particularly in respect of the relationships between the legislature and the 
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executive and the legislature and the judiciary … has been remarkable. Some of that 
change—for example law emanating from the European Union — occurs outside but 
greatly influences the workings of Parliament.” (Jack et al., 2011, p. viii). In other words, 
the contemporary, changing relationships between the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary have been remarkable because of the interaction with the EU. It unsettles the 
political precedents of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament is practically less sovereign 
because EU membership has unsettled prior historical constitutional forms in which the 
powers of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary must now be joined by the EU in 
impelling the machinery of government in a direction different from which either acting by 
itself would previously have done.  
It is not unusual to refer to, or imply, that the contemporary British constitution is a 
mixed constitution. Tomkins (2013) proposes that the contemporary British constitution is 
indeed now a “mixed constitution”, but does not employ the term with any use of historical 
precedent but in the sense of referring to the contemporary mix of politics and law 
(Tomkins, 2013, p. 2275). The mixed constitution possesses elements of both a political 
constitution and a legal constitution in explaining how the modern executive is held to 
account; and the distinction between the legal and political can often been a false choice. 
Yet, in doing so, it resists references to the mix of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy 
that eighteenth century legal and political scholars had described. He adds that the concept 
does not take us very far. In his view, “It matters less that the constitution is mixed than 
what the balance of the mix is, and should be.” (Tomkins, 2013, p. 2276). However, it 
matters both that the constitution is mixed and what the balance of the mix is, because that 
is precisely how EU membership has affected the underlying political custom of the mixed 
constitution, underpinning parliamentary sovereignty. Constitutional theorists such as 
Turpin and Tomkins (2011) overlook the relevance of the separation of powers doctrine in 
relation to buttressing contemporary parliamentary government and sovereignty but that is 
partly due to their focus being limited to an analysis of parliamentary government after the 
Reform Act of 1832 as not being based on separation of powers doctrine (Turpin and 
Tomkins, 2011, p. 129). 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the historical mixed constitution  
 
The mixed constitution has an inherent place in the historical development of the British 
constitution. The most preeminent authority on parliamentary sovereignty during the 
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eighteenth century is Blackstone, who in 1765, wrote of Parliament that it has sovereign 
and uncontrollable authority, an absolute despotic power entrusted by the constitution and 
was able to do anything unless of course it was naturally impossible (Lubert, 2010; 
Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 202; Blackstone, 1765). Blackstone characterises such sovereign 
power as located within a tripartite, neo-Montesquieuan mixed constitution (Lieberman, 
2006, pp. 318, 335; Montesquieu, 1748), although Lieberman questionably rejects 
parliamentary sovereignty as impermissible in that constitution. For Blackstone, England 
historically enjoyed a mixed constitution founded on the Crown, Lords and Commons – as 
“distinct powers” which jointly impel the machinery of government in a direction different 
from what either one acting by itself would have done and thereby in a direction formed 
from each part (Blackstone, 1765). Close to Blackstone, Montesquieu’s view of the 
English ‘power checks power’ constitution (Bellamy, 1996, pp. 443-4) is one in which the 
executive and the two branches of the legislative act as checks on one another yet the 
judicial power and tribunals of law are subordinate to the legislation (Lubert, 2010; 
Goldsworthy, 1999; Montesquieu, 1748). The sovereignty of Parliament for Edmund 
Burke, is located within a balanced constitution configured around a trust between the 
Crown and Parliament’s chambers (Craig, 2012, pp. 106-8).  
  Blackstone, Burke and many other leading political figures in eighteenth century 
England described the British constitution as being a well-balanced combination of 
different forms of government – monarchical, aristocratic and democratic – each balancing 
out the other (Lieberman, 2006, p. 318; Blackstone, 1765, pp. i, 50-2). The constitution 
generally reflected a ramshackle system held together by a poorly integrated composite 
state (O’Gorman, 2012). Nevertheless, judicial review was in this context not considered 
necessary for a system in which the Commons claimed to represent the electorate and the 
Crown and the Lords checked that relationship (Goldsworthy, 1999) and essentially 
decided what the law was which was then enforced by the courts. The organising principle 
for the English eighteenth-century constitution was that it could preserve political freedom 
by effectively preventing arbitrary or tyrannical acts of power (Lieberman, 2006, p. 317). 
The ultimate rule in the sixth historical constitutional form of ‘What the Crown-in-mixed 
constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ requires balance against its political convention of 
the mixed constitution to support the rule.  
  Although Dicey in the nineteenth century accepted principles and rules as “the 
conventions of the Constitution” which regulate relationships (Russell, 1987, p. 545), he 
subverted those conventions of Blackstone (1765), Burke and Montesquieu (1748) in 
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theory as non-legal, additions to the constitution, rather than having political primacy. The 
Diceyan approach provided no direct credit to the mixed constitution as a political custom 
(Francis and Morrow, 1994, p. 10) in understanding parliamentary sovereignty in the 
seventh and eighth historical constitutional forms. In the sixth historical constitutional form 
examining the eighteenth-century constitution (Chapter 3), however, the ultimate rule 
conferred supremacy upon the unlimited and absolute power of Parliament. The rule is 
constructed by political conventions, including a Tory-Whig consensus with the Crown-in-
Parliament, but limited role of the people, exercised within the mixed constitution of the 
executive, legislature and the judiciary.  
 Government at the helm of state – involving the mixed constitution of the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary – has since 1973 experienced the addition of EU 
institutions incorporated into its structure. Since the sovereign Parliament within the UK 
state structure has so often been lodged within the mixed powers, it is useful to examine 
their conceptual relevance to illuminate the EU’s institutional impact on the UK’s rule of 
the recognised helm. The conceptualisation of parliamentary sovereignty as emanating 
from the mixed constitution of Blackstone (1765), Montesquieu and Burke (Craig, 2012; 
Bourke, 1999) in the sixth historical constitutional form finds its expression, however 
latent or however pronounced, in that ultimate rule. That construction of the ultimate rule 
provides for constitutional custom and legal and political precedent. Parliamentary 
sovereignty is an ultimate rule of the recognised helm because, as a rule, it provides those 
political conditions (e.g. the mixed constitution) any other rule must satisfy in order for the 
rule to impose obligations as valid law confirming political settlement. The rule works 
because the executive initiates law and policy, the legislature accepts or rejects them, and 
the judiciary applies the law of that executive, assented to by the legislature, without 
substantial, external interference. The conditions are therefore crucial, but by no means 
causal or restrictive, to the rule because of the flexibility inherent to past, political 
precedent. A mixed constitution which places limits on government does not necessarily 
challenge the sovereignty of Parliament. Blackstone’s (1765) notion that the mix of 
Commons, Lords and Crown would jointly impel the machinery of government was 
derived from the notion that Parliament as a whole had sovereignty authority. Given the 
ultimate rule of parliamentary sovereignty must provide the conditions another rule must 
satisfy in order for that rule to impose obligations as valid law and political settlement, the 
requisite conditions of the rule must be properly described, namely the role of the EU 
institutions as it impresses upon the organised, historical precedent of the mixed 




Parliamentary sovereignty and the contemporary mixed constitution 
 
It is imperative to recognise the contemporary relationship between parliamentary 
sovereignty and the mixed constitutional model – particularly in contrast to ideal types 
underlying features of either a republican state or a constitutional state which undermine 
that connection and never wholly explain parliamentary sovereignty or its relationship to 
the mixed constitution, as impacted upon by EU membership. Bogdanor (2009a) in his 
central argument in The New British Constitution, argues that the post-2007 era of 
constitutional reform, together with Britain’s entry in 1973 into the European Communities 
has had the effect of replacing one constitution – that is the Diceyan doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and Bagehot’s proposed fusion of the legislative and executive 
powers – with a new constitution. The main elements of the new constitution include: post- 
European Communities Act arrangements, the Human Rights Act, the cornerstone of the 
new constitution; the devolution legislation, which has turned Britain from a unitary into a 
quasi-federal state; reform of the House of Lords, radically altering the role of the upper 
House; and the employment of referendums to validate constitutional reforms. He suggests 
those reforms strengthened the likelihood of Britain adopting a written or codified 
constitution and the potentiality for a popular constitutional state (Bogdanor, 2009a, pp. i-
xiii). However, the emergence of a popular constitutional state, based on those features, is 
not evident. The old constitution, he theorises, was based on the sovereignty of Parliament; 
the new constitution is based on a constitutional state with an enhanced separation of 
powers (Bogdanor, 2009a, p. 285). Bogdanor (2009a), in describing the complex mix of 
the new constitution, recognises it but views the rule of law as superseding Hart’s rule 
along with other more novel features and reforms at the forefront of the constitution. 
However, it has never been a zero-sum game as Bogdanor assumes: the UK has both 
parliamentary sovereignty and a pragmatically organised, partial separation of powers (on 
the latter, see Masterman, 2011) which ultimately have a directing capacity at the helm. 
Bogdanor’s theory is antithetical to recognising the contemporary connection between 
parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers, as the tripartite basis of mixed 
government.  
The traditional mixed constitution of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary 
is practically inter-related in the sense that under the Westminster model, ministers in 
government leading their departmental bill teams (including legal advisers) and policy 
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officials of the executive are at the recognised helm by proposing and drafting 
conventional Government bills, which in turn require consent of the House of Commons 
and application by the judiciary. As a ‘reactive’ legislature, the House of Commons is the 
means for a Government’s dominant, partisan parliamentary majority to support, amend or 
reject the executive’s legislation and their wider governing objectives, but not propose 
alternatives on their own (Norton, 1984; Norton, 1994; Mezey, 1979). The 1689 Bill of 
Rights established for the House of Commons a sole right to authorize taxation and the 
level of financial supply to the Crown. The Westminster model assumes the Prime Minister 
and members of the Cabinet are mostly drawn from the Commons (especially the more 
senior members), mostly from within a dominant Government, built upon a partisan 
Commons majority. In practice, a Government, with a strong majority, rules through 
Parliament (which has led many to view parliamentary sovereignty itself as only a vehicle 
for the will of the Government). The House of Lords has limited powers in the form of a 
legitimising and scrutinising body for proposing revisions to the Commons. The 
heightened democratic basis of the House of Commons secures its primacy over the House 
of Lords and the Crown within Parliament. The judiciary are then required to give effect to 
the statutes of Parliament or interpret their meaning where complexity and uncertainty 
arises as to how the law applies in a given situation. The judiciary is the branch of 
government responsible for interpreting the law and for resolving legal disputes, albeit 
under the Human Rights Act 1998, courts are able to make decisions through interpretation 
of legislation in a way which preserves European Convention rights (Bradley, 2011, p. 64; 
Bradley and Ewing, 2010, pp. 401-7). Those functionally separate institutions of the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary are practically interrelated by procedures and 
flexible relationships which underpin the rule of parliamentary sovereignty.  
The contemporary recognised helm has historically experienced the incorporation 
of EU institutions into that helm through a fusion of the executive with EU machinery, the 
dilution of the domestic legislature and the fusion of the judiciary within the Luxembourg 
(and Strasbourg) court system, which impacts upon parliamentary sovereignty. As such, 
EU obligations dilute and unsettle Blackstone’s (1765) understanding of the mixed 
constitution, existing as historical precedent: the Crown and legislature are now joined by 
the EU at the helm in jointly impelling the machinery of government in a direction 
different from what either one acting by itself would have done and thereby a direction 
formed from each part. Bogdanor (2009a), in line with many contemporary legal theorists, 
chiefly and questionably designates the constitutional reforms implemented since 1997 as 
having fundamentally altered the balance between the executive, the legislature and the 
107 
 
judiciary – and enhancing a separation of powers – and provides little credit to the much 
earlier EU membership itself as having affected or distorted that separation. It has meant, 
for Bogdanor (2009a), that the idea of parliamentary sovereignty has been replaced (not 
enhanced) by that of the separation of powers – a key feature in Britain’s move towards a 
constitutional state – rather than a state in practice operating on the rule of parliamentary 
sovereignty bolstered by the historical precedent of a mixed constitution, subsequently 
impacted upon by EU membership.  
  There is a partial separation of powers (see Masterman, 2011), particularly between 
the executive and the legislature and the extent of that separation depends upon the extent 
to which Parliament asserts itself against the government of the day. The EU helps 
reinforce that separation. As Bogdanor (2009a) perceptively observes, the traditional 
British constitution, in line with Bagehot’s view, supposes that there is no separation of 
powers at all, only a fusion between the executive and legislature, between Cabinet and 
Parliament, through the Cabinet. Bogdanor holds, contrary to Bagehot, however, there had 
always been a partial separation of powers given that not every MP is a minister, there is a 
separation of powers between Cabinet and Parliament and also the extent of that separation 
depends upon the extent to which Parliament asserts itself against the government of the 
day which depends upon political vicissitudes (Bogdanor, 2009a, p. 285), although 
ministers must collectively support the government and backbench government MPs only 
ought to. The separation of government and Parliament has also been intensified by the 
removal of the hereditary peers from the House of Lords (Bogdanor, 2009a, p. 288); with 
peers chosen specifically for the purpose rather than by birth being more prepared to 
challenge, or assert a position, against the government of the day. It is Bogdanor’s 
separation of powers, not Bagehot’s unity of the executive and legislature, under which the 
defined powers of the Commons at the helm are diluted under EU membership, because 
the governing weight of the national executive is grafted onto EU governmental 
machinery, creating uncertainty between the two.  
There is ample evidence that the constitutional elevation of the UK executive 
through its fusion with EU governmental machinery occurs through: 
• The Prime Minister, with other Heads of Government and respective Presidents of 
the European Council and Commission interacting to make decisions at the highest 
political level in the European Council. Those key decisions of the European 
Council have been milestones in the political history of the EU, including Treaty 
change since the Single European Act in 1987, EU enlargement, the development 
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of foreign policy, the launch of European economic and monetary union (EMU) 
(Kassim, 2016a) and the UK’s triggering of Article 50 to leave the EU. 
• The ministers for the executive integrate with the Council of the EU and the other 
27 executives to negotiate and make EU laws and take economic, trade, foreign and 
security policy decisions. 
• Ministers belonging to the executive meet in 10 different policy formations in the 
Council of the EU, economic and financial affairs being just one formation. 
• The Prime Minister nominating one Commissioner who stands as one of the 28-
member College of Commissioners providing the European Commission’s political 
leadership (Kassim, 2016b). 
• The Commission being subject to scrutiny by national government ministers of the 
member states and by the European Parliament (Kassim, 2016b; Kassim, 2016c). 
• The President of the Commission is appointed by the European Council through a 
qualified majority and with a majority in the European Parliament. 
• Ministerial meetings are prepared in detail by diplomats from the executive 
through the ‘Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of 
the member states to the EU’ (Coreper) and national civil servants perform official 
functions for Council working groups and committees (Kassim, 2016d). 
• EU legislation is eventually implemented by the UK executive (through 
Departments, agencies and local authorities) with national-level bodies 
administering 90 per cent of the EU Budget (Kassim, 2016c). 
The EU institutions are fused to the executive in this way because they were created by 
member state executives to help them achieve the objectives described in the EU Treaties 
(Kassim, 2016c). The legislature cannot be said to have any kind of equivalent connection 
as the executive within EU-level institutional decision-making through the European 
Council, European Commission or Council of the EU. The legislature is reported to by the 
UK executive. It usually decides, due to partisanship in Parliament, to scrutinise but not 
oppose what the executive has done.   
Conceptually, the traditional ultimate decision-making power of Parliament defines 
a Westminster model of MPs taking ultimate political decisions over policy and laws on 
behalf of the electorate whose interests and concerns they seek to represent. One common, 
leading assumption in the research, however, proposes a deparliamentarisation thesis in 
which EU integration has led to an erosion of Parliament’s regulating of the executive 
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(Raunio and Hix, 2000; Schmidt, 1999), generating a broad executive-legislature gap. The 
‘deparliamentarisation thesis’ expresses that the development of European integration has 
led to the erosion of parliamentary accountability over the executive branch, based both on 
constitutional rules and the political dynamics of the EU policy process (Raunio, 2011; 
Raunio, 2009; O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007; Raunio and Hix, 2000). As national 
governments represent their countries in EU negotiations, this tends to create “informal 
asymmetries” between the executive and the legislature (Raunio, 2011). In those 
circumstances, the historical precedent of Montesquieu’s (1748) ‘power checks power’ 
constitution, in which primarily the executive and the two branches of the legislative act as 
checks on one another, becomes partly anachronistic.  
  Bogdanor (2009a) wrongly dismisses the ultimate rule, ‘What the Crown in 
Parliament enacts is law’ as a rule of recognition in the UK legal system. He does so 
because his theory cannot conceive of sovereignty invested in a legislative power yet 
where the state maintains a distributed network of sub-powers. It also assumes that the 
ultimate, contemporary rule does not state the historically precedented conditions the rule 
must satisfy in order for it to impose obligations as valid law providing for political 
settlement. The settlement works because the historical precedent of the mixed 
constitutional model configures the internal executive, legislature, judicial relations to 
validate the rule, but Bogdanor (2009a) does not examine this as a form of historical 
precedent, nor its unsettling under EU membership. 
 It is not evident that a UK rule-based constitutional structure, including the rule of 
parliamentary sovereignty, within a tripartite constitution, has completely disappeared or 
given way to complex arrangements of other executive bodies. Loughlin (2010) considers 
that:  
“… in place of a clear, symmetrical, rule-based constitutional structure, we are 
obliged to examine a complex arrangement of government in which local and non-
public bodies play important roles and where knowledge and other flows are no 
longer linear but recursive.” (Loughlin, 2010, p. 416)  
 
The author therefore dismisses that the activity of governing takes shape within a tripartite 
structure of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary – and instead it occurs through 
an elaborate administrative network of persons, institutions, practices and processes 
involving a mixture of public roles (Loughlin, 2010, p. 416). It is not clear that a rule-based 
structure such as the rule of the recognised helm necessarily gives way to complex 
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arrangements of other public bodies – rather they confirm it. The convention of the 
tripartite structure likewise does not dissipate, but can often permit, an elaborate 
administrative network.  
  The growth and magnitude of EU administrative powers at the UK helm of state 
does raise concerns over the limits and dilution of the traditional separation of powers 
doctrine, given their influence on the supremacy of the executive, the dilution of the 
domestic legislature and the strengthened basis of administrative law in the judiciary, 
impacting upon the weakening and unsettling of parliamentary sovereignty. As Loughlin 
argues, the emergency of a separate system of administrative law and administrative 
powers of government has been tied to governmental modernisation and centralisations 
(Loughlin, 2010, p. 436). The system of administrative law that emerged in Europe during 
the 18th and 19th centuries was antithetical to English ways of governing consistent with 
the common law tradition (Loughlin, 2010, p. 444), the principles of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law (Loughlin, 2010, p. 441). It is an overstatement of the 
position however where more radical analysis such as that of Rubin reduces the mixed 
constitutional model to ‘heuristic’ or ‘metaphor’ and the three branches of government 
“exist only in our minds” (Rubin, 2005, p. 2995; Loughlin, 2010, p. 447). The growth in 
scale and complexity of contemporary government through administrative arrangements 
has made the recognition of a mixed, tripartite structure particularly acute.  
 For Loughlin, the growth of administrative power raises doubts about whether we 
can continue to work within the understanding of a separation of powers (Loughlin, 2010, 
p. 448) – although it might be more helpful to consider the influence EU administrative 
powers have had on the increased concentration of mixed powers than to abandon it. 
Loughlin credibly proceeds to argue for the rise of the elaborate networks (or ephorate, as 
he refers to it) – in which ministers are at the apex of the system – being replaced by 
differentiated arrangements, domestic and European, with elaborate service networks and 
public bodies (some 650, including the BBC) which operate at some remove from 
electorally authorised sources of authority (Loughlin, 2010, p. 448). This does not mean, as 
Loughlin suggests, that unaccountable bodies are now emerging to constitute a new fourth 
power but that they help inform parliamentary sovereignty. Yet it can mean, as Loughlin 
suggests, that public bodies do not generally exercise governmental power but they have a 
major impact on policy decision-making (Loughlin, 2010, p. 450). It is not necessary to 
view the network as a new branch of government comprising office-holders who possess 
the type of expertise and specialised knowledge that has enabled the basis of effective 
governmental decision-making. An interpretation of Edmund Burke’s view that the 
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sovereignty of Parliament is located in a balanced constitution configured around a 
triangulated trust between the Crown and Parliament’s chambers (Craig, 2012, pp. 106-8) 
now incorporates the EU into that constitution. This dilutes the trust and balance necessary 
for the inter-relationships in the mixed constitution and its dislocating of the sovereignty of 
Parliament.  
  The nature of the EU’s interaction with the mixed constitutional model in the UK 
parliamentary sovereignty structure occurs in the context of the rise of the administrative 
machinery. In that machinery, the network bodies realise their potential through an 
original, not delegated authority. It is an original, not delegated, authority because the 
delegating authority from the Commons’ is diluted under EU membership, the authority of 
the executive is preserved, if not enhanced, and judicial power is further enhanced through 
decision-making over competencies or competition in the administrative machinery. The 
evolution of the EU has meant the rise of the administrative machinery where EU functions 
relate to the acquisition of technical knowledge in specific regulatory fields, assisting 
intergovernmental institutions e.g. Council of Ministers, to make policy decisions 
(Loughlin, 2010, p. 463). The extent of the development of the modern EU has meant it is 
increasingly greatly more supranational than Loughlin observes and could hardly be 
illustrated as an entity that merely assists intergovernmental institutions. It has its own 
supranational political powers and institutions also.  
  It is conceivable in the EU context that the growth of administrative agency power 
(Egeberg and Trondal, 2017) threatens to ‘unbalance’ the separation of powers doctrine, 
particularly where bodies realise their potential through a newly developed and original, 
not delegated authority. It is not completely proven, however, that there is a fourth branch 
of government of increasingly complex, specialised, expert public bodies, or that it 
proposes completely breaking the tripartite structure. It need not be certain either that the 
new paradigm creates an alternative image of government as network – there are many 
agencies, domestic and European, and with a plurality of functions and purposes. In the 
domestic context, it is worth bearing in mind the domestic Coalition Government’s (2010-
2015) policy of the ‘bonfire of the quangos’, or 106 non departmental public bodies which 
closed, drastically reducing their number (The Guardian, 2012), meaning those elaborate 
networks not only extend but contract. An administrative apparatus, largely an extension of 
governmental institutions and which mostly execute policy, are a layer of executive 
agencies which need not be viewed as a cumbersome complex network, overriding the 
tripartite structure, but rather changing its relationships. It can occur simply because, as 
Egeberg and Trondal (2011) argue, EU level agencies become building blocks in a 
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multilevel union administration, partly bypassing, for example, national executives (see 
also Egeberg and Trondal, 2017).   
  By recognising that parliamentary sovereignty creates the tripartite mixed 
constitutional model and that the mixed constitution informs parliamentary sovereignty, 
the crisis of Bogdanor’s zero-sum game is averted – the UK can have both parliamentary 
sovereignty and a pragmatically organised, partial separation of powers. The recognised 
helm incorporating EU institutions entails the fusion of the executive with EU machinery, 
the dilution of the domestic legislature to ‘have its way’ and the fusion of the judiciary 
with the Luxembourg court system, which dilutes the strength of parliamentary 
sovereignty. But Bogdanor (2009a) recognises that there is a partial separation of powers, 
particularly between Cabinet and Parliament and that the extent of that separation depends 
upon the extent to which Parliament asserts itself against the government of the day.  
  Political theorists such as Richard Bellamy (1996) have credibly argued that the 
classically mixed government model is historical, or of the past. However, to diverge from 
Bellamy’s work, it also remains important to capture that past historical constitutional form 
as relevant to parliamentary sovereignty’s historical meaning which has a share in the 
composite parts provided by the ultimate rule of ‘What the Crown in Parliament enacts is 
law’. Hart’s (1997) ultimate rule, Bellamy’s (2007) consideration of the rule of persons 
including Hobbes’ primacy of a political body of persons to decide on rules of law, all 
point to the assumed or acknowledged consensus between officials/persons between 
different institutional parts of the state. That is relevant because the ultimate rule rests upon 
the sharing of the space at the recognised helm with institutional executive, legislature and 
judicial parts where there is an assumed or acknowledged consensus between persons in 
those institutional parts. When parliamentary sovereignty co-exists in the modern 
constitution with at least a partial separation of powers, the purported existence of a wider 
plurality of competing public and private agencies does not make an efficient check, as 
might be thought, but presents a problem for those distinct parliamentary powers 
governing at the helm.  
  EU institutions and agencies incorporated into government exert an influence 
through the supremacy of executive agencies (Egeberg and Trondal, 2017; Egeberg and 
Trondal, 2011) as above domestic legislative-scrutiny powers. It is not evident however 
that a UK-rule based constitutional structure, including the rule of parliamentary 
sovereignty, within a tripartite constitution, has given way to complex arrangements of 
local or non-public bodies, as Loughlin strongly indicates. Rather, the rule-based structure 
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confirms and provides for the complex administrative arrangements, even though at the 
institutional level European administrative bodies (e.g. the European Banking Authority, 
European Food Safety Authority and the European Defence Agency) compete at the 
recognised helm. The nature of EU interaction with the mixed constitutional model in the 
UK parliamentary sovereignty structure occurs in the content of the rise of the 
administrative machinery and where network bodies realise their potential through an 
original, not delegated, authority (e.g. Egeberg and Trondal, 2017; Wonka and Rittberger, 
2010; Gilardi, 2002).  It is an original, not delegated, authority because the delegating 
authority by the Commons’ is diluted under EU membership, the authority of the executive 
is enhanced since it evolves to a degree on its own terms (i.e. without delegated 
instruction) and the judicial power is fused into the Luxembourg court system.  
 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the contemporary mixed constitution under EU 
membership: the case of the Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) 
 
The European Commission’s proposal for an EU-wide tax on transactions in financial 
instruments, including 0.1 per cent for standard transactions on stocks and bonds and a 
0.01 per cent tax for transactions in derivatives, was first set out for member states in 2011 
as a measure to recover cost of the financial crisis from banks (Council of the EU, 2013; 
EU Committee, 2013). It was a partly popular measure in the light of the global financial 
crisis in which banks were deemed responsible for failures leading to the crisis. The tax 
was to be payable not by individuals but financial institutions located within a member 
state participating in the tax measure. The rationale for the tax was also grounded in 
regulators reducing risk, to level the playing field (VAT) and EU tax harmonization. At the 
time, France and Italy had already introduced national financial transaction taxes. The 
proposed tax is to be imposed on a wide range of financial transactions where at least one 
party to the transaction is a financial institution established in a member state participating 
in the Financial Transaction Tax. It appears, at the time of writing, “highly questionable” 
whether the tax will be implemented at least as originally conceived (Kastner, 2017). It is 
currently “less ambitious” as a watered-down, narrow-based tax on a limited number of 
transactions (Kastner, 2017). The proposal remains stuck in stalemate in the EU Council 
working group meetings with significant differences remaining among the ten participants 




Changing the inter-related pragmatically organised, partial separation of powers 
 
A consideration of the Financial Transaction Tax demonstrates precisely how the 
recognised helm has incorporated the EU institutions into its helm through an influence on 
the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, indirectly impacting upon parliamentary 
sovereignty. There are other recent examples in which this could be argued, including the 
Advocate-General to the ECJ dismissing the arguments of the UK Government in its 
attempts to block proposed EU restrictions in banker bonuses as a ration of salary (see 
Barker, 2014a; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2013; Euractiv, 2013) and also the ECJ 
dismissing the UK Government’s and parliamentary arguments to attempt to retain its 
national power over short selling in the markets, as compared with the new powers given 
to the EU-level European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (Barker, 2014b; 
House of Commons, 2011; BBC News, 2014b) but this chapter will focus exclusively on 
the financial transactions tax. The financial transactions tax notably centres upon an EU-
derived policy which invokes responses from across the executive, legislature, judiciary 
and the electorate. It is an example of taxation which itself classically falls under the remit 
of policies that Parliament is sovereign over. What will become clear is that Vernon 
Bogdanor’s zero-sum game that the UK cannot have parliamentary sovereignty but instead 
an enhanced separation of powers is expressed differently: the UK retains its rule of 
parliamentary sovereignty, but has altered its strongly inter-related pragmatically 
organised, partial separation of powers through EU obligations. Neither does Hart’s 
ultimate rule need to be consigned to the past, as Bogdanor (2009a) assumes, because the 
direct challenge by the Financial Transaction Tax to the ultimate rule does not occur. A 
brief consideration of the EU-level financial transaction tax demonstrates those key inter-
relationships.  
  The UK has agreed to the powers of the European institutions through the EU 
Treaties. In particular, in this context, the supranational European Commission: 
• Is one of the main institutions of the EU upholding the interests of the EU as a 
whole.  




• Is referred to as the ‘guardian of the Treaties’, meaning that it checks that each 
member state applies EU law properly. 
• Has the complete ‘right of initiative’ in policy areas covered by the Treaties – it can 
propose new laws in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, meaning, in theory, 
it deals only with issues that cannot be dealt with effectively at national, regional or 
local level (European Union, 2014) and only in policy areas where the Treaties 
provide for action.  
• Is the administration as well as providing a degree of policy and political direction 
(Hooghe and Kassim, 2012) which also depends on, for example, other actors such 
as the Council Presidency.  
• Drafts proposals for new European laws and “manages” the day-to-day business of 
implementing EU policies.  
• Exerts a strong influence over policy debates and in steering the EU as a whole.  
• Contains 28 Commissioners, one from the UK and each member state, providing 
the Commission’s political leadership during their five-year term. Each 
Commissioner is assigned responsibility for specific policy areas by the President. 
At its political level, the College of Commissioners are independent of member 
state governments. Commissioners swear an oath of independence when elected 
(Peterson, 2012).  
• Has independent powers over the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), external 
trade and competition policy.  
• Owns the agenda for all issues relating to the internal market and cohesion policies.  
• Alongside the Council and Parliament, sets long-term spending priorities for the 
EU in its ‘financial framework’.  
• Draws up the annual budget which must be approved by the Parliament and the 
Council.  
• ‘Supervises’ how EU funds are spent by agencies and national and regional 
authorities.  
 
The European Commission explained its original Financial Transaction Tax proposal as a 
transaction tax that would avoid fragmentation of the internal market for financial services 
and ensure that financial institutions make a fair contribution to covering the costs of the 
financial crisis (see the House of Lords EU Committee, 2013). The earlier proposal by the 
Commission to be adopted by all member states had the grander aim of creating a new 
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revenue stream which could gradually displace national contributions to the EU budget, 
lessening the burden of national treasuries. It is because of the UK (and Sweden’s) 
objections that the original Commission-led EU-wide proposal for a Financial Transaction 
Tax in 2011 was blocked – and was thereby permitted to be adopted as an amended version 
of the tax through the ‘enhanced cooperation’ method with 11 (Council of the EU, 2013), 
then subsequently, only 10 member states (Barbiere, 2017). The ‘enhanced cooperation’ is 
an EU procedure in which EU members (a minimum of 9) can jointly pursue a policy of 
advanced integration or cooperation within EU structures, but without all the other EU 
countries being involved (EUR-Lex, 2017). However, as the proposal was subsequently 
pursued and amended by 10 member states under enhanced cooperation, it makes it 
unlikely that the tax could be used as a stream of revenue for the EU budget.  
Traditionally, under the mixed Westminster model, it is the House of Commons as 
an institution which provides the means for a Government’s dominant, partisan 
parliamentary majority to provide financial supply and support the executive. This is 
because the 1689 Bill of Rights established for the House of Commons a sole right to 
authorize taxation and the level of financial supply to the Crown. And it is historically the 
executive which initiates the taxation measures, not the European Commission. So, 
paradoxically, the scope of weakened, minister-led, executive-sanctioned EU decision-
making powers exerted through the Council of Ministers widens significantly into the 
sphere of legislative consent-providing powers. Under contemporary EU membership, the 
Commission however has the complete 'right of initiative' – it can propose new laws in 
accordance with the subsidiarity principle and in policy areas where the Treaties provide 
for action. Domestically, the role of ministers in government and policy officials are 
diluted down in an executive scenario where they are at the recognised helm, to 
theoretically propose and draft Government bills, because they do not ‘initiate’ the 
proposed tax. This occurs despite the European Commission being subject to scrutiny by 
the national executive and those of the 27 EU members (Kassim, 2016b). The legislature 
however has no comparable connection to that of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in the 
executive within European Commission-level institutional decision-making. National 
legislatures have therefore themselves in this process lost traditional legislative powers of 
initiatives to hold to account, to amend and subsequently approve all final measures 




Judicialisation of the parliament-sanctioned executive 
 
Executive and judicial powers are clearly separated at the UK helm of state, but judicial 
decision-making moves ever closer into the scope previously defined by executive 
decision-making at the recognised helm. This process occurs as national judiciaries 
become more independent of the executive as a consequence of their EU-related roles 
(Schmidt, 2005). On 17 April 2013, the UK Government made an application to the ECJ 
for the annulment of the Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of 
the Financial Transaction Tax (UK v Council of the EU [2014]). The application focused 
on the extraterritorial elements of the tax. In that form, the Financial Transaction Tax 
Directive would infringe the rights and competences of non-participating member states by 
departing from accepted international tax norms. The UK Government were concerned 
about the ‘deemed establishment principle’ (House of Lords EU Committee, 2013, p. 11), 
where, for example, a UK bank would be deemed to be established in a participating 
member state (e.g. Germany) by virtue of their transactions involving bonds in that 
participating state. The scope of judicial decision-making widens into the sphere of 
Commons/legislative and executive decision-making at the recognised helm when the ECJ 
is able to dismiss, as it did, the arguments of the Crown-in-Parliament in its attempts to 
block the tax on financial trades, and despite a UK veto at the EU level in the legislative 
process (Barker, 2014c; UK v Council of the EU [2014]). The law is to be applied by 
judges but the political sphere is divided and the open-ended politics over the tax remains 
contested. It has nevertheless been the case that the UK entry into the EU brought about a 
significant expansion of judicial power, not least because of the supremacy of EU law 
(Blauberger and Schmidt, 2017; Tabarelli, 2013, p. 346; Weiler, 1991; Weiler, 1994). A 
judiciary once obliged to merely give effect to the statutes of Parliament under the 
Westminster model overlaps at the recognised helm with the proposing of taxation usually 
reserved for the executive – and furthermore, overlaps with the dominant, partisan, 
Government majority in the House of Commons who legitimately expect to sanction the 
tax.   
  A substantial body of literature explains how European integration tends to 
encourage such a judicialisation of politics (Weiler, 1991; Weiler, 1994) and spreads a 
juridified mode of governance, or ‘Eurolegalism’ (Kelemen, 2012, p. 55). This assumes 
that judicial institutions can answer deeply political questions on taxation. Compared to 
legislatures, unaccountable courts tend to do more to serve the interest of powerful 
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economic actors and vested interests (Hirschl, 2004; Bellamy, 2008). At the European 
level, there is a widespread consensus that the ECJ has played a major part in the progress 
towards European integration (Easson, 1989) – “an indispensable role” as a motor of 
European integration (Kelemen and Schmidt, 2012), particularly as its substantive role 
ensures that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties. The 
court has for many decades been accused of “being an excessively activist judiciary” (see 
reports by de Waele, 2010, p. 3). Such a judicialisation of politics in Europe has led courts 
to become involved in nearly every major political and policy dispute imaginable 
(Kelemen, 2012, p. 59), including that of the Financial Transaction Tax. 
 
Enhanced cooperation over indirect taxation, the absence of parliamentary consent and 
executive-legislative fragmentation 
 
Although the court dismissed the UK’s challenge because their view was directed at 
elements of a future tax which was yet to be agreed, the tax continued to be pursued by a 
Eurozone grouping of 11 (Council of the EU, 2013), and subsequently 10 member states, 
through enhanced cooperation (after Slovenia later withdrew) (Moscivici, 2017; Barbiere, 
2017). The ruling also confirms the UK has limited power to block the Eurozone from 
pursuing joint policies under enhanced cooperation that potentially damage UK interests, 
even in the field of taxation where the UK retains its vetoes on EU rules (Barker, 2014c). 
The UK helm of state necessary for the governance of the realm has judicial EU 
institutions incorporated into its government through a direct competitive overreach, or 
dilution, of the executive powers which impacts upon the comparative weakening of 
legislative powers in the Commons to ‘have its way’ vis-a-vis the ECJ and thereby an 
unsettling of parliamentary sovereignty.  
  The balance of parliamentary scrutiny powers as against those of the executive 
remain distinct but the executive decision-making dilutes the House of Lords powers of 
scrutiny and the role of the legislature in general at the recognised helm. In terms of 
assessing specific impacts of the EU on the UK, Parliament itself, as distinct from 
executive, has two special committees by both Houses of Parliament which exercise 
scrutiny functions for Parliament in assessing the impact of EU legislation and activity 
(Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 136). The UK Parliament has a European Scrutiny 
Committee and three European (standing) Committees in the Commons, and an EU 
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Committee with (currently, six) sub-committees in the Lords. The House of Lords’ EU 
Committee were highly critical of the measure and the Government’s treatment of the tax 
on an ongoing basis (EU Committee, 2012), insisting that there was a substantial risk that 
financial institutions would relocate outside the EU if a Financial Transaction Tax was 
introduced, with serious consequences for the City of London and for the EU economy as a 
whole (EU Committee, 2013, p. 7). The Committee were consistently critical of the 
measure, stating: 
“The proposal would clearly have a significant adverse impact on financial 
institutions established in non-participating member states by making them liable 
for the Financial Transaction Tax under either the deemed establishment or 
issuance principles.” (EU Committee, 2013, p. 86) 
The Committee condemned the process as being ‘divisive’, ‘significantly detrimental to the 
UK’s interest’ and ‘deliberately contentious in such a controversial area’. They were 
strongly critical of the Government in their approach to negotiations at an EU Economic 
and Financial affairs Council (ECOFIN) vote on 22 January 2013, authorising the use of 
enhanced cooperation. The Government merely abstained rather than voted against the 
authorising decision, and did not encourage other non-participating member states to vote 
against, given that fewer than one half of member states advocated the tax (EU Committee, 
2013, p. 10).  
  The committee played a significant part in contesting not only the Financial 
Transaction Tax but more importantly, the Government's overall approach to the tax. The 
committee were very concerned of the damage caused by a Financial Transaction Tax 
introduced by a smaller group of EU member states but found only a “marked 
complacency” within the UK’s HM Treasury as to the potential deleterious impact, a 
serious underestimation of the political will amongst supporting member states and an 
inadequate response to the committee’s report (EU Committee, 2013). The committee even 
viewed the Government’s initial assessment to be based on the assumption that the UK 
stood to benefit from a Financial Transaction Tax imposed by other member states. 
Nonetheless, the Government declined proper responses or negotiations with the 
committee and finally pursued a legal challenge – rather than adhere to Lords’ suggestions 
and proposals throughout the legislative process, and subsequently lost. The recognised 
helm has incorporated EU institutions such as ECOFIN which reciprocate the strength of 
the executive role in EU government machinery. This is particularly the case in minister’s 
qualified majority voting at the EU Council. That process leads to a direct dilution of 
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Lords’ and Commons’ scrutiny and voting powers (House of Commons’ European 
Committee B (2013)) and to the weakening of legislative scrutiny powers and of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  
Of course, the UK, through the European treaties and its regular practices, have 
agreed that through the intergovernmental Council of the EU, or the EU Council 
(previously known as the Council of Ministers), its own national ministers and those from 
all member states meet to adopt laws and coordinate policies. The Council of the EU has 
several defining features: 
• Through that institution, the UK and all EU partners pass EU laws and coordinate 
the broad economic policies of EU member countries, including surveillance, 
budgetary and public finance monitoring – and although outside of the UK’s remit, 
the legal, practical and international aspects of governing the euro (European 
Union, 2014).  
• The Council consists of representatives of the UK and all other member states, each 
member state being represented by a minister, who is authorised to commit the 
government of that member state and to cast its vote (Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 
120). 
• The UK and each member state sends their minister for the policy field being 
discussed at each Council meeting.  
• The Council as an institution enables the overarching objective of the UK and all 
other members to articulate and consolidate their national interests by 
representatives of each of the national governments by legislating jointly with the 
European Parliament (Hayes-Renshaw, 2012, p. 68).  
• Through the UK’s participation, the overall Council provides a co-ordinated 
economic and employment policy for Europe within the competences of the 
Treaties, coordinated by the finance ministers of the member states.  
• The Council is required to act by a qualified majority vote unless the Treaties 
provide for another procedure e.g. simple majority or unanimity.  
• The UK votes more often than other EU member states against EU measures, but 
even so, rarely votes against proposals (Thompson and Harari, 2013). Nonetheless, 
the UK is now the country that is least similar in its voting behaviour to other EU 
member states, is the only one of the large member states to contest more often, and 
is the “furthest removed in its voting behaviour from the other coalitions in the 
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Council”. It has been referred to as playing “in a league of its own” (Van Aken, 
2012).  
During the EU policy process, executive decision-making powers shift away from their 
traditional role of accountability to the House of Commons’ consent-providing powers 
(Raunio, 2011; Raunio, 2009) in the field of taxation. While the power to levy taxes 
remains central to the sovereignty of UK and other EU member states, there is some agreed 
limited UK competence for the EU in this area – outside of personal direct income taxes – 
which enable the smooth running of the single market, the harmonisation of indirect 
taxation (e.g. value-added tax (VAT), excise duties, import levies, and energy and other 
environmental taxes), fighting tax evasion and avoidance, tax challenges to fair 
competition and money laundering, and the potential proposal for a common consolidated 
corporate tax base (Paternoster, 2016). It is widely debated in the literature that almost 
without exception, “national parliaments are unequivocally considered the ‘losers’ in 
European integration because of their severe loss of competencies” (Sprungk, 2013, p. 
298) and it has been briefly discussed how the executive experiences the loss of the ‘right 
of initiative’. The executive voluntarily shorn of its initiative at the helm, but which 
integrates its functions as a qualified majority voting stakeholder in the Council of 
Ministers – ECOFIN in this case – effectively bypasses the scrutiny system in the Lords’ 
and Commons’ (House of Commons’ European Committee B (2013)). In that process, the 
executive retains a significant degree of discretion over policy-making where Parliament is 
made partially absent as an actor.  
This process occurs as the elevation of the executive through its fusion with EU 
governmental machinery is strongly maintained through its relationship with the Council 
of the EU. The ministerial executive integrates with the Council of the EU and the other 27 
executives to negotiate (Kassim, 2016d) and attempt to create such taxation measures. The 
ministers, diplomats and civil servants belonging to the UK executive attend the meetings 
of the Council of the EU (Kassim, 2016d) to set out their respective positions on the tax. 
Specialised EU decisions are taken by those ministers. The legislature has no comparable 
connection to that of Cabinet ministers in the executive within EU Council-level 
institutional decision-making. 
  As one tax adviser told the House of Lords EU Economic and Financial Affairs and 
International Trade Sub-Committee, when providing evidence on the measure:  
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“A substantial part of the tax paid to Brussels would therefore be at the cost of the 
British taxpayer, simply transferring revenue from the UK budget subject to 
Parliamentary scrutiny (and a National Audit Office which is allowed to be 
effective) to Brussels where there are no such safeguards.” (Chown, 2011, p. 108)  
More broadly, the development of the EU’s quasi-institutional structures has significantly 
affected all member states’ structures by altering the traditional power and authority of 
national governments (Schmidt, 2005).  
  The Commons consenting to indirect taxation in the precedented, historical 
convention of the mixed constitution is highly relevant to parliamentary sovereignty’s 
historical meaning. Where EU membership results in the scope of executive decision-
making powers strengthening to make law for the whole of the EU within a Council of 
Ministers arrangement, shifting away from a national sphere of legislative consent-
providing powers, it dilutes the relevance of that historical precedent.    
Given the tense debate between the Conservative MPs during this period and the 
Coalition Government and the Prime Minister, there is initially both a uniting and 
contesting, rather than strict separation, of powers between the executive and legislature 
because the majorities of each were all in opposition to the tax (to differing degrees). 
Subsequently, despite the later fact that at the original ECOFIN vote on 22 January 2013, 
authorising the use of enhanced cooperation, the Government merely abstained rather than 
voted against the authorising decision which the Lords’ committee then strongly criticised 
(EU Committee, 2013).  
  The dispute did not terminate at this stage and as will be discussed, the political 
cleavage between Government and Parliament re-opened the debates for more urgent 
referendum legislation on EU membership after that failure of the Government’s legal 
challenge at the ECJ, which the Commons majority had originally supported. An 
unregulated, political and irregular division opens up between Government and Parliament 
because (i) the Government has no ‘initiative’ in this case, as compared with the 
Commission and European Parliament; (ii) the Government’s reciprocity, engagement and 
trust through ECOFIN, the European Parliament and the court proved ineffective, and (iii) 
traditionally, the House of Commons is the means for the Government’s dominant, partisan 
majority to provide financial supply and in this case, their vote against the tax is partly 




The rule of the recognised helm preserved? 
 
It is relevant to acknowledge that the upholding of the ultimate rule of parliamentary 
sovereignty is notably dependent upon an acknowledged consensus between Government 
and Parliament and even at the EU-level within the different institutional parts. For 
example, when the Government abstained against the authorising decision, ministers did so 
on the basis (however paradoxical) that if they attempted to block others from proceeding, 
they would have undermined the broader EU consensual principle of national sovereignty 
over taxation matters. Again, the then Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Greg Clark, 
reflecting the House of Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee view, observed that the 
measure raised questions relating to parliamentary sovereignty and primacy (House of 
Commons, 2013). Although proceeding in fundamentally different ways, both Government 
and Parliament openly acknowledged a rule of sovereignty in the protection of taxation 
measures.  
  Furthermore, within the EU itself, the Legal Service of the Council on 10 
September 2013 notably played a significant part in the political discourse by identifying 
several critical aspects of the revised Financial Transaction Tax (Barker, 2013). It argued 
that the ‘deemed establishment principle’ – affecting financial institutions established in 
non-participating member states – did not comply with the Treaty conditions through 
enhanced cooperation because: (i) it exceeded member states’ jurisdiction to impose tax 
extraterritorially; (ii) it infringed the competences of non-participating member states (e.g. 
UK); (iii) it was discriminatory and likely to lead to lead to distortion of competition to the 
detriment of non-participating member states (e.g. UK) (Barker, 2013).  In the opinion of 
the Legal Service of the Council, there would be insufficient connection between the 
taxpayer and the member state imposing the tax (Barker, 2013). It would fail to respect the 
competence of non-participating member states as the Financial Transaction Tax would be 
imposed on institutions resident in their territory by and to the benefit of the participating 
member state despite the fact that the primary competence to taxation lies with the non-
participating member state (EU Committee, 2013, p. 16). The Commission immediately 
rejected this opinion (House of Lords’ EU Committee, 2013, p. 8). The opinion of the 
Legal Service of the Council, in short, while not specifically referring to the problems as 
relating to sovereignty, did infer concerns over taxation sovereignty when the tax exceeded 
member states’ jurisdiction to impose tax extraterritorially and that there would be 
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insufficient connection between the taxpayer and the member state imposing the tax 
(Barker, 2013). While the recognised helm has incorporated EU institutions into its 
government – and although the ECJ marginalised the Opinion of the Legal Service of the 
Council, there was ultimately a dilution of the executive powers impacting upon the 
comparative weakening of legislative powers in the Commons. Despite this trend there 
remained wider acknowledged consensus, both domestic and European, on the UK’s 
ultimate rule as protecting domestic, territorial, budgetary sovereignty. This suggests that 
the EU will not as a whole transgress more fundamental principles of territorial, budgetary 
sovereignty over taxation – applicable not just to the UK but all member states – but where 
it can potentially gain voluntary consent (i.e. through enhanced cooperation), it can by 
gradual developments accrue that power.  
So far, despite the presentation of proposals, the EU has had difficulties accruing 
such power to construct the tax (Kastner, 2017); leaving tax sovereignty and parliamentary 
sovereignty broadly intact. The recognised helm with its limited legislative-sanctioned 
power and through the exercise of executive power can voluntarily choose to not 
participate in, and therefore not incorporate, specific EU measures which might impact 
upon its claims to sovereignty.   
 
The fracturing of executive-legislative relations – the open door for parliamentary and 
popular political campaigns 
 
Through political contestation, the subsequent impasse in which the Government has not 
yet realised the policy it had set out, or to have reformed or blocked it in the EU legislative 
process, and having further lost their legal challenge, heightened the fracturing of 
executive-legislative relations arising from EU policy. The dispute drove the policy into a 
deeply contentious political debate and the UK Government’s proposed high-level EU 
renegotiation with other member states. The tax, by nature of the executive-legislature 
division in the Commons became part of the deeper, political EU treaty renegotiation 
agenda being sought by the then UK Prime Minister, David Cameron (Parker and Barker, 
2015). It is perhaps in the House of Commons where the division of powers is most 
observable. In the past, post hoc Prime Ministerial statements in the Commons’ on the 
European Council meetings or the Chancellor’s announcements on ECOFIN meetings have 
long been perceived to be weak guarantees of Westminster accountability for ministerial 
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decisions made at the EU-level. The government’s own backbench MPs disaffection in 
Parliament to the Government’s impasse in its European policy and strategy drove a deeper 
political wedge in executive-Commons relations. The unregulated and political division is 
created where the Government demonstrates reciprocity, comity and trust in the Council 
and court system of the EU at the expense of comity and trust with the House of Commons 
as the means for the Government’s dominant, partisan majority to provide their ultimate 
consent to a tax. The process confirms Bogdanor’s political intervention on Bagehot: there 
is a partial separation of powers, particularly between Cabinet and Parliament and the 
extent of that separation depends upon the extent to which Parliament asserts itself against 
the government of the day (Bogdanor, 2009a, p. 285). Neither Parliament, nor its 
dominant, partisan majority found a need to strictly assert itself against the government of 
the day because the Government were already in opposition to the measure – but as a ‘new 
phase’ opened up, following the initial ECJ legal challenge which failed, the separation of 
power between executive and the elected legislature seemed further deepened as 
backbench Conservative MPs pushed for more urgent EU referendum legislation and the 
Prime Minister pledged a renegotiation of the UK-EU relationship.  
  By nature of the contested political, open-ended situation of possibilities, including 
the then potential outcomes of the EU referendum and Prime Ministerial renegotiation, and 
despite the ECJ judgement, the finality of the UK accepting the Financial Transaction Tax 
continued to proceed within the political sphere. The fracturing of executive-legislative 
relations creates an open door for parliamentary and popular politics. Political possibility is 
open-ended because the historical constitutional forms contain a conceptual system of 
discourses, which are open to the possibility of constant modification (consistent with 
Prokhovnik, 2008), permitting contestability between the present constitutional form and 
other historical forms. The custom of the mixed constitution conflicts with the modern 
customs and assumptions of modern parliamentary sovereignty.  
  The Government’s approach to the Financial Transaction Tax was contested by a 
parliamentary opposition and a popular opposition organised by several campaign groups. 
Those national and sub-national groups and minority political groups seeking support for 
the Financial Transaction Tax who found their views underrepresented in the Commons’ 
subsequently found a greater collective representative capacity in the European Parliament 
which strongly voted for and supported the tax. By its nature, this produces a negative or 
poor stature of the Westminster Parliament in the eyes of minority political groups. The 
European Parliament’s competition at the recognised helm directly undermines the 
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representative capacity of the Commons – the Commons, without an executive-led 
majority to support the proposed tax remains, in the eyes of minority and sub-national 
groupings, less trusted than the EU parliamentary and court system for giving them the 
tax/right they desired. The ‘deparliamentarisation’ of the system occurs under the rise of 
the executive branch and notably a Westminster submission to a “legislative powerhouse” 
(Kohler, 2014) of the European Parliament. The Government won its parliamentary votes 
on Motions sceptical of the tax, although the Government won those votes through the 
support of dominant, partisan majorities in Parliament. But this was not unopposed. The 
strength of public anger directed against the financial sector and the view that those who 
contributed to the financial crisis should contribute to its costs resonated in popular 
political and mainstream opposition Labour Party discourses and in proposals for some 
form of transactions tax (House of Lords’ EU Committee, 2013, p. 7), indicating support 
for the Financial Transaction Tax. In the UK itself, 65 per cent were in favour (while 25 
per cent opposed) a Financial Transaction Tax (Labour Party manifesto 2017; Labour Party 
EU Manifesto, 2014; House of Commons, 2013; Eurobarometer, 2011). 
  As against the Conservative-led Coalition Government’s position, the Financial 
Transaction Tax proposal followed a historically strong socialist origin in Europe and there 
have been many testimonies from those who campaigned for the tax (Ford, 2012). The 
recognised helm has since 1979 had a directly elected European Parliament incorporated 
into its governing institutions. This has led to an influence on the balance of the executive, 
and judiciary, along with a dilution of the domestic legislature by a European legislative 
body, which impacts indirectly upon parliamentary sovereignty. The Lisbon Treaty in late 
2009, brought further law-making powers to the European Parliament that put it on an 
equal footing with the Council of Ministers and which further diluted the position of the 
domestic legislature. The executive and judiciary receive a deep engagement in the EU 
system – through ECOFIN votes, the European Parliament involvement in the legislative 
process and a court challenge through the ECJ (Barker, 2014c; EU Committee, 2013; EU 
Committee, 2012). However, the domestic legislature, in which the Commons has primacy, 
receives virtually no equivalent form of engagement. To make this observation is to 
acknowledge the relationship between the precedented, historical constitutional form of the 
mixed constitution in the sixth of the eight historical forms as relevant to parliamentary 
sovereignty’s historical meaning. Ultimately, where EU membership results in the scope of 
EU-integrated Prime Ministerial (European Council) and executive decision-making 
powers (ECOFIN) moving into the remit of Commons’ consent-providing powers through 




Tax-collecting powers diluting the basis of mixed government through non Westminster-
delegated authority 
 
Contrary to Loughlin (2010), it is not as if a UK rule-based constitutional structure, 
including parliamentary sovereignty, within a tripartite constitution, has completely 
disappeared or given way to complex arrangements of local and non-public bodies. But 
Loughlin, it seems, may be justified in arguing for the rise of the elaborate networks – in 
which the objectives of ministers at the apex of the system are being diluted at the 
recognised helm by differentiated arrangements with elaborate service networks such as an 
EU-sanctioned HMRC and other public bodies which for those explicit EU purposes, 
operate at some remove from electorally authorised sources of authority.  
 Furthermore, the nature of the EU’s interaction with UK parliamentary sovereignty 
occurs in the context of Loughlin’s purported rise of the administrative machinery. It 
strengthens the hand of the executive at the helm and where network bodies realise their 
potential through an original, not delegated authority (e.g. Wonka and Rittberger, 2010; 
Gilardi, 2002), it dilutes the Commons’ historic capacity to sanction tax-collection. The 
growth of administrative powers threatens to unbalance the legislative as against 
heightened executive, tax-collecting powers, diluting the basis of mixed government, 
particularly where EU-sanctioned bodies realise their potential through a newly developed, 
original, and not Westminster-delegated authority. 
For example, it has been importantly suggested in the course of events that by 
implementing The Mutual Recovery Directive in relation to the Financial Transaction Tax, 
if one of the parties to that financial transaction was established in the UK then the tax 
authorities of the Financial Transaction Tax member state would be able to request the 
UK’s HMRC to collect and account for them when the tax is imposed directly or indirectly 
(EU Committee, 2013). It has been heavily scrutinised because the involvement of the 
HMRC to collect the tax is of higher relevance when the employment of executive 
agencies for European purposes again fuses the executive into an administrative order 
where the rules are separate and different.  
While it is accepted parliamentary sovereignty co-exists in the modern constitution 
with at least a ‘partial separation of powers’, the contemporary existence of a wider 
plurality of competing public and private agencies can present difficulties for those distinct 
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but diluted powers governing at the helm. The HMRC is not operating with normal 
domestic tax-collecting circumstances in this case. The HMRC operates within a 
plurality of competing public and private agencies which do not overcome the worry that 
checking might subvert the independence of a branch of government/ institution, but rather 
unsettle the operation of other branches of government.  
The elevation of executive agency powers occurs as EU legislation is eventually 
implemented by the UK executive. In this case, the recognised helm has incorporated EU-
sanctioned national executive agencies into its government notably through an influence on 
the elevation of executive agency powers, with limited involvement of the legislature-




This chapter has argued that Parliament remains theoretically sovereign because the 
ultimate rule of parliamentary sovereignty rests on the precedential and structural basis of 
the mixed constitution in which the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are 
intermeshed as functionally separate, but practically inter-related. Yet Parliament is 
practically less sovereign because the recognised helm under EU membership 
institutionalises a fusion of the executive with EU machinery, the dilution of the domestic 
legislature and the fusion of the judiciary with the Luxembourg court system, unsettling the 
political precedents of parliamentary sovereignty. It unsettled prior historical constitutional 
forms in which the powers of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are now joined 
by the EU in jointly impelling the machinery of government in a direction different from 
which either one acting by itself would have done, thereby a direction formed from each 
part. The theoretical explanation of parliamentary sovereignty rested upon the sixth of the 
eight historical forms, illustrating the meaning of the mixed constitution attributed to 
parliamentary sovereignty.  
  In comparison to other approaches, it was valuable to examine the ultimate rule in 
the sixth historical constitutional form of ‘What the Crown-in-mixed constitutional 
Parliament enacts is law’ (1690-1790s) requires balance against its political custom of the 
mixed constitution to support the rule. The view in the House of Commons’ recent 
procedural guide, Erskine May that the contemporary, changing relationships between the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary have been remarkable because of the interaction 
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with the EU is a pertinent observation (Jack et al., 2011). Preceding 1973, the recognised 
helm necessary for the governance of the realm depended upon those historically 
precedented inter-relationships, which in turn have diluted the strength of parliamentary 
sovereignty.  
  The consideration of the Financial Transaction Tax fundamentally demonstrated 
that the governing helm with those deeply intricate interrelationships had been disturbed 
and this experience had impacted upon the unsettling of parliamentary sovereignty. The 
scope of judicial decision-making widens into the sphere of Commons/legislative and 
executive decision-making at the recognised helm when the ECJ is able to dismiss, as it 
did, the arguments of the Crown-in-Parliament in its attempts to block the tax on financial 
trades, and despite a UK veto at the EU level in the legislative process. It is crucial to 
acknowledge the Commons-consenting-of indirect taxation between the precedented, 
historical convention of the mixed constitution in the sixth of the eight historical 
constitutional forms as relevant to parliamentary sovereignty’s historical meaning. Where 
EU membership results in broadening the scope of executive decision-making powers 
relative to the sphere of legislative consent-providing powers, it unsettles and dilutes the 
claims of that historical precedent. The historical constitutional form of Montesquieu’s 
(1748) ‘power checks power’ constitution in which the executive and the two branches of 
the legislature act as checks on one another becomes anachronistic in its operation.  
  It is relevant to acknowledge the upholding of the ultimate rule of parliamentary 
sovereignty itself was dependent upon an acknowledged consensus on tax sovereignty 
between Government and Parliament – consistent with Hart and Goldsworthy (1999) – and 
even at the EU-level within the different institutional parts. Yet, through political 
contestation, the subsequent impasse in which the Government has not yet realised the 
policy it had set out, or to have reformed or blocked it in the EU legislative process, and 
having further lost their legal challenge, amplified the fracturing of Commons’ and 
executive relations. That process drove the policy into the deeply contentious political 
debate and the UK Government’s proposed referendum and high-level renegotiation with 
other member states – providing for Bogdanor’s partial separation of powers. The 
European Parliament’s specific competition at the recognised helm directly undermines the 
representative capacity of the Commons’ – the Commons, shorn of its representative roots, 
in the eyes of pressure groups, is less trusted than the European parliamentary and court 
system for giving them the tax/right they desired. Furthermore, the growth of 
administrative powers threatens to unbalance the legislative as against heightened 
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executive, tax-collecting powers, as the basis of mixed government, particularly where EU-
sanctioned bodies realise their potential through a newly developed, original, and not 
Westminster-delegated authority. The historical constitutional form of Burke – that the 
sovereignty of Parliament is located in a balanced constitution configured around a trust 
between the Crown and Parliament (Craig, 2012; Bourke, 1999) – now incorporates the 
EU as a new steering hand into the broader helm of state.   
The subsequent chapter (Chapter 5) will argue that Parliament has become 
practically less sovereign because the UK’s recognised helm has had European Parliament-
level parliamentary representation competing over it, not for individual interests, but over 
its capacity to collectively represent its electors. In the sixth constitutional form, the 
ultimate rule required balance against its political conditions, including collective 
representation, to support the rule. On the other hand, the European Parliament exemplifies 
a high level of specialist ‘functional’ representation, a shared neo-corporatist emphasis 
with the central EU institutions, a reliance on ‘constitutionalisation’ as a means to 
strengthen its representative linkages and a role of party and management of political 
partisanship. The case study of the Working Time Directive presents a UK recognised 
helm which has had European Parliament-level parliamentary representation competing in 
its capacity to collectively represent its electors. That inter-parliamentary competition 
produces an unsettling of the historically precedented capacity to collectively represent the 
electorate as strongly embedded within previous historical constitutional forms, thereby 






Chapter 5: Parliamentary sovereignty, collective representation and EU membership 
 
Parliament ought to remain sovereign on the historically precedented basis that the 
‘collective representation’ of the UK electorate through the Westminster Parliament 
provides a deeper connect than the specialist interest representation pursued by the 
European Parliament. Under EU membership, the UK Parliament has however become 
practically less sovereign, in part, because the UK’s helm of state has had European 
Parliament-level parliamentary representation competing over it, not for individual 
interests, but over its capacity to collectively represent its electors. That the UK Parliament 
has become less sovereign due to the distorting of its capacity to collectively represent is 
consistent with the well-recorded observations that the European Parliament exemplifies a 
high level of specialist ‘functional’ representation. Functional representation provides 
“instruments of linkage” between citizens and the European Parliament through lobbying 
channels to organise interest groups and social movements in order to influence EU policy-
making (Berkhout et al., 2017; Marsh and Norris, 1997, p. 158). In Strasbourg, the 
proposed boundaries to representation are defined through neo-corporatist approaches 
whereby social dialogue between key institutions and social partners is ingrained – it is not 
primarily defined around majority-supported manifesto(s) turned into elected government 
agendas. Yet, as a whole it holds virtually no equivalent connect with the domestic 
electorate in a similar fashion to the national parliaments; the Westminster parliament 
operates ‘nearer the people’. The same contrast cannot be made of the devolved assemblies 
whose territorial location and means of representation is closer to their electorate, albeit 
only on policy areas agreed to by Westminster.  
 Conceptually, the ‘collective representation’ of the people defines a Westminster 
model of representation characterised by both a ‘trustee’ representative status (in contrast 
to a delegate status) of its elected Members of Parliament and a collective parliamentary 
status by which Parliament acts in the common, national interest so that, as Edmund Burke 
argued, it “… is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole” 
(Burke, 1774). 
  The historical constitutional forms, as precedents, present an English constitution in 
which governing at the helm is presented as politically contingent upon parliament’s 
capacity to collectively represent its electors. It is notable that the features of political 
representation are to an extent described in all the historical forms explaining 
parliamentary sovereignty, although not effectively achieved until the full electoral 
132 
 
franchise was established in 1928 giving women electoral equality with men, and further to 
18 year-olds in 1969 throughout the seventh constitutional form. However, in the form of 
representation identified in the sixth historical constitutional form, for Burke, there is a 
sense of recognition of defining a collectively representative Parliament through mixed 
government in the eighteenth century (Craig, 2012; Bourke, 1999), which is central. The 
status of sovereignty as it was stated in the eighteenth century reflected the 1688/89 
settlement, the 1707 Union and the rivalling of popular sovereignty with Parliament’s 
sovereignty. In that precedent, the ultimate rule of ‘What the Crown-in-mixed 
constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ (1690-1790s) required balance against its political 
conditions, including collective parliamentary representation, to support the rule. 
  The case study of the Working Time Directive demonstrates that the recognised 
helm has had European Parliament-level parliamentary representation competing in its 
capacity to collectively represent its electors. In the UK context, political decisions are 
usually taken by politicians as accountable representatives, not judges or by other bodies, 
simply because they are electable as representatives and removable at the ballot box and 
are accountable to Parliament throughout their tenure and ultimately to their electors. The 
inter-parliamentary competition with the European Parliament, however, produces an 
unsettling of Parliament’s historically precedented capacity to collectively represent its 
electors as strongly embedded within precedented political historical constitutional forms, 
thereby diluting the strength of parliamentary sovereignty. The European Parliament is 
strongly reliant on the Council, Commission and the European Economic and Social 
Committee’s shared neo-corporatist emphasis because it seeks to represent the approach 
taken by the shared central institutions. In the example of the Working Time Directive, this 
chapter will also look at the general reliance on ‘constitutionalisation’, as an attempt to 
construct constitutional texts defining EU-level individual rights by the European 
Parliament, in order to strengthen its representative linkages. Yet, here, a clear place can 
also be found for party and management of political partisanship in explaining the outcome 
of the Directive. The feature of representation of the collective interest is primary in 






Parliamentary sovereignty and historical collective representation by Parliament 
 
The collective representation of the people has an inherent place in the historical 
development of the British constitution. The UK public currently elects 650 Members of 
Parliament to represent their interests and concerns in the House of Commons. By 
collectively representing the electorate, MPs consider and propose new laws, and can 
scrutinise government policies by asking ministers questions about current issues either in 
the Commons Chamber or in Committees (UK Parliament, 2014). The Government cannot 
make new laws or raise new taxes without Parliament’s agreement. The political party that 
wins the most seats at a General Election takes charge of the Government for five years, 
until the next General Election. The Government are therefore the people from political 
parties that voters’ have elected to represent them in order to run the country. The leader of 
the winning party is appointed as Prime Minister and chooses other party members to work 
in the Government with them – as Cabinet ministers and junior ministers. Parliament is 
there to represent voters’ interests and make sure they are taken into account by the 
Government.  
  The features of representation are to an extent described in most of the previous 
historical constitutional forms explaining parliamentary sovereignty. However, the form of 
representation identified in the sixth historical constitutional form in which there is a 
recognition of ‘What the Crown-in-mixed constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ (1690-
1790s) is central. The ultimate rule described above required balance against its political 
conditions, including collective representation, to support the rule. It is in that explanatory 
historical constitutional form that the political theory of Edmund Burke has been and 
remains useful in contemporary understandings of representation – albeit Burke is writing 
for a pre-democratic age, at least 150 years before Britain establishes the full extension of 
the franchise. Even with Burke writing in a pre-democratic age, in his view, the English, or 
Westminster model of representation is characterised by Members of Parliament being 
elected to the House of Commons with a ‘trustee’ representative status (as opposed to 
being directly delegated) by voters and a collective parliamentary status acting in the 
national interest in that it “is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that 
of the whole” (Burke, 1774). In his now infamous ‘Speech to the Electors of Bristol’ of 3 
November 1774, Burke conveys his understanding of the trustee nature of a representative 
in which he opposed “authoritative instructions” or “mandates issued” by constituents, 
“which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for,” as 
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they are “contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgement and conscience”. Therefore, 
on the definition of the Parliament itself, he argues it – 
“… is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which 
interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and 
advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one 
interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to 
guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You 
choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of 
Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.” (Burke, 1774) 
The speech conveys at once both that the representative occupies a ‘trustee’ status (as 
opposed to a delegate status) and that Parliament itself occupies an institutional status of 
“… a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole.” (Burke, 
1774) That depth of understanding between voter and representative is even more greatly 
pronounced in a Letter from Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe in 1792, in which he 
describes a notion of “Virtual representation” (Burke, 1792). It is described as  
“… that [process] in which there is a communion of interests and a sympathy in 
feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people 
and the people in whose name they act …” (Burke, 1792). 
He maintains that such representation “corrects the irregularities in the literal 
representation”, by reinforcing “common interest and common sentiment” (Burke, 1792). 
Burke was again re-stating the primacy of common interest in the act of representing.  
In this context, Burke saw political parties as strongly mediating between executive 
authority and parliament, having defined a political party in his ‘Thoughts on the Cause of 
the Present Discontents’ of 1770 as  
“... a body of men united on public principle, which could act as a constitutional 
link between king and parliament, providing consistency and strength in 
administration, or principled criticism in opposition” (Burke, 1770, pp. 431-32).  
But the ordering of precedents is visible: there is first an institution with Members who can 
represent its electors as trustees in as their collective interest, followed secondly, by the 
governing party in the House of Commons governing consistently with that interest. The 
governing party would then be held to account for having discharged that interest at a 




Parliamentary sovereignty and contemporary collective representation by Parliament  
 
It is necessary to question the contemporary relationship between parliamentary 
sovereignty and the parliamentary collective representation model. Some contrast needs to 
be found to the underlying features of the popular sovereignty approach (Bogdanor, 2009a) 
or a traditional party government model (Dalton et al., 2011; Sartori, 2005; Adams, 2001; 
Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999; Dahl, 1998). Those approaches tend to partially distort that 
connection and never wholly explain parliamentary sovereignty and its relationship to 
collective representation, particularly as impacted upon by the development of a European 
Parliament. The direct ‘popular sovereignty’ representation model (Bogdanor, 2009a) often 
misconstrues the relationship between electors and trustees while marginalising the role of 
parties in Parliament. The party representation model (e.g. Dalton et al., 2011; Adams, 
2001), above all, overlooks the prime precedent of MPs who represent as trustees in the 
collective interest and therefore of electors, as not simply being represented by party.  
  The introduction of European level parliamentary representation has meant that UK 
citizens as EU citizens are able to vote directly for MEPs as their elected representatives in 
the EU. Electors elect MEPs under a proportional representation system, under a regional 
list system with seats allocated to parties in proportion to their share of the vote; whereas 
under the Westminster system, they vote under a First-past-the-post system to elect MPs to 
the House of Commons by constituency, putting a cross next to their preferred candidate 
on a ballot paper and the candidate with the most votes is elected to represent the 
constituency. The job of the MEPs is to represent voter interests and those of their city or 
region in Europe. There are 73 UK MEPs in the European Parliament. They are elected by 
voters in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, while other EU member states elect MEPs 
from their own respective countries. Elections take place every five years. For this purpose, 
the UK is now divided into twelve electoral regions made up of the nations and regions of 
the UK. Each region has between three and ten MEPs: Eastern - 7, East Midlands - 5, 
London - 8, North East - 3, North West - 8, South East - 10, South West - 6, West 
Midlands - 7, Yorkshire and Humber - 6, Wales - 4, Scotland - 6, Northern Ireland - 3. The 
Members of the European Parliament sit in political groups which are not organised by 
nationality, but by political affiliation. There are currently 8 political groups in the 
European Parliament.   
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  In employing the term political ‘representation’, Hanna Pitkin (1967) provides one 
of the most straightforward and traditional definitions used throughout studies of political 
representation in the social and political sciences. For Pitkin, to represent is simply to 
“make present again” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 8). On this basis, political representation is the 
activity of making citizens’ voices, opinions, and perspectives “present” by political actors 
speaking, advocating, symbolizing, and acting on their behalf in the public policy making 
process (Pitkin, 1967). As Rehfeld persuasively argues, “political representation is not had 
for its own sake” and is created through a set of institutions for a very particular function 
(Rehfeld, 2005, p. 148). In the Westminster model, elected representatives as MPs, support 
messages strongly affiliated to a core party philosophy (in practice, the Party Whip), 
although there remains room for individual manoeuvrability on party-political issues (e.g 
Pettit, 2009). The governing party in power inside Parliament is able to provide a 
legislative program as a self-policing corporate body (Pettit, 2009, p. 85). The Westminster 
model of political representation – which includes the processes of authorisation and 
accountability through institutions – conveys the manner in which elected representatives 
collectively stand for the represented in the corporate body of parliament, with an agenda 
defined by the party in power (Pettit, 2009). Political representation is deeply 
institutionalised under the Westminster model because those elected party representatives 
who form the legislature do so in the national interest and then form the government (and 
its opposition) in pursuit of the broader, collective interest. 
 
The challenge of popular sovereignty approaches to representation  
 
From a ‘popular sovereignty’ perspective presented by Vernon Bogdanor (20009a), the 
modern theory of a popular constitutional state directly seeks to affirm the primacy of 
electors as delegating their representatives in the representation process at the expense of 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  
Firstly, for Bogdanor (2009a), on the British model, those who enjoy the right to 
make political decisions are empowered to do so by virtue of the representative mandate 
they have received from the electorate. Yet, this can rightly be contrasted, with the EU’s 
highest constitutional principle whereby the separation of powers reflected between its 
central institutions (Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the 
European Parliament) and also in the division of power between the EU and the member 
states, marginalises that direct, unitary representative capacity (Bogdanor, 2009a). While 
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that argument is certainly valid, it is not clear on Bogdanor’s argument what the reasons 
are for the distribution of EU level executive authority impacting upon the weakening of a 
legislature’s right or ability to represent its electors. Many EU countries themselves have 
widely distributed constitutional separation of powers and executive machinery without 
that impacting upon the representative roles of their legislatures.  
Second, for Bogdanor, the House of Commons is an executive-sustaining 
parliament, whereas the European Parliament, by contrast, operates by sustaining a 
dialogue with other Community institutions (Bogdanor, 2009a). However, it might also be 
considered that the central EU institutions are, to a degree, political actors, not least 
because of their overarching commitment to enhanced European integration, if not, 
federalism. That is to argue, and contrary to Bogdanor, the European Parliament as a neo-
corporatist body can in practice help sustain both its Commission as well as supporting an 
inter-institutional dialogue. The European Parliament, in particular, has sought parity with 
the Council particularly through co-legislating with the Council (Bux, 2017; Hix and 
Høyland, 2013, p. 172) and a greater fusion with the political powers of the central 
institutions. It is the European Parliament’s approach to ‘functional representation’ through 
its being a collaborative chamber representing the mandates, political interaction and views 
of the other EU institutions (e.g. Jarman, 2011) and through dialogue with social partners 
that characterised its strength. Given its historical development as a collaborative, 
legitimising feature of an executive, administrative body, it cannot seek a national-style 
‘collective representation’ of an EU-electorate.  
Yet, at the same time, the European Parliament’s position of functional 
representation (Marsh and Norris, 1997, p. 158) has not only moved the British 
constitutional model away from its instincts in a collective representative model, 
previously shoring up parliamentary sovereignty, but even further removed it from a 
delegated model in which electors seek a direct connection with decision-making bodies. 
Bogdanor asserts a top-down parliamentary sovereignty system derived from the past as 
being inconsistent with the social and political pressures of modern politics, which 
promote a greater degree of popular power (Bogdanor, 2009b); yet, Britain’s experience of 
the EC representative institutions suggests an even greater removal of electors from 
parliamentary decision-makers (let alone direct decision-making), not a design which 
incorporates them.  
 Third, for Bogdanor, the Commons is fundamentally a debating chamber 
dominated by the binary dialogue between government and opposition. EU legislation does 
not conform to that binary pattern of politics, and there is no party-supported government 
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in the European Parliament seeking to promote its legislation or secure support for its 
policies (Bogdanor, 2009a). However, Westminster’s binary pattern of politics in which 
government and opposition battle over policy need not be considered as completely 
incompatible with the European Parliament-style of consensual political representation. 
Thomassen (1999) and several theorists have argued that the more formal introduction of a 
party government model for Strasbourg would help to politicise the relationship between 
the European Parliament and the Commission and create a pattern of government and 
opposition within Parliament (Thomassen, 1999, p. 236). Voters would then reward or 
punish parties for supporting or opposing the Commission. However, for Bogdanor, in 
contrast to Westminster, the European Parliament as it currently exists is a consensual, 
working legislature. That assumption sits uneasily with the observation that politics inside 
the European Parliament is broadly dominated by political parties. In the European 
Parliament, political groups dominate the agenda (and selection of key positions and 
forming alliances), while imposing some degree of party discipline (Hix, 2016), albeit 
European party umbrella groups could not be said to have mirrored national party 
discipline (Marsh and Norrris, 1997, p. 155).  
Fourth, for Bogdanor, the European Parliament is a multiparty parliament, 
operating through carefully constructed coalitions, a kind of “Coalitional politics of this 
kind” which “is largely unfamiliar to British politicians.” (Bogdanor, 2009a) Of course, on 
this point, it might be observed that Britain has since adapted to recent coalition’s and 
confidence arrangements in which parties, by agreement, prop up others in government. 
That means that the supposed binary approach that characterises Westminster, however, is 
not strictly precise – the binary political scheme is resistant to the idea of an overarching 
primacy of collective representation of the electorate at Westminster. Political 
representation is presupposed by a prime national legislature able to practically represent 
as an institution (Rehfeld, 2005, p. 36) and the legislature representing the common interest 
‘in respect to’ its national electors (Rehfeld, 2005, p. 149). There is no real justification to 
establishing a national representative legislature without reference to a broader “good of 
all, whatever the good of all may turn out to entail.” (Rehfeld, 2005, p. 149). The direct 
‘popular sovereignty’ representation misconstrues the broader relationship between 
electors and trustees while marginalising the role of parties.  
The drift toward a popular British constitutional state, toward popular sovereignty 
as contrasted with parliamentary sovereignty, and toward electors delegating ‘mandated’ 
representatives (as opposed to collectively entrusting them), does not materialise in any 
major form under EU membership. Parliament and political parties are increasingly 
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relevant. The suggestions of a drift away from parliamentary sovereignty and towards a 
popular sovereignty model under EU membership seem unevidenced. The impact of the 
EU’s separation of powers on domestic representation by itself need not have a substantial 
impact. The claim that Westminster is an executive-sustaining parliament while the 
European Parliament is a consensual one, fails to recognise the part-federal objectives of 
the EU institutions, including the European Parliament, which sustains the Commission’s 
policies. Westminster operates on a binary government-opposition style; but the European 
Parliament, though consensual, does also occupy some aspects of a binary politics, 
competing to some degree over the Westminster model of representation and sovereignty.  
 
The challenge of the traditional party government model   
 
Since political parties are a feature of both Westminster and European Parliament 
representative systems, a brief consideration is necessary of the traditional party 
government model, emphasising the role of political parties in political representation 
(Sartori, 2005; Dahl, 1998). Dalton et al. (2011) have described the assumptions by which 
British and European political representation is dominated by parties in a political system 
where representatives acted as trustees, strongly mediated by political parties (Dalton et al., 
2011, pp. 22-3). It is an approach to political representation relevant to a parliamentary 
system with strong political parties. Parties rather than candidates are viewed as the main 
political actors. It is political parties, not individual legislators that are the primary vehicles 
that articulate citizens’ policy beliefs and convert them into public policies (Adams, 2001, 
p. 3). The party government model therefore examines the congruence, or not, between 
voters and their selected party. The voters are assumed to be those who support the parties 
in a nation. Voters’ choices of parties then provide them with a method of exercising 
control over the actions of individual legislators and through these over the affairs of 
government (Adams, 2001, p. 4). The parties consist of their representatives acting as a 
collective. It is assumed party members act in unison and that they vote as a bloc in 
Parliament. It is parties that exercise control over the government agenda and policy-
making process in Parliament. When voters choose parties they are given indirect control 
over the actions of legislators and affairs of government. The model strongly suggests that 
to the extent that competing parties present divergent, stable policies and citizens use these 
policies as the basis for their voting decisions, parties provide effective vehicles for 
representing the electorate’s political beliefs (Adams, 2001, p. 5). In empirical studies, 
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broad congruence is found between the Left-Right socio-economic position of the median 
voters and the Left-Right position of the governing parties (Dalton et al., 2011, p. 23).  
 ‘Party’ occupies an essential and powerful mediating role in the development of the 
Westminster system, but as with Bogdanor’s delegating-voter, it need only be considered 
secondary to the exercise of powers in the British constitution. The traditional party 
government representation model, above all, overlooks the prime precedent of Members 
who represent as trustees in the collective interest and therefore electors as not simply 
being represented by party. Nonetheless, the centrality of party is demonstrated by the 
House of Commons’ own guide to all members of the public entitled, ‘You and Your MP’ 
(UK Parliament, 2013). The guide specifies to the general public – that is, to voters of all 
political parties and none – that:  
 
“At times a constituent’s demands may conflict with party policy and your MP will 
have to decide where their first loyalty should lie. The MP may decide that a 
majority of constituents would support the party policy – after all that is likely to be 
one of the reasons why they elected him or her” (UK Parliament, 2013, p. 2).  
 
The collective representation of the electorate, reinforced by the process of election and 
through an institution which has primacy among the others, provides the framework of 
political parties. It returns political parties to the central nature of political representation, 
which is presupposed by a prime national legislature able to practically represent as an 
institution (Rehfeld, 2005, p. 36) and the legislature representing the common interest in 
respect to national electors (Rehfeld, 2005, p. 149). 
The British constitution (in Burke’s eyes) primarily incorporates party to enmesh 
the link between executive power and the legislature. The party government model is 
therefore mostly feasible for the powerful emphasis it places on a political party 
representative as trustee in the policy- and law-making process, of articulating voters’ 
political beliefs and their conversion into official public policy or legislation. Mair and 
Thomassen (2010) acknowledge the absence of party in explaining collective 
representation in the context of the EU when they argue: 
 
“In effect, Parliament within this model of party government loses the capacity to 
function in the way that Edmund Burke once favoured: ‘The virtue, spirit and 
essence of a House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the 




The political analysis offered by Burke of a collective-style, virtual representation has 
often been overlooked when interpreting the European Parliament.   
  To some degree, however, it is far more complicated to analyse the system of 
representation employed by the EU using the party government model (Schmitt and 
Thomassen, 1999, p. 16). The model is said to be “highly problematic when applied to the 
context of the European Union” (Marsh and Norris, 1997). The European Parliament has 
no experience of collective representation of a European-wide electorate but it has a weak 
form of electoral representation and a strong form of functional representation through EU-
level, neo-corporatist partnerships. Marsh and Norris (1997) argue that ‘functional 
representation’ creates alternative linkages between citizens and the European Parliament. 
This form of representation enables lobbying channels to organise interest groups and 
social movements for them to influence EU policy-making (Berkhout et al., 2017; Marsh 
and Norris, 1997, p. 158). The different forms of political representation such as functional 
representation are “insufficiently, strongly developed” in the European Parliament (Marsh 
and Norris, 1997), yet it is central to identify that those alternative instruments of linkage 
exist and that they underpin representation. The role of major groups, particularly 
economic groupings, is formally recognized and particularly through the European 
Economic and Social Committee. Elected MEPs can often see their role as spokespersons 
for trade union groups, farming and small business groups. Pluralist theories have 
emphasised that interest groups therefore provide another linkage between citizens and the 
EU, by being represented in pursuit of this functional method. In Strasbourg, the proposed 
boundaries to representation are defined through neo-corporatist policy whereby social 
dialogue between key institutions and social partners is ingrained and its purposes are less 
defined through election, because it is not structured around majority-supported 
manifesto(s) turned into elected government agendas.  
The electorate can influence the Union both indirectly through the choice of parties 
in national elections and directly through elections to the European Parliament (Marsh and 
Norris, 1997, p. 154). European elections tend to be fought by national political parties 
often mainly on national issues and voters make their choice on the basis of their opinions 
on national issues (Weiler, 1999, p. 266) – or to reward or punish the governing party (Hix 
and Marsh, 2007). Consequently, it might be argued, EU elections fail as an instrument of 
democracy at the European level – they fail to link policy preferences of “the European 
people” to the decision-making process in the European Parliament (Costello et al., 2012, 
p. 1229).  European elections are often viewed as second-order national elections (Nugent, 
142 
 
2010, p. 192). In theory, the party government model might claim to work effectively in 
the European Parliament on the basis that:  
(i) cohesive and unified parties within the European Parliament need to offer 
alternative policy programmes; 
(ii) the electorate needs to choose parties based on performance;   
(iii) the outcome of elections link voters’ preferences with a policy making 
process in the European Parliament.  
 
But, those conditions are often faced with a confusing reality in which European party 
groups are loosely co-ordinated umbrella organisations with lesser party discipline than 
nationally (Marsh and Norris, 1997, p. 155). In the European Parliament, for example, 
three dimensions are found necessary to describe the policy attitudes of voters and 
candidates: an economic left/right dimension, a cultural dimension capturing attitudes 
towards a broad range of social issues, and a dimension capturing attitudes towards the EU 
(Costello et al., 2012, p. 1245). Importantly, “the parties and MEPs within Parliament do 
seem to serve an effective representative role, with the congruence between the European 
electorate and Parliament being much more pronounced than is generally credited” (Mair 
and Thomassen, 2010, p. 33). Voting on left-right lines has been increasingly common in 
the European Parliament, with ideological grounds being central to votes through ‘grand 
coalition’ alliances (Nugent, 2010, p. 198; Hix et al., 2007). It is, at best, a partial model of 
European Parliament representation but which explains only one facet of distinct 
representation pursued by the European Parliament; in Westminster, the party government 
model might be seen as much more central to its almost singular mode of electoral 
representation.   
   
Parliamentary sovereignty and contemporary collective representation by Parliament under 
EU membership: the case of the Working Time Directive 
 
The Working Time Directive provides an illustration that the recognised helm has had 
European Parliament-level functional representation joined with it, not for representation 
of individual interests in Westminster, but for Parliament’s capacity to collectively 
represent its electorate. That competition produces a distortion of the historically 
precedented capacity of Parliament to collectively represent its electors as strongly 




  What is the Working Time Directive and what does it mean for the individual? The 
Directive has been designed to protect workers’ health and safety and that working hours 
must meet minimum standards applicable throughout the EU, including the UK. The EU’s 
latest Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC) requires EU countries to guarantee rights for 
all workers, including:  
• a limit to weekly working hours, which must not exceed 48 hours on average, 
including any overtime;  
• a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours in every 24 and a rest break 
during working hours if the worker is on duty for longer than 6 hours;  
• a minimum weekly rest period of 24 uninterrupted hours for each 7-day period, in 
addition to the 11 hours’ daily rest;  
• paid annual leave of at least 4 weeks per year; extra protection for night work, e.g. 
average working hours must not exceed 8 hours per 24-hour period;  
• night workers must not perform heavy or dangerous work for longer than 8 hours in 
any 24-hour period;  
• night workers have the right to free health assessments and, under certain 
circumstances, to transfer to day work and;  
• special rules on working hours for workers in a limited number of sectors, 
including doctors in training, offshore workers, sea fishing workers and people 
working in urban passenger transport (European Commission, 2015).  
There is an individual ‘opt out’ in which individuals can opt out of the 48-hour week under 
specified conditions. The Working Time Regulations (1998) implement the European 
Working Time Directive in UK law. Before that point, rights on hours of work and the 
right to time off were agreed in individual job contracts (Adnett and Hardy, 2001, p. 119).  
 
The impact of the Working Time Directive upon the UK’s social and employment law and 
the UK constitution 
 
The actions and decisions of the European Parliament put it at the centre of drafting the 
Working Time Directive as it currently exists. The creation of the Working Time Directive 
rested on the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 
Resolution in March 1989 (European Parliament, 1989a), key events in November 1989, 
its passing a number of Resolutions relating to the draft Community Charter of 
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Fundamental Social Rights (Hantrais, 2017; European Parliament, 1989b, 1989c, 1989d), 
its introducing the requirement of four weeks’ annual leave in its first reading in February 
1991 (European Parliament, 1991) and developing a common position on the Directive 
being approved by the European Parliament in October 1993 (European Parliament, 1993). 
That presentation of where power sat in relation to representatives came at considerable 
expense to the severely weakened approaches of UK ministers attending the Council and 
the authority of politicians in Westminster itself. 
On a practical level, the Working Time Directive provided legislation for the 
organisation and reduction in working time in the UK and all EU member states. Before 
that point, the Conservative Government had historically resisted what it viewed as 
inflexible and burdensome labour and social laws being imposed on business (Lourie, 
1996). Legislation designed to protect young people’s, children’s and, women’s hours 
began to be introduced at the beginning of the nineteenth century in response to hugely 
concerning conditions prevailing in factories and mines on top of the extremely long hours 
worked in factories, mines and shops (Lourie, 1996, Annex 2).  
It is notable however both that there have been very few UK legislative restrictions 
on the hours of work of adult males (Adnett and Hardy, 2001) and that many of those 
historical legal restrictions, except those affecting children under school leaving age and 
those on drivers’ and pilots’ hours, had then been repealed (Rogowski, 2015; Lourie, 
1996). On employment law, it is worth bearing in mind the partisanship of the dominant 
Governing party-in-Parliament remains a determining factor. Throughout the 1980s, the 
mainstream Conservative Party argued that such legal working time controls were outdated 
or reduce the flexibility and competitiveness of UK business (Rogowski, 2015, p. 236) 
while the then mainstream Labour Party asserted the protection of the worker’s ‘working 
time’ workplace rights as essential to safeguard their labour and interests against big 
business and vested interests.  
 
Westminster’s collective representation versus neo-corporatist, functional representation 
   
The European Parliament itself, while providing some democratic legitimation for making 
laws and policies under its own remit, cannot claim to ‘collectively represent’ its own 
domestic electorate as it does not classically compete as a formal Parliament with 
Westminster in that sense. While there is no direct conflict in European Parliament-
Westminster ‘collective representation’ of electors – because the European Parliament does 
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not operate with that form of representation – the European Parliament pursued a form of 
functional representation (Marsh and Norris, 1997, p. 158) which impacted upon 
Westminster’s concept of collective representation.  
 An exemplary resolution by the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs in November 1983 on a Commission proposal for a recommendation on 
the reduction of working time conveys that its neo-corporatist approach relied upon the 
European Parliament, Council, Commission and the European Economic and Social 
Committee’s shared emphasis on a proposal (European Parliament, 1983). The neo-
corporatist emphasis in the early resolution is clear from its uncomfortable statement of 
“having regard to the clashes between the social partners as to the effect of a reduction in 
working time on employment and the costs of a reduction of working time” (European 
Parliament, 1983). The European Parliament’s fundamental commitment to partnership at 
Community level action is such that it “… stresses that the lack of agreement between the 
social partners at European level must not result in collective-agreement initiatives in the 
member states which are geared to Community aims being delayed or blocked” (European 
Parliament, 1983). There was, however, a stalling process because the Council had been 
forced to acknowledge in 1984 that it was unable to reach unanimous agreement with the 
UK on the proposal. The ministers acting for the Government had vetoed the measure as 
being unconducive to improving employment (Rogowski, 2015; Stothers and Porter, 
2011).  
  Again, however, the European Parliament demonstrated its cooperative, neo-
corporatist approach and determination, for example, in September 1984, when the 
Socialist Group’s European Parliament Resolution called on the Council to “make a 
prompt and positive response” to all the European Parliament resolutions passed urging a 
reduction in working time (European Parliament, 1984). By emphasising social 
partnership, it called on the Commission to support all trade union and management 
initiatives likely to provide industries and regions with approaches to the reduction of 
working time (European Parliament, 1984). The resolution requested that the nine 
governments who had previously expressed their support in the council for “working time” 
proposals of the Commission and European Parliament “should implement these 
proposals” e.g. irrespective of the UK. The resolution itself was sent to the Council, the 
Commission, the member state governments, the Union Industries of the European 
Community (UNICE) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).  
  So, in 1988, given the UK’s ongoing resistance, an alternative path had to be found 
by the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs and other 
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institutions and pro-Working Time Directive member states to proceed as they agreed and 
thereby circumvent the UK veto. In the meantime, the European Economic and Social 
Committee, Commission and Parliament, by partnership and collaboration, between 1988 
and 1989, produced and passed a draft Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 
(Hantrais, 2017; Lourie, 1996; European Parliament, 1989a; European Parliament, 1989b; 
European Parliament, 1989c). The European Parliament notably sought to strengthen it and 
remove national controls over the draft. In December 1989, it was passed as a “solemn 
declaration” by the member states with the exception of the UK (Lourie, 1996; European 
Parliament, 1989b). Fundamentally, the Commission produced an action programme to 
implement the Directive and the European Parliament urged for the legislation to be 
created by the end of 1990. The European Economic and Social Committee and Parliament 
partnership, again, strengthened the proposals, for example, to ensure 4 weeks annual leave 
(European Parliament, 1989a; European Parliament, 1989b; European Parliament, 1989c; 
European Parliament, 1989d).  The Directive was delayed in the Council for some time and 
the European Parliament passed an amended and strengthened version in October 1993 
(European Parliament, 1993). It was adopted in the Council on 23 November 1993 (as 
Council Directive 93/104/EC), where the UK controversially abstained in the vote.  
In urging proposals for working time in its 1983 Resolution (European Parliament, 
1983), the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs is 
evidently reliant on the Council, Commission and the European Economic and Social 
Committee’s shared neo-corporatist emphasis because it seeks to represent the approach 
taken by the shared central institutions. It is also concerned only with binding, 
supranational commitment, not watered-down national promises, on working time. The 
entire rationale for its frustrations at the dialogue and agreement having broken down 
between collaborative social partners, as described in the 1983 Resolution (European 
Parliament, 1983) is because of the European Parliament’s reliance on neo-corporatism and 
mode of functional representation which occurs through social dialogue and inter-
institutional agreement, rather than direct representation of electors. The attempts to save 
its alternative linkages of representation beyond the citizen-representative link were being 
frustrated. 
The character of the contemporary European Parliament reflects those neo-
corporatist and collaborative practices. It is the only institution which is directly elected, 
with MEPs selected by UK voters and from all EU states voters every five years. The 
institution seats 751 MEPs – including 73 from the UK – and has gained broad powers 
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through the Treaties (Shackleton, 2012). It is one of the EU’s main law-making 
institutions, along with the Council of the EU. In legislative terms, today’s European 
Parliament takes part in the three-stage ordinary legislative procedure with the Council of 
Ministers on an equal status with it, as “co-legislature”, in order to legislate (Bux, 2017; 
European Union, 2014; Hix and Høyland, 2013, p. 172; European Scrutiny Committee, 
2013; Shackleton, 2012, p. 137; see Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 122). The field of 
policies covered by the ordinary legislative procedure has since increased under the Lisbon 
Treaty, providing the European Parliament with further powers to influence the content of 
certain laws. UK voters elect MEPs to an institution only on the basis that is recognised as 
an institution in the recognised helm having the main role of debating and passing 
European laws, with the Council, as well as scrutinising other EU institutions, particularly 
the Commission, to make sure they are working democratically (European Union, 2014). 
In terms of legislation passed by the EU impacting upon the UK, the EU determines more 
than 50 per cent of its legislation (on that proportion, see Geddes, 2013, p. 7; Miller, 2010; 
Lord Triesman, 2006), through non-UK, EU representative/ legislative bodies of the 
European Parliament with its own directly elected representatives in addition to other EU 
institutions. It is still national parliaments, rather than the European Parliament directly that 
guarantees democratic principles are respected and that the importance of national 
parliaments playing “a central role in the European institutional system is thus the 
condition sine qua non of democracy” in Europe (Neyer, 2014, p. 125). Irrespective of the 
European Parliament’s direct election under a system of proportional representation, it is 
reported to suffer generally from a ‘democratic deficit’. 
  Following the early UK veto over working time proposals, the hardened 1984 
Socialist Group’s European Parliament Resolution sought even greater representation 
through social dialogue between the Commission and trade union and management 
initiatives (European Parliament, 1984). It urged that degree of inter-institutional 
agreement to the extent that the other nine pro-working time member states should proceed 
without the UK. The Resolution requested that their European Parliament view be sent to 
the major European trade union bodies. The allied work with the European Economic and 
Social Committee in strengthening the proposals in the early 1990s and the urging for the 
Commission to stronger relations with social partners to produce working time law in the 
1989 European Parliament resolution is further evidence of representation through social 
dialogue with partners plus inter-institutional agreements. The European Economic and 
Social Committee is part of the neo-corporate institutional means of representation in the 
sense that it is a “consultative body” that closely cooperates with the European Parliament 
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(as well as the Council and the European Commission) by the representation of the views 
of Europe’s major socio-occupational interest, workers and employers groups and others 
(European Economic and Social Committee, 2016). The deeply ingrained nature of 
representation through social dialogue is reflected very well in one of the European 
Parliament’s major amendments to the Working Time Directive in February 1991, on first 
reading, which demanded that the member states themselves adopt measures to ensure 
agreements on working time between social partners would be legally binding (European 
Parliament, 1991). When it comes to social partners, the EU comfortably absorbs national 
social partnerships with employer and workers organisations into its own social dialogue in 
a way that Westminster partly rejected. This difference produces a competitive distortion 
of the domestic legislature as a primary political actor able to collectively represent its 
constituents on social and employment interests.  
Whereas the UK’s (Conservative) governing party-in-Parliament as the 
representative self-policing ‘corporate body’ –  collectively standing for the represented in 
that corporate body of parliament through an agenda defined by party (Pettit, 2009, p. 85) – 
had previously been the space for resolving contested labour laws, the acceptance and 
irreversibility of the imposed EU policy, then law, demonstrated the unaccountability of 
ministers at Westminster in making laws and policies in the national interest. It shifted the 
space for resolving deeply contested labour laws into a wider domestic situation taking 
place in the UK by the mid-1990s: a strong desire to change the UK’s governing party-in-
Parliament. Given the impasse at the European level, the UK’s governing New Labour 
Party in 1997 as pledged in the General Election, signed up to the Social Chapter and 
subsequent legislation such as the Working Time Directive (Hantrais, 2017; Lourie, 1998). 
It did not address the impasse as such, but through its acceptance brought a small degree of 
political settlement and EU-UK policy consistency, despite the ongoing practical failures 
in implementing the legislation since that date.  
  European Parliament representation on the other hand is exemplified by a second-
order collaborative legislature set up as a politically representative institution (while unable 
to represent a unified European interest). It represents, as a neo-corporatist body, the 
approaches of other central institutions and its social partners while only weakly 
representing its electors. The existence of multi-representation government as described in 
practices, and part-federal representative government as described in the Treaties, 
however, make the party government model both useful and relevant. Elective and 
professional interest ‘functional’ representation in the European Parliament works by 
creating ‘instruments of linkage’ (Marsh and Norris, 1997, p. 158) as opposed to operating 
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through Westminster’s ‘collective representation’. Collective representation by MPs of 
their electors is defined strongly by their political parties, when in Government, remaining 
accountable to parliament and through regular elections to the electorate, who retain 
ultimate decision-making capacities. It is sovereignty-affecting at Westminster because 
collective representation allows the governing party to be a self-policing ‘corporate body’, 
collectively standing for the represented in that corporate body of parliament through an 
agenda defined by party (Pettit, 2009, p. 85). Collective representation is straightforwardly 
distorted at Westminster when representatives of the governing domestic political parties 
become less accountable to parliament because those parties’ policies are bypassed by the 
policymaking of the European Parliament. Under EU membership, the UK Parliament has 
become practically less sovereign because the UK’s helm of state has had European 
Parliament-level parliamentary representation competing with it – not as a competing 
delegation of representatives – but in relation to its ‘trustee’ capacity to collectively 




The ongoing and repetitive statements by the European Parliament in its Resolutions to 
ensuring a supranational commitment to working time reduction, as distinct from weaker, 
non-binding national pledges, served to remind the Commission to strengthen its binding 
requirements at the supranational level. It also is a reminder that the Commission and 
European Parliament are vital supranational elements - the Commission as government, the 
European Parliament as representative parliament - within the multi-representational, 
federal architecture. The 1983 Resolution is heavily critical of the Commission’s proposal 
at this stage for not sufficiently ingraining the law at the Community level. It positively 
warns off collective agreement initiatives in member states (European Parliament, 1983). 
The 1984 Resolution pressing for the nine member states to take up the working time 
proposals of the Commission and European Parliament (European Parliament, 1984), 
irrespective of the UK, is again supranational in its objective. The subsequent maneouvre 
in the late 1980s in utilizing the draft Community Charter is an attempt to create one of a 
number of constitutional documents for government at the European level. The step of 
adopting the Working Time Directive under Article 118a (Lourie, 1996), thereby relying 
on a qualified majority rather than unanimity in the Council (Rogowski, 2015, p. 236), 
affirms the supranational decision-making procedure as essential to making genuine 
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‘European decisions’. It is that exercise of supranational decision-making by a 
supranational institution seeking to bring about a request in law at a supranational level, as 
well as the presentation of the Treaties (Article 118a) which achieved a sidestepping of the 
consent of the UK through qualified majority voting (Martinsen and Wessel, 2014, p. 14). 
The process marginalised and bypassed the understanding that politics is defined through a 
representative legislature able to govern consistently with its function being Burke’s 
common interest, or Rehfeld’s “good of all” (Rehfeld, 2005, p. 149). The essence of 
supranational decision-making in this way is that the EU, with procedural approval from its 
parliamentary institution, competitively distorts the domestic legislature’s ability to make 
decisions as a primary political actor consistent with collective representation in the 
electorate’s interest.  
 
Representation through constitutionalisation   
 
Representation can also occur at the EU-level by reference to ‘constitutionalisation’ as a 
means to strengthen its representative linkages. It is of relevance in the broader 
‘constitutionalisation’ process that in late 1989, the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Employment and Social Affairs and Committee on Women’s Rights had pushed for the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers alongside measures for 
the reorganization of working time (Hantrais, 2017; Adnett and Hardy, 2001, p. 115; 
European Parliament, 1989b, 1989c). During that process, in November 1989, the 
European Parliament adopted the text of a powerful resolution on the Community Charter 
of Fundamental Social Rights convinced that the adoption by the Council of that Charter 
“constitutes a first step towards the establishment of fundamental social rights in the 
European Community ...” (European Parliament, 1989b). Nevertheless, it criticised the 
draft as a “watering down”, “inadequate”, “imprecise” not least because of “the repeated 
references to ‘national legislation’ and ‘national practices... which must on no account be 
allowed to weaken the fundamental nature of the rights set out in the Charter.” (European 
Parliament, 1989b). The resolution expressed references to the opinion of the European 
Economic and Social Committee earlier that year on fundamental Community social rights 
and the Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms adopted earlier that year. The 
resolution is supportive of the International Labour Organisation conventions in making 
those claims. Another separate European Parliament resolution, again, passed on the same 
day on the attainment of economic and social cohesion lays bare the European 
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Parliament’s frustration at the Council’s inability to provide worker’s rights through a 
constitutional source – they were “not satisfied merely with a solemn declaration by the 
Council on the basic social rights of workers” (European Parliament, 1989d). That Charter 
was signed by all Heads of Government of the member states of the European Community 
except the UK at Strasbourg in December 1989 (Adnett and Hardy, 2001, p. 115; Lourie, 
1996).  
 The European Parliament commitment to a form of representation through social 
partnership and constitutionalisation, in spite of UK resistance to the measure, was further 
demonstrated in the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs 
resolution of September 1990, relating to the Commission’s impending action programme 
on the implementation of the Charter for 1991-1992 and working time (European 
Parliament, 1990). The Commission itself had submitted its proposal for a Draft Directive 
concerning certain aspects of the Organisation of Working Time to the Council of 
Ministers in September 1990 (Lourie, 1996). The European Parliament resolution pushed 
for the Commission to submit to the Council by 31 December 1991 proposals in its 
legislative programme, along with tighter changes made by the European Parliament with a 
view to adoption of the legislation by 1 January 1993 (European Parliament, 1990). Then, 
the Commission submitted a proposal for a Draft Directive concerning certain aspects of 
the Organisation of Working Time to the Council of Ministers in September 1990. The UK 
Conservative government objected to that Directive from the beginning (Rogowski, 2015), 
arguing that it would impose burdens on employers, interfere in the relations between 
employers and employees, while reducing competitiveness and flexibility (Rogowski, 
2015, p. 236; see Bolick, 1995). It was not seen as necessary on the grounds of health and 
safety (Lourie, 1998, p. 19; Lourie, 1996). It was only when the proposal for a Council 
working time directive came before the European Parliament in February 1991 for first 
reading that it was approved with 39 amendments (European Parliament, 1991). One 
amendment (no. 2) called upon the Community to at least respect certain Conventions of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) in seeking working time reduction. The 
European Parliament approved the Commission proposal subject to Parliament’s 
amendments at that first reading.  
The most unexpected facet of representation at the European level in the example 
of the Working Time Directive is its general reliance on ‘constitutionalisation’ as a means 
to strengthen its representative linkages. The constitutional sources of the EU Treaties, 
notably through the Single European Act, the draft Community Charter (which became the 
Social Chapter), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions (e.g. Adnett and 
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Hardy, 2001, p. 120), the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, the November 
1996 ECJ judgement against the UK and ECJ case law provided consolidated and clarified, 
written expressions of rights which supported the overall objective of reducing working 
time. That political turned constitutional project is at odds with the Westminster system, 
with its partly written but wholly uncodified constitution. In both a 1989 Resolution and on 
the above first reading of the Directive in 1991, the European Parliament is reliant on the 
ILO Conventions – setting out the principles of international labour law – in seeking a 
reduction of working time, which as well as helping to consolidate the European 
Community standard is, by its nature, a strong international (not merely European 
Community) standard. It is already well documented that the European Economic and 
Social Committee and European Parliament have repeatedly called on the Commission to 
draw on ILO standards in formulating social policy (Rönnmar, 2011, p. 41; see Adnett and 
Hardy, 2001, p. 120). The Westminster system has historically rejected extensive, written 
rights-based documents – including many ILO Conventions – as a source of governing law 
and political schemes.  
The UK Government, after all, rejected the Community Charter, did not participate 
in several ILO Conventions and took the Commission to the ECJ over the Working Time 
Directive law (Adnett and Hardy, 2001). It is notable after the 1988 period the Charter and 
other ‘fundamental rights’ expressions provided significant weight in relation to the 
European Parliament’s representative authority in order to support legislation for the 
reorganisation of working time (see Hantrais, 2017). At that early point, the European 
Parliament had little reputation, credibility or recognition as a legitimate legislature able to 
represent the views or sentiments of its electors, even though it perhaps did not necessarily 
require it. When it came to constitutionalisation as a tool of representation, the EU offers 
citizens texts and documents with material, claimable rights as authoritative guidance. This 
creates a competitive distortion of the domestic legislature as a primary political actor able 
to collectively represent the collective interest in the absence of constraining, inflexible, 
written, rights-based, authoritative guidance.  
 
Competitive partisanship and party government 
 
Westminster’s capacity to collectively represent an electorate is competitively distorted in 
the face of EU-level multi-representational government. The competitive, partisanship 
demonstrated at both the Westminster and Strasbourg levels is meaningful to the outcome 
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and implementation of the Working Time Directive. Within the political cultures generally, 
just as the socialist approach to a social Europe in the vision of Jacques Delors hardened 
the UK Conservative government’s stance on social and labour law, so too did Thatcher’s 
free market stance harden the European Parliament’s political resolve to create a 
Community-wide labour code (Dimitrakopoulos, 2013). The partisanship created a fluidity 
of political culture which in Strasbourg was generally supportive of Working Time 
Directive and labour market regulation, irrespective of domestic support or opposition in 
member states.  
 This observation on bi-party partisanship in political culture is an important point 
of evaluation because in attempting to characterise EU and Westminster representation in 
the context of the Working Time Directive, it is central that in Westminster, a national 
Conservative administration had been elected for the duration of the 1979-1997 period. It 
viewed itself as ‘deregulatory’ and seeking reductions in the burdens of inflexible social 
and employment legislation imposed on business (Adnett and Hardy, 2001; Bolick, 1995). 
It rejected the notion of ‘social Europe’ – and by extension the legislative binds of working 
time legislation, which during the 1980s Margaret Thatcher strongly resisted. The 
Conservative government notably maintained an opt-out on the Social Chapter on the 
Maastricht Treaty (Gowland et al., 2010, p. 103). The domestic Labour Party, while 
weakened, Eurosceptic and in opposition, opposed the Conservatives on all those policies. 
On the other hand, the European Parliament as a whole, contained a much greater number 
of pro-working time socialist MEPs in its political grouping throughout the European 
Parliament elections of 1984, 1989 and 1994. The British Labour Party and the political 
left in Europe, along with its strong sub-national relationship with the trade union 
movement on the whole favoured and mostly campaigned for strengthening social and 
employment law, the vision of a social Europe and along with it, the Working Time 
Directive. In Strasbourg, the Socialists were therefore the largest majority groupings in the 
first four elected European Parliament’s (1979-99) and the centre left has held the majority 
for the duration of this period (Hix et al, 2003, p. 315). This is important to bear in mind 
even where there is cooperation with the European Parliament. That entire period 
responsible for the creation of the Working Time Directive contrasts with a domestic, 
deregulatory Conservative administration from 1979 to 1990 under the premiership of 
Margaret Thatcher, then from 1990 to 1997 under John Major. It was following events 
under the Major government that the UK took the Commission to the ECJ and lost that it 
was required to implement the Directive (UK v Council of the European Union [1996]; 
Lourie, 1998). It followed in Tony Blair’s, post-1997 newly elected Labour administration 
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that the UK then opted into EU social legislation and introduced the regulations in 1998 
(Rogowski, 2015; Barysch, 2013). This partisanship impacts upon the respective 
legislatures, enabling them to harden in the recognition of their representative strength. In 
particular, the significant and hardened role played by the socialist grouping in the 
European Parliament played – through the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D) combined with the European People’s Party (EPP) in helping to produce 
the EU working time legislation – can be contrasted with the resistance exerted by a 
national, majority Conservative administration in Westminster.  
 The bi-partisanship was again more widely illustrated to the public at large in the 
ongoing battles between the UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a Conservative free-
marketeer, and the then EU Commission President, a socialist, Jacques Delors over that 
Charter. When, in 1989, Delors presented a Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, the 
reason it was adopted by all member states except the UK had been that Thatcher opposed 
it on the grounds that it would restrict free enterprise (Raileanu-Szeles, 2013, p. 34; Adnett 
and Hardy, 2001, p. 115). Even when the Charter was finally attached to the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, known as ‘the Social Chapter’, Britain employed its opt-out under John 
Major’s government to prevent it becoming part of UK law at that stage (Lourie, 1997). 
The UK Government under John Major claimed an opt-out from the Directive. For 
the UK’s purposes, it made an application for the annulment of the Directive to the ECJ in 
March 1994 (Lourie, 1996). The ECJ had rejected the UK Government’s challenge to the 
Directive (Lourie, 1998; UK v Council of the European Union [1996]). In sum, the UK had 
“no option but to obey the law”, as the Government minister was forced to concede 
(Adnett and Hardy, 2001, p. 120). Directives, as legislative acts, set out the objective that 
all EU countries must achieve but in which it is up to the individual countries to decide 
how, by implementing legislation (European Union, 2014). Despite losing its case before 
the ECJ in 1996, the Conservative Government did not implement the Directive until the 
adoption of the enforcing Working Time Regulations 1998, which entered into force on 1 
October 1998 (Lourie, 1998). This took place under the later New Labour government in 
1997, who accepted the Social Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty and also accepted an 
updated Working Time Directive, which was adopted in November 2003 and brought it 
into effect (Hantrais, 2017; Dimitrakopoulos, 2013). The European Parliament has 
continued to be at the forefront of unsuccessful and ongoing attempts to end Britain’s 
individual opt-out from the Working Time Directive and the UK finally being forced to 
limit the working week to 48 hours for all employees.  
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  The partisanship in legislating for the Working Time Directive demonstrated at a 
deeper institutional level how the federal structures of the European Parliament, through 
electoral and functional representation, however weak, were functioning at the European 
level. On first interpretation, Bogdanor (2009a) is correct that the European Parliament is 
not an executive-sustaining parliament where members of the executive are drawn from the 
voter-elected legislature in similarity to the Westminster model. Yet the European 
Parliament is an executive-approving parliament – with consultative and advisory powers 
preceding the Maastricht Treaty – whose opinions and votes issued to members of the 
governing Commission and Council are driven to conform or amend their behaviour in 
governing.  
  Since the European Parliament exists in a complex system of multi-tiered 
government, its representative capacity exists in a complex multi-representation, part-
federal government. Traditional lines of accountability and authority under the 
Westminster model are diffused and dissipated under the European Parliament model, but 
nonetheless political party remains relevant to its representative ability. Schmitt and 
Thomassen (1999, p. 17) argue that the EU is a multi-tiered system of government. It has 
several layers of European government, each with its own system of political 
representation. Of course, European government is different from state government based 
upon a responsibility to a significant majority in parliament. Nor is there a European 
people whose sovereignty is embodied in the European Parliament.  However, as Schmitt 
and Thomassen (1999) argue, the Treaties (Article 138a TEU) on which the European 
political institutions are based provide for a system of political representation as expressed 
in the responsible party model. The Treaties provide the goal to which the Union should 
aspire, albeit an objective for a federal Europe. That interpretation of the Treaties makes 
the party government model relevant. As Costello et al. (2012) have argued, while 
European political parties do not compete for the votes of a European electorate (Costello 
et al., 2012, p. 1229)  and while there is no true European system of political 
representation, that does not mean European elections cannot provide an “‘instrument of 
linkage”.  In the European Parliament, parties are instruments of linkage with less power of 
direction at the recognised helm; in Westminster, parties are both well-established 
instruments of linkage as well as instruments of direction at the helm.  
 Claims to sovereignty rest on binary politics conducted through the Westminster 
system. The performance of EU politics which creates linkages of that binary party politics 
in a European Parliament therefore undermines the claims to parliamentary sovereignty. 
The serious difficulty many theorists have in accepting that binary party-based 
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government-opposition politics has some level of explanation at the European Parliament-
level representation is because of its reliance on a theory which explains that European 
Parliament-level is, at least in part, a parliament incorporated into a European federation. 
To accept federation is to accept a specific distributed state structure at the European level, 
which alters the claims to sovereignty in the member states and is not always accepted in 
the existing research (Moravcsik, 2008; Blankart, 2007; Majone, 2006). Yet, in following 
Thomassen’s reasoning of multi-tiered government and the federal interpretation of the EU 
by Annett (2010), it should also be understood that European multi-tiered government is 
indeed part-confederation and part-federation (McCormick, 2015, p. 38; Burgess, 2006), 
just as those arrangements are part-supranational and part-intergovernmental. When 
representation is pursued at the European Parliament-level, it can divert to a federal, 
representation mechanism through political parties, which includes the majority socialist 
support behind the Working Time Directive. One reason why political groupings first 
formed in the European Parliament had been the conscious effort to establish a federal 
form of political organisation in the EU-level institutions (Hix et al., 2003, p. 313). Given 
that the European Parliament exists in a part-federal structure and where its representation 
is only poorly and part-elective, it is only true for one part of European Parliament 
representation. Yet, however minimal, it is essential, albeit unusual, as it is able to reflect 
the role of a partisan political party belief system in a proto-bicameral, non-majoritarian, 
consensus-seeking, Strasbourg-setting.  
The collective representation of the electorate at Westminster over substantive 
areas of government policy works effectively when it is elevated beyond the partly elective 
and strongly functional representation pursued by the European Parliament. There have 
been some theoretical omissions in recognizing the contemporary relationship between 
parliamentary sovereignty and the parliamentary collective representation model - 
particularly in contrast to the popular sovereignty representation approach (Bogdanor, 
2009a), or the party government approach which distort that connection – as impacted 
upon by European Parliament parliamentary representation. Delegate- and party-
representation models have importance and utility in relation to parliamentary sovereignty 
but only in so far as they are presupposed by the primacy of a national legislature 
(consistent with Rehfeld, 2005, p. 36) able to practically and collectively represent its 
electorate. That representing is driven toward a collective interest, brought to bear in the 
Government’s majority party inside the House of Commons, with its manifesto-turned-
agenda, governing consistently with that interest. The European Parliament can undermine 
that representation process.  
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While European Parliament binary politics is not strictly organised through 
government-opposition parties as in Westminster, the parties are importantly organised 
into party-based, political-affiliation blocs, where the majority socialist groupings held 
ideological power over those not in that grouping throughout the 1980s and 1990s and 
provided their approval or amendment to Commission and Council decisions. The 
dominance of the the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) in relation 
to the European People’s Party (EPP) in Strasbourg and the relevance of working time to 
the political culture and vision of the political left on the Left-right dimension strongly 
aided the European Parliament’s representative capacity. That is a challenge to those who 
view the European Parliament representation as distinct from Westminster or reject any 
notion of attempted EU federation party-politics as defining representation at the European 
level. Stable and cohesive political parties in the S&D and EPP groupings do have 
relevance and binary politics is feasible (consistent with Hix, 2016; Hix et al., 2007) within 
a part-federal system, in line with the party government model, despite the strength of 
other forms of representation. The lineage in which parliamentary sovereignty depends on 
political representation that, in turn, relies on binary party competition is undermined.  
Consistent with Mair and Thomassen (2013), competing parties can operate with at 
least a partially effective representative role in the European Parliament. The acceptance of 
party and of party-approving parliament is valuable however but only in so far as it is a 
second-order, collaborative legislature unable to represent a unified European interest in 
respect to a European electorate. On the other hand, Westminster’s capacity to collectively 
represent had been dis-empowered when the governing Conservative Party became less 
accountable to Parliament – given its pledges to veto and prevent the Directive from 
coming into action in the UK – because the party’s policy was bypassed by the policy-
making of the European Parliament. The bypassing of Parliament in this manner strongly 
indicates the reverse of Bogdanor’s (2009a) assumption, that EU representation affirms the 
popular power of British voters, for they and their direct and indirect pathways to 
representation are minimised. The exception to the rule in the creation of the Working 
Time Directive might be domestic, minority opposition groups and broad trade union 
movement on the political left who, in resisting Thatcher domestically, viewed working 
time legislation as a universal, European-wide solution to their campaign to improve 
national working conditions. The European Parliament representation process 
competitively distorts the domestic legislature as a primary political actor able to 
collectively represent its constituents because the governing party in the House of 
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Commons, which is charged with producing laws and policies is so radically bypassed by 




The Working Time Directive provides a very useful illustration, and often for unexpected 
reasons, that the UK’s helm of state has had European Parliament-level functional 
representation competing with its capacity to collectively represent its electors. That 
competition produces an unsettling of the historically precedented capacity to collectively 
represent its electors as strongly embedded within historical constitutional forms, thereby 
diluting the strength of parliamentary sovereignty. The Directive provides a presentation of 
where power sat in relation to representatives, which came at considerable expense to the 
severely weakened approaches of UK ministers and the authority of politicians in 
Westminster itself. In urging proposals for working time, it is notable that the European 
Parliament was strongly reliant on the Council, Commission and the European Economic 
and Social Committee’s shared neo-corporatist emphasis because it seeks to represent the 
approach taken by the shared central institutions. The European Parliament had been eager 
to ensure a supranational commitment to working time reduction, as distinct from weaker, 
non-binding national pledges, which served to remind the Commission to strengthen its 
binding requirements at the supranational level. It had also been a reminder that the 
Commission and European Parliament are vital supranational elements - the Commission 
as government, the European Parliament as representative parliament - within the multi-
representational, federal architecture. The most unexpected facet of representation at the 
European level in the example of the Working Time Directive is its general reliance on 
‘constitutionalisation’ as a means to strengthen its representative linkages. Yet, here, a 
clear place can be found for party and management of political partisanship in explaining 
the outcome of the Directive. Westminster’s capacity to collectively represent had been 
disempowered when the governing Conservative Party became less accountable to 
Parliament – given its pledges to veto and prevent the Directive from coming into action in 
the UK – because the party’s policy was bypassed by the policy-making of the European 
Parliament. The bypassing of Parliament in this manner puts EU-level representation at 
odds with both parliamentary and popular sovereignty models, for voters’ direct and 
indirect pathways to representation are minimised.  
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Finally, whereas the UK’s (Conservative) governing party-in-Parliament as the 
representative self-policing corporate body (Pettit, 2009) had previously been the space for 
resolving contested labour laws, the acceptance and the irreversibility, of the imposed EU 
policy, then law, demonstrated the unaccountability of ministers at Westminster in making 
laws and policies in the collective interest. As Rehfeld (2005, p. 149) argues, separately, 
the collective national good is primary in defining the function of political representation. 
This chapter, however, has not sought to deal with the shift in the European Parliament’s 
powers from consultation, to cooperation, to co-decision throughout the early European 
Community, the Single European Act and then the Maastricht Treaty, respectively (Bux, 
2017; Hix and Høyland, 2013, p. 172), but that shift in powers has a significant relevance 
to the role of European Parliament in producing legislation. While extended political 
representation mechanisms have arguably led to more accessible representative institutions 
in Westminster and Europe, as Westminster is fused ever-closer into EU-level 
representation – whilst also being morphed into federal, devolved, sub-national and 
regional bodies domestically – it has ultimately led to the distortion of the domestic 
legislature as a primary political actor able to collectively represent its constituents.  
 The subsequent chapter (Chapter 6) explains that Parliament is effectively less 
sovereign because the recognised helm has had EU-level fundamental rights schemes 
incorporated into it. In that process, EU fundamental rights schemes protected by the 
courts become constitutionally elevated, entrenched in codes of written and legal form. 
That can be contrasted with the historical precedents of Bracton (in the first historical 
constitutional form) presenting an English constitution in which governing at the helm is 
presented as legally distinct but politically contingent upon its capacity to determine and 
respect fundamental rights. Contemporary EU rights are alternatively expressed as 
unchallengeable instruments above politics – complete with EU legal supremacy, direct 
effect and ECJ jurisdiction – relative to the precedented and minimalist protection afforded 
by Parliament. The case study of the EU free movement right makes evident that the UK 
governing helm of state has had EU rights incorporated into its constitution through a 
dependency upon EU-level rights. The submission of the domestic legislature to the courts, 
along with a final binding effect upon the executive, impacts upon and unsettles 






Chapter 6: Parliamentary sovereignty, the EU free movement of persons and the 
precedent of fundamental rights provision 
 
Parliament has been theoretically sovereign because, in part, it rests on the historically 
precedented basis in which the provision of fundamental rights is made through recourse to 
political, parliamentary mechanisms rather than the subordinate provision offered by the 
courts. Under EU membership, the UK Parliament has however become practically less 
sovereign because the UK’s helm of state has had EU-level fundamental rights schemes 
incorporated into it. In that process, EU fundamental rights schemes protected by the 
courts become constitutionally elevated and entrenched in codes of written and legal form. 
As such, rights are expressed as unchallengeable instruments above politics – complete 
with EU legal supremacy, direct effect and ECJ jurisdiction – relative to the precedented 
and minimalist provision afforded by Parliament. The submission of the domestic 
legislature in that key respect to the courts, along with a final binding effect upon the 
executive, impacts upon and dilutes the strength of parliamentary sovereignty. 
  What are those fundamental rights presently claimed to be? Within the expanding 
scope of human rights, ‘fundamental rights’ describes rights which are claimed to be of 
greater or particular significance which cannot be derogated from. The term “human 
rights” is used in international law arenas; whereas rights guaranteed by constitutions at the 
national level are most often referred to as “fundamental rights”. In some interpretations, 
both can often be referring to the same substance. Contemporary rights are categorised as 
fundamental when they guarantee that no one living in a free democratic society such as 
the UK should be free to forego (Bingham, 2010). Those rights have included:  
• the right to life;  
• the right that no one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment;  
• the right that no one shall be held in slavery or perform forced labour;  
• the right to security and liberty of the person;  
• the right to a fair trial;  
• the right not to be published without the law;  
• the right to respect for private and family life;  
• the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;  
• the right to freedom of expression;  
• the right to freedom of association;  
• the right to marry;  
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• the right to protection of property, and; 
• the right to education. 
 
It is held that those rights must be secured without discrimination on grounds of sex, 
religion, race, colour, language, political opinion, national or social origin (Bingham, 2010, 
pp. 10-36). Domestically, systems for the provision of fundamental rights present a 
challenge and constraint upon the authority of decision-makers – it therefore becomes the 
function of the system as a whole to ensure that decisions made on behalf of the general 
interest do not neglect or deny individual rights (Muir, 2014, p. 29). There is however no 
universal consensus on fundamental rights, even among developed countries (Bingham, 
2010, p. 68).   
  The first historical constitutional form presents an English constitution in which 
governing at the helm is presented as legally distinct but politically contingent upon its 
capacity to determine and respect fundamental rights. The law and the law-making 
sovereign were “mutually conditioned”, contingent, reciprocal and interdependent at the 
helm, even though the sovereign retained the power to govern the realm (Kantorowicz, 
1957, pp. 153, 155). In contrast, this chapter considers how the modern neo-Diceyan view 
of the British constitution disregards that contingency (Dicey, 1964), the radical common 
law constitutionalism school (Allan, 2013) overstates it and; the constitutional state 
perspective (Bogdanor, 2009a) overlooks that contingent relationship. Those 
interpretations of the British constitution have misplaced EU fundamental rights in a 
political and constitutional context, if not underestimated their supremacy to European 
Convention- and international-rights. This chapter addresses those oversights through 
appealing to the ‘political constitutionalism’ of Jeremy Waldron (1999), Richard Bellamy 
(2007) and Adam Tomkins (2013). It asserts the primacy of political legitimacy over 
constitutional entrenchment and challenges the contemporary narrow determination of 
rights by courts in favour of a shared responsibility by the executive, the legislature and 
judiciary. It challenges the approach of supranational legalism in determining EU rights 
through the prism of democratic parliamentary majorities.  
  The case study of the EU free movement right demonstrates that the UK governing 
helm of state has had EU rights incorporated into its constitution through a dependency 
upon EU-level rights by individuals in the UK, as EU citizens, in order to protect their 
interests to move freely. It leads to the elevation of the UK judiciary as a rights-
adjudicating court system as it fuses ever-closer into the Luxembourg court system. This 
has meant the dilution of the UK Parliament as a rights-providing institution. The deep 
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political claims made to the constitutional and institutional entrenchment of the rights 
themselves, irrespective of political legitimacy, combined with the disappearing consensus 
between the arms of state and community in protecting rights has progressed this continued 
legislative decline and judicial advance in the UK, impacting indirectly upon the unsettling 
of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Parliamentary sovereignty and historical fundamental rights provision 
 
Fundamental rights have a unique but reflexive role in the historical development of the 
British constitution, in which the development of modern British-EU citizens as rights-
bearing individuals developed from Royal subjects with very basic rights granted by royal 
privilege through to British subjects of Empire with limited, implicit privilege-determined 
rights, then UK citizens with limited statutory rights determined by the state, to UK 
citizens enjoying a greater, wide bundle of rights as EU citizens. Although Dicey in his 
seminal 1885 work, ‘An Introduction to the Study of Law of the Constitution’, accepted 
such key principles and rules as “the conventions of the Constitution” which regulate 
relationships (Russell, 1987, p. 545), he subverted them as non-legal additions to the 
constitution. Dicey’s work embodied the subordination of court-based fundamental rights 
provision in Parliament's role in the sense that no higher, fundamental right framework was 
required where freedom was protected by common law custom and Parliament checked the 
unwieldiness of the executive (Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 397; Francis and Morrow, 
1994, p. 23). The relevance of that view has been lost in contemporary Britain. At that 
time, national citizens equipped with material rights which they could read from a 
constitution or charter was simply not precedented. As Royal subjects, their British 
nationality developed from an allegiance to the Crown owed by them in return for which 
the Crown had no power to expel them from the realm (Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 418). 
People born within the Crown's dominions became a subject. The major common law 
division was between British subjects and aliens (foreigners). It was only in the later part 
of the twentieth century in post-imperial Britain that Parliament wrote national subjecthood 
and immigration into parliamentary law – the Immigration Act 1971 and the British 
Nationality Act of 1981 – with the former drawing on the deep division between European 
Community and non-European Community freedom of movement rights (Bradley and 




 The Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) itself then explicitly included 
the right to move and reside freely in member states (subject to limitations and conditions) 
under the concept of EU citizenship, along with a number of associated rights. So, the 
principle of free movement was significantly incorporated through the Maastricht Treaty as 
a core part of the concept of ‘EU citizenship’ (Marzocchi, 2017). The European 
Commission says it is the right most closely associated with EU citizenship (Peter, 2014). 
The Treaty formally created the European Union and formalised the recognition of the 
status of EU citizens with their associated rights, as claimable for every national of a 
member state. EU citizenship offers significant potential for the provision of fundamental 
rights (van den Brink, 2012). The principle has itself evolved as a definition over time 
from the right to free movement for workers, or those economically active in the EU labour 
market, to then apply also to job-seekers, the self-employed, students and the self-
sufficient e.g. retired persons. Under the Treaties, the free movement of persons is an area 
of ‘shared competence’ so that where the EU has enacted legislation, the UK does not have 
competence to act other than in accordance with that legislation.  
The subsequent EU treaties including Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003) and Lisbon 
(2009) have entrenched EU citizenship as a bundle of rights built around ‘free movement’ 
and ‘non-discrimination’ between and across EU member states (Isin and Saward, 2013, p. 
1). The development of modern British-EU citizens as rights-bearing individuals 
developed from Royal subjects with very basic rights granted by royal privilege 
(medieval), to British subjects during Empire with limited, implicit privilege-determined 
rights, to UK citizens with limited statutory rights determined by the state, to UK citizens 
enjoying a greater, wide bundle of rights as EU citizens which have been determined by 
the EU as assented to by UK and 27 other European governments.  
The character of parliamentary sovereignty has been historically dependent upon 
Parliament respecting the customs of fundamental law. It is notable that the historical 
development of the sovereignty invested in Parliament is legally separate but politically 
contingent upon the development of fundamental law/rights provision. It is that first 
episodic historical constitutional form within a historically evolving approach of eight 
potential historical forms that demonstrated that the development of parliamentary 
sovereignty was dependent upon respecting the customs of fundamental law. That 
interpretation of Bracton leads to the understanding of sovereignty as government through 
the helm of the ship of state, which can be understood from the vantage point of the period 
of medieval kingship in the centuries preceding the Reformation in the thirteenth and 
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fourteenth centuries. The important relationship is that baronial counsel reinforced the 
moral – albeit, not legal – duty of fundamental law that the Crown was now subject to and 
must respect. That historical form responds to an interpretation of Bracton’s medieval 
constitutionalism in which law and the law-making sovereign at the ‘helm’ of the medieval 
state, were “mutually conditioned and contingent even though the sovereign retained the 
power to govern the realm (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 153). The governing at the helm of the 
state is then, both legally separate but politically contingent upon the capacity to respect 
fundamental law and rights. 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty and contemporary fundamental rights provision 
 
In understanding the contemporary relationship between UK parliamentary sovereignty 
and fundamental rights, there are ample contrasts to be made to the underlying features of 
the neo-Diceyan view, a radical common law constitutionalism or a constitutional state 
perspective – which undermine that connection and never wholly explain parliamentary 
sovereignty and its relationship to fundamental rights, as impacted upon by EU 
membership. In a neo-Diceyan political landscape, contemporary Britain does require a 
fundamental rights framework of some sort – which Dicey himself saw as unnecessary 
(Francis and Morrow, 1994, p. 23) – and one of the major developments which has led to a 
framework being incorporated into the UK is through the rights introduced to UK citizens, 
as EU citizens. The historical precedents of Bracton present a British constitution in which 
governing at the helm is presented as legally distinct but politically contingent upon its 
capacity to determine and respect fundamental rights. This chapter appeals to the ‘political 
constitutionalism’, as the politics of rights, preferring to examine the primacy of politics 
over institutional rights entrenchment in relation to parliamentary sovereignty.  
  Most notably, the introduction of ‘EU citizenship’ through the EU Treaties means 
that UK citizens as EU citizens are able to appeal to directly enforceable modern EU 
fundamental rights, as against rights previously determined through a national 
constitutional structure. They are material rights, not ancient privileges. Citizens generally 
have to appeal to courts, not Parliament in claiming those rights. Neither can Parliament 
redefine those rights or in any way abridge them. The process to realise an EU or national 
right which is claimable is through a legal and judicial process, not a political or 
parliamentary process, and the process of determining, maintaining and protecting rights is 
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gradually becoming a matter for the courts, not Parliament. They are claimable as 
entrenched tools of entitlement but they are not tools strictly subject to political or 
parliamentary decision-making as consented to by the political community. That argument 
identifies with the political constitutionalism of Jeremy Waldron (1999), Richard Bellamy 
(2007) and Adam Tomkins (2013), who have each convincingly addressed how 
judgements about decisions, including rights, cannot be legitimately entrenched or handled 
by judicial or technical bodies that are isolated from accountable and democratic processes. 
The argument that EU fundamental rights have impacted upon UK parliamentary 
sovereignty only partially rests upon the changing nature of the individual as a Crown’s 
subject which has been altered. This occurred partly through the UK’s own national 
legislation in the 1970s and 1980s, including the Immigration Act 1971 and the British 
Nationality Act 1981. What was more notable, however, after the Maastricht Treaty was 
the morphing of UK subjecthood into that of EU citizen. This is a fundamental feature, but 
by itself, has only a limited explanatory power. The move to EU citizenship explains the 
shift in the individual’s access to a system of rights which were almost exclusively an 
expression of parliamentary-determined privileges towards access to a system of 
immediately codified, court-determined entitlements. It partially explains the displacement 
of an individual’s allegiance to Crown-determined-rights to a citizen’s legal obligations 
within a broad, contractual set of rights, or material/text-based constitution. It also in part 
explains the shift from obligation to ‘a nation’ as a political entity toward the rights of a 
citizen in relation to their state. But it is absent in explaining how a political community 
provides the legitimacy for any potential constitutional entrenchment of certain rights – 
EU, international or otherwise –  and how the consensus between officials in the arms of 
the state determines the impact of EU fundamental rights upon parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Constitutional state theory and the entrenchment of codified rights 
 
In the existing research, the ‘constitutional statist’ perspective is incompatible with 
recognising the contemporary connection between parliamentary sovereignty and 
fundamental rights. Part of the incompatibility arises from overlooking the historical 
precedent describing parliamentary sovereignty as enabling Parliament to politically 
determine fundamental law and rights. The constitutional state perspective assumes instead 
that the entrenchment of written, codified, fundamental rights trumps their parliamentary 
legitimacy and sovereignty. Vernon Bogdanor (2009a, p. 57) in his central argument in The 
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New British Constitution, argues that the post-2007 era of constitutional reform, together 
with Britain’s entry in 1973 into the European Communities, has had the effect of 
replacing one constitution – that is the UK’s Diceyan doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
and its comparatively weaker provision of fundamental rights among European 
Community members – with a new constitution. The main elements of the new constitution 
include stronger provisions afforded to fundamental rights in the UK and a part of which is 
already due to separate non-EU rights under the Human Rights Act as well as EU-derived 
rights enabled under the European Communities Act.  
  The Human Rights Act itself is supposedly the cornerstone of the new constitution. 
He suggests those reforms strengthened the idea of Britain adopting a written or codified 
constitution and the potentiality for a popular constitutional state (Bogdanor, 2009a, pp. i-
xiii). It is further claimed that judges fear and act on the basis that Parliament and 
government cannot be trusted in several circumstances to refrain from passing legislation 
inconsistent with fundamental rights (Bogdanor, 2012). It is not verifiable however that the 
emergence of a popular constitutional state, based on those multiplicity of features, 
including the development of EU-level and European Convention on Human Rights-level 
fundamental rights, is evident now or even potentially in the future. The old constitution, 
he theorises, was based on the sovereignty of Parliament; the new constitution is based on 
a constitutional state with a stronger provision of human rights (Bogdanor, 2009a, pp. i-
xiii, 87). That proposition does not sit well with the observation that despite the Human 
Rights Act, there remains a well-evidenced lack of human rights culture in the UK (Ziegler 
et al., 2015).  
  In later research, Bogdanor overlooks the relevance of fundamental rights to the 
making of parliamentary sovereignty by almost singularly describing parliamentary 
sovereignty as being limited by the European Communities Act 1972 (Bogdanor, 2012). 
He claims the Act altered the rule of recognition – meaning that Parliament cannot 
derogate from European Community law. Because national courts have to apply European 
Community law where inconsistent with national law, the European Communities Act 
limits Parliament’s substantive power (Bogdanor, 2012, pp. 184-6; Goldsworthy, 2012; 
Bogdanor, 2009a). For Bogdanor, the rule of law embodied by fundamental rights is 
superseding the rule of recognition (Bogdanor, 2009a, p. 74). In describing that bolstering 
of rights under the rule of law, Bogdanor recognises but worryingly consigns Hart’s rule of 
recognition to the past, and as being superseded by the rule of law. Furthermore, it has 
frequently not been the case of accepting either the sovereignty of Parliament or of 
fundamental rights provision as Bogdanor appears to assume: the UK has simultaneously 
167 
 
experienced both parliamentary sovereignty and a politically, subordinated fundamental 
rights provision scheme. Part of the assumed segregation arises from overlooking the 
historical and political medieval precedent of how parliamentary sovereignty, though 
legally distinct, was made politically contingent upon fundamental law and rights. 
Bogdanor’s theory constructs a tension between parliamentary sovereignty and 
fundamental rights.  
  Finally, if one were to accept that there is a development of a UK constitutional 
state, it seems logical that post- European Communities Act arrangements with EU legal 
supremacy and ECJ jurisdiction over the UK in the past forty years would have a vastly 
greater and binding impact on the stronger provisions afforded to fundamental rights 
through the courts and an undermining of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty than 
those provisions afforded through the Human Rights Act. Bogdanor instead relies on non-
EU, European Convention-based rights and obligations under the Human Rights Act as 
being the cornerstone of the new constitution, when there is no such supremacy afforded 
by that Act. Parliament’s sovereignty is said to be explicitly preserved and the courts are 
merely obliged to issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’. That reasoning which overstates 
European Convention rights relative to the impact of EU rights tends to overlook the 
distinction in constraints between Charter-, Convention- and international- rights. It 
thereby overlooks the serious constraints imposed on parliamentary sovereignty by EU-
level rights.  
 
From Treaty- to Convention- to EU-rights: claimable legal rights preceding parliamentary 
sovereignty 
 
The UK’s historical system of rights ultimately provided by Parliament can be viewed as 
contrary to the court-provided, legally-claimable rights in the EU political system. One 
observable contrast is the way in which UK parliamentary sovereignty has been severely 
diluted by entrenched EU-level rights accorded to EU citizens through the implementation 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – in comparison to the partial dilution by 
partially entrenched European Convention-rights and it being relatively unaffected by 
international Treaty obligations. Under the Charter, the UK’s recognised helm has recently 
had a written single document defining the fundamental rights protected in the EU 





Box 6.1: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU  
• The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU brings together fundamental rights 
protected in the EU under a single document;  
• The Charter contains rights under six headings: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, 
Solidarity, Citizens' Rights, and Justice; 
• First announced in 2000, the Charter became legally binding on the EU with the 
Treaty of Lisbon entering into force in December 2009; 
• It entrenches the rights found in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU; 
• It entrenches the rights and freedoms enshrined in the European Convention on 
Human Rights; 
• It entrenches the other rights and principles resulting from the common 
constitutional traditions of EU countries and other international instruments; 
• The provisions of the Charter are relevant to the national authorities only when they 
are implementing EU law and EU institutions in regard to the principle of 
subsidiarity;  
• Where the Charter does not apply, the protection of fundamental rights is 
guaranteed under the UK’s own system and in other EU countries, under their own 
constitutions and international conventions. 
(European Commission, 2017) 
 
In the past, fundamental rights had been considered a ‘peripheral’ element of the EU 
construction (Hrestic, 2014). By incorporating the Charter, a high-level provision provided 
by the courts is entrenched in codes of written/legal form of a charter in contrast to the 
historical provisions afforded by Parliament. The Charter is primary EU law. As Koen 
Lenaerts has observed, “By rendering fundamental rights visible and by merging and 
systematising in a single document the sources of inspiration scattered in various national 
and international legal instruments, the Charter marks a new stage in the process of 
European integration.” (Lenaerts, 2012, p. 375). It is enforced by the Court of Justice. At 
every step, from the EU legislative process to the application of EU law at the national 
level, the rights and principles of the Charter are taken into account. The right of the free 
movement of persons, for example, is incorporated into the Charter itself under Article 
45(1) which “Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the member states” (European Commission, 2017). Since 1 December 2009, 
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when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
stands on an equal footing with the EU Treaties. 
  The UK’s historical system of Parliament-provided rights is minimalist compared 
to the partially protected Convention-rights and fully supreme EU-rights. It has recently 
been concluded that the Charter is directly effective in the UK with supremacy over 
inconsistent national law, albeit it does not apply to all areas of national law (European 
Scrutiny Committee, 2014). It only applies to those areas that fall within the scope of EU 
law. Whilst existing human rights litigation in the UK most often comes within the 
framework of the European Convention on Human Rights, the important focus must be on 
the way in which EU law in 2009 “codified a wide number of human rights, which it calls 
fundamental rights, in the form of the Charter” (European Scrutiny Committee, 2014). The 
UK’s historical system of Parliament-derived rights is almost completely contrary to the 
centralised, legally-claimable rights in the EU system. The Charter not only provides an 
additional source of human rights law, but includes rights not specifically mentioned in the 
European Convention. This can go beyond the provision afforded by the European 
Convention and it is set to become a more contemporary and relevant catalogue of rights 
than the now aged, mid-twentieth century European Convention on Human Rights 
(Douglas-Scott, 2015, p. 259). 
 The EU legal framework distinguishes it strongly from other international 
organisations. By specifically focusing on the constraints imposed on parliamentary 
sovereignty by EU-level fundamental rights, it ought to be recognised that whereas the 
courts cannot strike down Acts of Parliament under the Human Rights Act (incorporating 
the European Convention on Human Rights), EU legislation and fundamental rights have 
direct legal supremacy for UK/EU citizens. That legal framework is what distinguishes the 
EU from other international organisations (Nugent, 2010, p. 225). EU rights override 
inconsistent national legislation and European institutions can politically act in accordance 
with that legal power. It can be acknowledged, as Bogdanor (2009a) does, the balance 
between parliamentary sovereignty and European-wide fundamental rights provision, or 
more generally the rule of law, has become more pertinent, if not controversial, since the 
Human Rights Act 1998 was passed, incorporating the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  
The European Convention did give individuals the right to complain of breaches of 
their Convention rights. The Human Rights Act in 1998 then meant it was possible to 
enforce ‘foreign’ Convention-rights in the domestic courts i.e. not only in Strasbourg 
(Bradley and Ewing, 2010, pp. 401-7). In content, there are many similarities between the 
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EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Prospective EU members are asked to sign up to the European Convention although there 
is no explicit request or obligation for current EU members (McHarsky-Todoroff, 2015; 
Miller, 2014). The Act allowed that subordinate legislation in the UK not compatible with 
the Convention’s fundamental rights could be quashed or disapplied. Primary legislation 
such as Acts of Parliament which were not compatible with Convention rights remained in 
force but the High Court would only issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ where 
ministers would be expected to remedy or make amendments to remedy the Act in order to 
remove the incompatibility. That can be contrasted to a position in which EU law – directly 
supreme over UK law – developed into an individual rights-based system and mechanisms 
such as the “direct effect” of EU law allows individuals to themselves claim EU rights 
against the member states in an increasingly large number of settings (Muir, 2014, p. 28). 
Legal supremacy, direct effect and preliminary rulings referring matters to the ECJ all 
mean judges are obliged as a “powerful check” to give effect to the interpretation of EU 
law and fundamental rights adopted by the ECJ irrespective of whether a domestic higher 
court might disagree with this (Muir, 2014, p. 36).   
 Many of the doctrines of EU law that have posed the greatest challenge for the 
UK’s parliamentary sovereignty are often not to be found in the articles of the Treaties, nor 
even in European law specifically, but in the case law of the ECJ (Tomkins, 2010). The 
doctrine of ‘direct effect’ means that individuals in the UK can bring actions in national 
courts in order to vindicate rights secured to them under the Treaty or EU legislation 
(Craig, 2011, p. 122), as against purely domestic rights in the domestic courts. It has the 
effect of making EU law ‘the law of the land’ and dramatically increased the number of 
cases brought by individuals to national courts to defend rights accorded to them under EU 
law (Hix and Høyland, 2011, p. 84; Weiler, 1991). A treaty provision can have direct effect 
where a private party can rely upon it against another (‘horizontal direct effect’) and by a 
private party against the state (‘vertical direct effect’) (Hix and Høyland, 2011, p. 84; 
Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 129). The doctrine of legal EU supremacy (Costa v. ENEL 
[1964]), of individuals invoking direct effect in their national courts (Van Gend en Loos 
[1963]), of indirect effect (Marleasing [1990]) or of state liability (Francovich [1991] 
and Factortame [1990]) or the law relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (e.g. the 




 However, compare that incorporation of entrenched, directly effective EU 
fundamental rights and part-entrenched Convention rights into the UK’s national 
constitutional structure with that of other internationally binding rights and obligations. 
The post-war international law environment required an introduction of a rights regime 
with new obligations to be imposed on the UK. Yet, international Treaty law has not posed 
an equivalent challenge or represented a direct constraining effect as supranational EU 
fundamental rights have on UK parliamentary sovereignty. Lebeck (2007) examines the 
strict differentiation between public international treaties emphasising relations between 
governments, rather than relations between individual rights in domestic public law. 
International human rights are established directly by treaties, whereas EU fundamental 
rights have been recognised over time through the case law of the EU. Parliament should in 
theory take into account the UK's obligations in relation to international law when it 
legislates, but in practice the courts would not hold an Act void on the basis that it conflicts 
with principles of international law (Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 57). Rights agreed to by 
international Treaties must nevertheless strictly be approved by Parliament if there is to be 
a change in national law. Although European Community-law emerged from such treaty-
law regarded as a part of public international law, it marked a departure from those 
previous constraints.  
  Where the EU claims directly effective domestic powers, most international legal 
orders can only claim decision-making powers that aim to influence decisions in domestic 
legal orders – but which are not usually directly effective. The rights of both the European 
Convention on Human Rights as well as European Community-law cannot be understood 
as merely treaties under public international law, as they both have claimed to have 
acquired certain constitutional characteristics that distinguish them from other forms of 
international cooperation and also provided them with a constitutional authority. The 
European Convention on Human Rights is a constitutional document – but the 
constitutionalisation of the European Community started with the creation of the ECJ and 
its statement in case law (particularly, beginning with the case Costa v. ENEL [1964]). 






Common law constitutionalism and the entrenchment of rights 
 
Similar to Bogdanor’s (2009a) approach in the existing research, a uniquely distinct 
common law perspective in the radical theory of national common law constitutionalism 
(Allan, 2013; Alan, 2011) might be viewed as equally problematic. That perspective 
directly seeks to overstate the primacy of a national common law, court-decided, 
entrenched fundamental rights architecture at the expense of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty (Allan, 2013). The historical constitutional form that the provision of 
fundamental rights by the courts is subordinate to the political provisions provided by 
Parliament is incompatible with today’s rights-based, court-primacy theories of domestic, 
radical common law judges and constitutional theorists. The common law argument 
accepts the supremacy of the judges through EU level fundamental rights and diluting UK-
level parliamentary sovereignty. The radical theory of common law constitutionalism seeks 
to affirm the primacy and sovereignty of a national common law, court-decided, 
entrenched fundamental rights architecture and a displacement, if not rejection, of the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty (Gordon, 2015, pp. 126-131). Parliamentary 
sovereignty is expendable for Allan (2011) because judicial loyalty to EU principles can 
justify the disapplication of Acts of Parliament inconsistent with EU law. The theory 
supposes the judiciary would pursue that practice even if that were to qualify the exercise 
of parliamentary sovereignty (Allan, 2011, p. 162). It offers a theory that parliamentary 
sovereignty can be diluted by EU fundamental rights. The challenge of common law 
constitutionalism to parliament as a provider of fundamental rights is best answered by the 
political constitutionalist model. The reason for this response lays with the very 
mechanisms through which the people authorise their political and legal representatives 
and hold them to account which comprise the fundamental rules of the UK constitution and 
its rights. Such a parliamentary model can still withstand rights review and a ‘weak’ form 
of Convention rights-based judicial review, in which a declaration of incompatibility by 
the appropriate court is possible, providing it is advisory or can be overridden or put to one 
side by the legislature (Bellamy, 2014). 
 It is an overstatement to suggest EU fundamental rights are altogether entrenched in 
relation to rights derived from Parliament. Yet, the EU implication of radical common law 
constitutionalism has been that the UK constitution has specially “entrenched” EU-level 
fundamental rights incorporated into it. As Allan (2010) maintains, the 1972 Act meant EU 
law with its rights “has been entrenched” (Allan, 2010). As entrenched rights, they act as a 
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substantive limitation upon legislative supremacy, which opens the way to the broader idea 
that the voluntary European Communities Act substantively and legally limited Parliament. 
While Allan does mostly allow that the European Communities Act can be expressly 
repealed if necessary, the Act is said to be subject to a “qualified immunity” to that 
enjoyed by national, common law fundamental rights, including the Magna Carta and the 
Bill of Rights 1689. Allan also therefore refers to a “special entrenchment” of European 
Community law (Allan, 2013, p. 148). Despite those claims to entrenchment of EU rights, 
there is little to no evidence to suggest that there has been a contemporary change in the 
rule of recognition itself or the underlying consensual understanding of British state 
officials that judges still do not have the authority to declare a statute invalid (see 
Bingham, 2010; Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 253).  
 
Political constitutionalism: a response to constitutional state theory and common law 
constitutionalism 
 
The argument that EU fundamental rights have weakened UK parliamentary sovereignty 
rests on the constitutional entrenchment of the rights themselves – but that subsidiary 
concern itself rests on settling the broader question of their political legitimacy. In order of 
intensity, the UK system has veered between: 
• Centuries of non-entrenched parliament-provided rights.  
• Then, over nineteen years of statutorily entrenched European Convention-rights 
(under the Human Rights Act) but which are enforced by only weak judicial 
review.  
• Then, forty-four years of entrenched directly effective ECJ rights brought in under 
the European Communities Act and founded on the Luxembourg court’s case law, 
through to; 
• Directly effective entrenched EU rights founded on a constitutional EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 gave full effect to that Charter 
(Howe, 2013). 
 
The latter marks the height of EU fundamental rights as being constitutionally entrenched. 
It explains the shift from a UK individual’s access to Parliament-provided rights toward 
their access to claimable, directly effective rights due to them in a national court. The 
entrenchment reinforces the supremacy of EU rights – it creates and is an effect of a 
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system which stabilises the supremacy of EU law. It explains how rights have been 
displaced from a stage in which rights are parliament-provided to one in which they are 
partially provided by courts. That also means it helps to explain the move from a 
consensual system in which rights cause acts to be reviewed by Parliament to an internally 
antagonistic constitutional system in which rights enable acts to be reviewed in courts. But 
statements of the ‘entrenchment’ of rights fail to address the ultimate and broader question 
of political legitimacy of those rights – and the role Parliament plays in providing that 
legitimacy. Parliament-provided rights cannot become entrenched in this manner because 
rights are deferred to a forum of contested politics in which rights are pursued as 
amendable (i.e. subject to politics) and enacted only when there is the necessity to 
convince a parliamentary majority.  
  In the existing literature, such recognised problems of overlooking historical 
precedent carries with it the consequence of the blurring of EU fundamental rights as 
arising simply from international obligations, or as equivalent to Convention-rights, or of 
supposing that European Communities Act rights alter the rule of recognition. This has led 
to a broader emphasis on an entrenched, court-decided rights architecture which has 
created a bias toward mainstream legal constitutionalist interpretation. The role of 
institutional politics is considered irrelevant. Fundamental rights are seen as irremovable or 
entrenched features, above politics. Jeremy Waldron and other political constitutionalists 
have consistently argued against this weight of scholarship assuming that the rules 
governing the legal system and the political system should be constitutionally entrenched 
(Waldron, 1999). The strong degree of EU fundamental right entrenchment does not 
depend on EU or UK legality, as is often assumed, but on the political legitimacy of rights 
within the political system. The fast-developing system of rights is progressively framed 
by ECJ case law (Blauberger and Schmidt, 2017), and not Parliament.  
Howe (2013) describes that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has directly led to a 
significant expansion of the scope of matters (not just on fundamental rights) subject to EU 
law, including: 
• Making it unlawful for insurance companies to charge different premiums to 
customers based on gender, adversely affecting young women drivers who in 
general have a lower accident rate than young males (Association Belge des 
Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministers [2011]). 
• The Charter becoming applicable when a Court in the UK makes an order 
involving the disclosure of personal data under the Data Protection Directive 
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(Supreme Court in RFU v Consolidated Information Services Ltd (formerly 
Viagogo Ltd) [2012]). 
• Justifying the expansion of EU law to cover the general procedures by which 
member states enforce the payment of taxes (Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson 
[2013]). 
The broadened expansion scope of issues falling under the Charter has led to a diminution 
of the UK Parliament’s role, and a judicialisation of rights which should otherwise be the 
subject of decision by democratically elected and accountable politicians (Howe, 2013; see 
also, Benkharbouche & Anor v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan (Rev 1) [2015]; Google 
Inc v Vidal-Hall & Ors [2015]). The danger is that rights are increasingly made in the 
context of practices with poorly developed political legitimacy i.e. by less accountable 
European courts, European commissioners and appointed ministers at the European 
Council, which bypass elected representatives in legislatures and direct accountability to 
the political community. 
  The difficulties of legitimacy in those decisions can be addressed through an appeal 
to political constitutionalism – although that does not mean to reject all the rules of legal 
constitutionalism (see Gee and Webber, 2010, p. 273; Loughlin, 2003). For example, it 
does not warrant the assumption that Hart's rule of recognition no longer exists, as 
Bogdanor (2009a) theorises. As Goldoni (2013) summarises, political constitutionalism 
proposes that: 
• decisions about rights are better left to the political and parliamentary process, 
while;  
• judicial reasoning must accept a subordinate role in that respect as well as keeping 
the government in check and protecting the political process itself (Goldoni, 2013).  
Some emphasis must be placed on the analysis of institutions. Parliaments, as political 
institutions, are capable and better at reasoning and deciding about the content of rights 
than courts. For that reason, it can be more accurate, as Wilkinson (2013) has already 
argued, to refer to ‘parliamentary’ constitutionalism as opposed to ‘judicial’ 
constitutionalism.  
  Politics matters. Fundamental rights, or constitutional rights, should not be 
considered to be pre-political or above politics, but, instead, ought to be deeply embedded 
in the political process. It is consistent with Waldron’s (1999) political constitutionalism 
that such fundamental rights are subject to the ‘circumstances of politics’. That process 
involves both the recognition of a plurality of perspectives on common problems which 
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leads to pervasive disagreement and the recognition of the need to make decisions that 
address the fact that there is a plurality. Rights are protected but on the basis that they have 
a constitutive collective dimension, defended as common goods of a political community, 
rather than individual entitlements. The openness to politics entails the rejection of 
constitutional entrenchment, as recognised by Bogdanor (2009a) and Allan (2013). 
However, the arguments for protecting fundamental rights by legal entrenchment pre-
empts future political action of the community and other arms of government without 
providing a solid justification. By removing rights from politics, it attaches only legal 
significance and views them as politically non-negotiable, irreversible, unamendable and 
non-reviewable. Constitutional entrenchment alienates rights from their political context 
and, alongside a strong form of judicial review, fosters a detrimental judicial culture of 
rights. Political constitutionalism is largely justifiable since the UK reasonably disagrees 
about the rights (e.g. underpinning the extension of benefits in the welfare state, to social 
housing, to fertility treatment) because they disagree on the substantive outcomes, or 
common good, that a society committed to democratic ideals should achieve. The 
democratic process is more legitimate than the judicial process at resolving these 
disagreements, and it offers an effective mechanism for upholding the key constitutional 
goods of individual rights and the rule of law (Bellamy, 2008; Bellamy, 2007; Waldron, 
1999). On a practical level, Bellamy and Weale (2015) concede liberal democracies 
combine different degrees of legal and political constitutionalism. The UK constitution is a 
reflection of that mix. One defining point where legal constitutionalism meets political 
constitutionalism is where constitutional entrenchment itself meets political legitimacy. 
After all, legal entrenchment does not fully explain why the breakdown in inter-
institutional comity and political consensus between officials in the arms of state enables 
EU fundamental rights to dilute parliamentary sovereignty. The shift is explained as the 
move from a political consensus between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary as 
being responsible for fundamental rights provision through to the judicial power as being 
elevated (in contrast to the executive and legislature) and more narrowly responsible for 
fundamental rights provision.  
 
The shared deferral approach to fundamental rights 
 
EU membership has diluted parliamentary sovereignty by delegitimising fundamental 
rights provision previously resting on the historically precedented basis that the executive, 
the legislature and the judiciary enjoyed an official consensus in which they all have a 
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shared responsibility for that rights provision. Under the traditional Westminster model, a 
form of official consensus exists between the branches of the state including Parliament in 
exercising a shared responsibility for that provision. Radical common law constitutionalists 
and constitutional statists have therefore narrowly and wrongly overemphasised an 
advance in judicial power as leading and finalising what constitutes rights, which 
disregards the role of intra-state consensus.  
Hunt et al. (2012) criticise the false choice between the legislature and the 
judiciary. The choice between either one as the guardian of fundamental rights is being 
misplaced and increasingly rejected. In place of that old dichotomy, they argue there is 
now a consensus that all branches of the state – including the executive, the legislature and 
the judiciary – have a shared responsibility for the provision and realisation of fundamental 
rights. This shared deferral might be reframed to explain that such a consensus is not a new 
one – it is a neat historical accompaniment to the rule of the recognised helm. Furthermore, 
while there had long been a consensus behind officials in maintaining the ultimate rule 
(Goldsworthy, 1999; Hart, 1997), it might be considered there has also been a similar, 
secondary-level consensus between state and legal officials in which the provision of 
fundamental rights by the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are to be protected 
albeit in a subordinate position in relation to the ultimate rule. By acknowledging the role 
of politics, there is a broader assumption that the law of the legislature (statute) should not 
be seen as a unitary person with a single will but shared consensus emerging out of a broad 
plurality of proposals (Waldron, 1999), not to be navigated around. 
While theories of the British constitution must understand parliamentary 
sovereignty relative to the whole constitution, as Allan (2013, p. 23) argues, that does not 
mean the British constitution must now tend towards the judicial power of the common law 
courts as characterising what constitutes rights. This has been pursued to the extent that the 
latter approaches view rights as above politics and in which consensus, inter-relationships 
and comity between the branches of government and the political community are given 
insufficient attention. Bogdanor attributes an enhanced dialogue between the judiciary, 
Parliament and government to the provision of rights through the Human Rights Act 
(Bogdanor, 2009a, p. 68), but the shared deferral and consensus well predated that 1998 
Act. In so doing, Bogdanor (2009a) has tended to disregard the role of that ‘shared 
responsibility’ or even ‘consensus’. Furthermore, many would argue that the enhanced 
dialogue for the provision of rights broke down further (and was therefore not enhanced) 
after the Human Rights Act and other associated legislation and has been in constant 
decline since the UK’s incorporation into the then European Communities. Neo-Diceyan 
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thinking pervading mainstream legal constitutionalism also gives the confusing impression 
that parliamentary sovereignty is on par with the ‘rule of law’ and in which a statement of 
the relationship with fundamental rights provision is not specified. 
 The transfer of fundamental rights provision as historically subject to ‘shared 
deferral’ to a contemporary stage under EU membership where the shared deferral is 
absent and there is a greater singular deferral to the courts, is a pivotal point. It reflects the 
change in the meaning and strength of fundamental rights. That Europeanisation process 
suggests again the reverse of Bogdanor’s popular constitutional statism in contemporary 
Britain: a more narrowly defined power centred on the court-provided rights in which the 
relationship with the politics of popular, elected representatives in Parliament is 
increasingly disassociated from the content of rights. The courts trump Parliament. In that 
process, following EU membership, a greater, shared deferral of rights-making power 
(which, for Bogdanor, might be expected under a written constitutional order) is being 
replaced, or at least weakened with a narrowly-defined rights-making power.   
 
Democratic parliamentary majorities as guarantors of fundamental rights and 
parliamentary sovereignty 
 
In the existing research, political constitutionalism also remedies the omission of the role 
of parliamentary majorities in making parliamentary sovereignty contingent upon rights. 
EU fundamental rights have diluted Parliament’s sovereignty because the subordinate 
provision of fundamental rights by the courts – which previously posed only minor limits 
on the will of the Government’s parliamentary majority constituting the ultimate rule, now 
defies its subordination to the will of that majority. In theory, Parliament is sovereign 
because it rests on the basis that the provision of fundamental rights by judges is 
subordinate and poses very few limits on the political will of the Government’s 
parliamentary majority. It is often identified in the literature that fundamental rights 
expressed as pre-political features, have the effect of constraining public reasoning and 
parliamentary settlement and enable a limit on parliamentary majority rule (see Goldoni, 
2013). EU fundamental rights provision calls into question, to an “unprecedented extent”, 
sensitive governmental policy areas through a rights-based process of Europeanization 
(Muir, 2014).  The proposition that the provision of fundamental rights constitutes a 
primary function of the state, to be exercised within the framework of the constitution, 
179 
 
through the action of its democratically elected Parliament presents an insurmountable 
problem for common-law and constitutionalist statist theories in general.  
  It is to be expected that EU fundamental rights have diluted parliamentary 
sovereignty previously resting on the assumption that legitimate fundamental rights 
provision is derived from national parliamentary majoritarianism – because parliamentary 
sovereignty now rests on a weaker assumption in which rights are provided and protected 
by a non-elected, less accountable supranational legalist architecture. Majoritarianism 
provides a democratically accountable foundation – legalism does not. Supranational 
legalism provides a legal, technical, judicial competence for decisions which reinforce an 
EU-wide legal system – parliamentary majoritarianism does not. As EU rights are enforced 
by individuals against the actions of their own state, including Acts of Parliament, a 
democratic question naturally emerges. The laws enacted by Government majorities in 
national parliaments have become subject to rights interpreted by a supranational court, 
even where those laws are inconsistent with the constitutional interpretation of parallel 
rights (see Pérez, 2009, p. 15). A supranational court by its very nature makes legal 
decisions on a judicial, non-majoritarian basis. The ECJ is therefore a directly non-
accountable institution and it belongs to a supranational system of governance in which the 
introduction of a fundamental rights system at the supranational level has been viewed as 
one of its greatest achievements (on the latter point, see Fabbrini, 2014, p. 9). Protecting 
human rights specifically performs a function in the development of a political union at the 
EU-level and highlights the major role played by the ECJ along with national courts as 
guarantor of individuals’ rights (Egger, 2006, p. 551; Mayoral, 2016).  
  There is one underlying theme which underpins the role of democratic 
parliamentary majorities in constituting rights. The exercise of EU fundamental rights 
represents a shift from majority-backed rights to a position of majority-limited rights. 
Rights have been displaced from a stage in which rights reflect majoritarian decision-
making as determined in parliamentary elections to one in which they are decided by non-
elected, judicial or technical bodies, courts or tribunals. The shift from Parliament to 
legalism in the provision of rights is coupled with the shift from majority-backed rights to 
the position of majority-limited rights. Pérez (2009) persuasively addresses how judicial 
review of legislation by the ECJ poses a counter-majoritarian difficulty since the decisions 
of the body representing the people are struck down by judges lacking public 
accountability.  
  Domestically, in the executive, the role of ministers leading Department advisers is 
then diluted in the recognised helm. Their carefully-devised policies and Government Bills 
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are drafted in accordance with the provision of EU fundamental rights. Yet those rights 
were already decided in the ECJ without the consent of the majority in the House of 
Commons. Through the ECJ pursuing a process of filling in the case law gaps (Blauberger 
and Schmidt, 2017; Ferraro and Carmona, 2015), the court deprives the ultimate rule of the 
parliamentary will of the Government-in-Commons majority in significant policy areas in 
which the provision of fundamental rights by judges is superior to any potential provision 
offered by the elected majority in the House of Commons.  
 In contrast to the view that governing at the helm is presented as legally distinct but 
politically contingent upon its capacity to determine and respect fundamental rights: 
• the modern neo-Diceyan (1964) tradition disregards that contingency;  
• the tradition of the common law constitutionalism school (Allan, 2013) overstates 
the relationship and;   
• the constitutional state perspective (Bogdanor, 2009a) overlooks that contingent 
relationship through its appeal to popular sovereignty and the enhanced role of the 
courts.  
 
Those interpretations of the British constitution have tended to misplace EU fundamental 
rights in a political and constitutional context, if not underestimated their supremacy to 
Convention- and international-rights.  
 
Parliamentary sovereignty and contemporary fundamental rights provision under EU 
membership: the principle and qualification of the free movement of persons 
 
The EU fundamental right of free movement of persons unsettles the UK’s own 
historically subordinate fundamental rights scheme, further diluting the strength of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The European Economic Community established a common 
market in which the citizens of member states enjoyed freedom of movement for economic 
purposes. Today, this is now understood as a freedom of movement and residence 
guaranteed as an aspect of EU citizenship, extended to family members without regard to 
nationality (Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 418). The free movement of persons is 
understood as a fundamental right at the EU-level. 
  What is the right and what does it mean for the individual? EU nationals have the 
right to free movement under the EU Treaties, including the right to live and work in any 
of the other member states of the union. EU citizens have a right of entry and residence to 
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the UK and other states as long as they are coming to the country in the exercise of a 
Treaty right e.g. the right to take up employment or to set up business (HM Passport 
Office, 2014). Student and self-sufficient persons (e.g. retired persons) also have right to 
entry and residence in a non-economic capacity. (Individuals in Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway as part of the European Economic Area, enjoy freedom of movement within that 
area which includes the EU). A US citizen in contrast must apply, for example, for a 
Standard Visitor visa if they want to visit the UK for leisure, business, or to receive private 
medical treatment but that is for six months only. For shorter 90 day visits, the need for a 
visa is waived. Citizens from all other parts of the world also follow a complex system of 
visa arrangements. Their right to freely move across borders does not exist as it does 
within the EU and not without extensive conditions and significant bureaucratic obstacles.  
The right of the free movement of persons for EU citizens is one of the four 
‘fundamental freedoms’ that comprise what is known as the EU’s single market – which is 
based on the idea of ensuring the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. 
The Single Market is central to the original Treaty of Rome, for the original six members 
of the then European Economic Community (EEC). It was not however until the Single 
European Act 1987, amending the Treaty of Rome, that created a single internal market, 
which had otherwise proved difficult under the existing EU Treaties. Article 2 of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 had set out the objectives of the then EEC to establish a common 
market and Article 3(1)(c) EEC provided that the Community aspired to ‘the abolition, as 
between member states, of obstacles to freedom of movement for[…]persons’. The free 
movement rights set out in this Treaty were confined to persons who exercised economic 
activity and were a national of a member state.  
The principle of free movement is qualified at the EU level because since the 
formation of the EU, specific rules have been written to provide for the movement of only 
certain groups of EU ‘workers’ within its territory. (These are distinguishable from the 
rules applicable to nationals from outside the EU (‘third country nationals’) which will not 
be discussed in this chapter). It therefore included key supporting provisions to ensure 
rules within individual national social security systems would not act as a 
barrier/disincentive for workers and their families to move between member states. Other 
associated Treaty provisions permitted the general principle of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality; for example, a German worker in the UK must enjoy the same 
treatment as a British worker working outside the UK but within the EU. The free 
movement principle also only applies when there is movement between member states and 
is not to be applied to internal domestic situations. Fundamental 'freedoms' tend to be 
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legally and materially categorised as fundamental 'rights'. Specifically, fundamental rights 
were in fact not directly acknowledged in the original Treaty of Rome and the EU still 
lacks a comprehensive fundamental rights competence (Douglas-Scott, 2015, p. 273). The 
Union is said to have a limited capability as a human rights organisation. Originally, 
fundamental rights were considered a ‘peripheral’ element of the EU construction (Hrestic, 
2014). 
 
The right to freedom of movement of persons – the qualifications 
 
From early on, two significant measures implemented the rights of free movement for 
workers in the 1960s – Council Directive 68/360 on free movement for workers within the 
then European Community and EEC Regulation 1612/68 on the abolition of restrictions on 
movement and residence within the EC for workers of member states and their families. 
The UK has historically contested specific aspects of border control policy relating to the 
conditionality of free movement. The UK and Ireland did not participate in the Schengen 
Agreement – designed, in 1985, to abolish immigration controls between EU states 
(Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 440). The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 confirmed that the UK 
and Ireland would not be bound by the Schengen acquis but later participated in some 
measures (e.g. police forces sharing law enforcement data through the Schengen 
Information System) to the extent that EU politics and law still exercises a dominant 
influence on UK immigration policy (Sobolewska and Ford, 2016).  
This further developed in the 1990s, when the EC adopted three Directives which 
conferred a general right of movement and residence on the retired, students and those with 
independent means, on the basis that they had sufficient resources and medical insurance. 
As one recent Coalition Government policy document on the free movement of persons in 
the single market observed of those pre-Maastricht changes in the 1990s, “This reflected 
the gradual change which had been taking place in relation to the link between economic 
activity and free movement – moving towards the idea of migrants as individuals with 
rights in their host member state.” (Home Office, 2014). EU powers were enlarged to 
include matters that affected individuals as human beings and not just as economic actors 
(Pérez, 2009, p. 14). In the contemporary EU, more than 3.2 million EU citizens live in the 




 The right to free movement of persons was further clarified in legislation in 2004 
by the ‘Free Movement Directive’ (Directive 2004/38/EC) and the ‘Free Movement of 
Workers Regulation’ (Regulation 1612/68 by Regulation 492/2011) (Marzocchi, 2017). 
Following the adoption of this Directive, the ECJ sought to expand free movement rights 
through a series of rulings. The rules have been significantly expanded in scope to cover 
the family members of workers who choose to exercise their free movement rights. 
However, EU Treaty provisions from the beginning have allowed for the ‘export’ of 
particular benefits, meaning that, if a British person remains eligible for a benefit in the 
UK, they can still receive it in another, and likewise EU persons in the UK. The ongoing 
seminal ECJ cases of Baumbast confirmed the contemporary severing of the relationship 
between migration and the need to be economically active (Baumbast and R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [1999]), the Metock [2008] judgement extended the free 
movement rights even further for family members, and Zambrano [2011] on deciding the 
criteria for the ‘right to reside’ for EU citizens.  The right of the free movement of persons 
has focused on its understanding as a fundamental right at the EU-level.  
In this context, it is notable that several recent UK-specific EU interventions 
between 2013 and 2016 sought to alter or change the character of the EU right to free 
movement. Those claims and (re)negotiations took place during the British debate ahead of 
the June 2016 Referendum on EU membership – and subsequently played a significant part 
in the majority decision of the British people to leave the EU in June 2016 (Curtice, 2017a; 
see also Heindlmaier and Blauberger, 2017; Sobolewska and Ford, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; 
Wilkinson and Hughes, 2016). Before inviting the voters in the 2016 referendum to make 
its choice, and whilst legislating for the referendum itself, the Prime Minister had been 
seeking to renegotiate the terms of the UK’s EU membership – with voters essentially 
being asked to decide whether the UK should remain a member of the EU under the Prime 
Minister's newly renegotiated arrangements or to leave the EU altogether. Those 
renegotiations, one of the Prime Minister's early statements in the Financial Times entitled 
'Free movement within Europe needs to be less free’, stated that “It is time for a new 
settlement which recognises that free movement is a central principle of the EU, but it 
cannot be a completely unqualified one” (Cameron, 2013a). During the Coalition 
Government period (2010-2015), the Prime Minster had already faced considerable 
pressure on the issue of EU immigration (Sobolewska and Ford, 2016) from within his 




The impact of the EU fundamental right to free movement upon the UK fundamental rights 
scheme and the UK constitution 
 
The example of the EU free movement right demonstrates that the UK governing helm of 
state has had EU rights incorporated into its constitution. This is achieved through a 
dependency upon EU-level rights by individuals in the UK, as EU citizens. It elevates the 
UK judiciary as a rights-adjudicating court system as it fuses ever-closer into the 
Luxembourg court system. This dilutes the domestic legislature as a rights-providing 
institution. The deep political claims made to the constitutional and institutional 
entrenchment of those ‘non-negotiable’ rights themselves, irrespective of their political 
legitimacy, has progressed this continued legislative decline and judicial advance in the 
UK, impacting indirectly upon the unsettling of parliamentary sovereignty.  
  With the introduction of EU free movement rights, several national executive 
powers come into play that others might argue have enhanced UK parliamentary 
sovereignty. The existing, centuries-old entrenched English common law approach that 
British subjects were free to do as they pleased unless expressly prohibited by law (Bradley 
and Ewing, 2010, p. 418) smoothed the way for free movement. The UK Government has 
been not merely a willing participant in promoting free movement rights, whether as 
provisions through national, EU or international mechanisms, but has been an active agent 
in promoting that right. But the reason why EU free movement has not reconfigured the 
executive to enhance parliamentary sovereignty is that the character and strength of that 
fundamental right is judicially-determined and presented as insurmountable by the 
legislature from the viewpoint of the unwieldiness of the executive. For the executive, it is 
torn when the free movement principle and policy is exercised, administered and protected 
as it dutifully permits free movement for UK and EU citizens in airports and ferry ports 
while at the same time, sharing its decision-making capacity over the policy. They must 
heed the judges who apply broad, conditions over the free movement principle (e.g. 
provision of welfare to those freely moving to the UK) – which helps to explain why 
disputes over that right are politically contentious.  
 
The judicialisation of the freedom of movement of persons 
 
Judicial rights-adjudicating and executive rights-respecting powers are distinct at the UK 
helm of state but judicial decision-making has nonetheless moved into the scope and 
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political space previously defined by parliamentary decision-making. As observed in 
Chapter 4, a substantial body of literature explains how European integration tends to 
encourage an enhanced judicialisation of politics (Weiler, 1994; Weiler, 1991), or 
‘Eurolegalism’ (Kelemen, 2012, p. 55). This assumes that judicial institutions can answer 
deeply political questions on what constitutes a fundamental right within the political 
community. ‘Direct effect’ has meant that the UK helm of state has judicial EU institutions 
incorporated into its constitution with a direct, claimable relationship by UK-EU citizens 
of EU individual rights in their own national courts. This marks a direct competitive 
overreach of judicial- over parliamentary-rights determination which impacts beyond the 
weakening of legislative powers in the Commons to have its way vis-a-vis court-
adjudicated Charter-rights and the unsettling of parliamentary sovereignty.  
  The incorporation of the free movement of persons into law as historical 
'fundamental right', despite those rights being peripheral to the original EU construction 
(Hrestic, 2014), presents the right as pre-political, politically inarguable, unquestionable, or 
non-contestable concrete law. EU membership brought about a significant expansion of 
judicial power, not least because of the supremacy of EU law (Blauberger and Schmidt, 
2017; Tabarelli, 2013, p. 346). Such a process occurs as national judiciaries become 
independent of executive and parliament functions as a consequence of their EU-related 
roles (Schmidt, 2005). Yet that process lacks both parliamentary legitimacy (consistent 
with Bellamy, 2007) and ministerial accountability (consistent with Tomkins (2013)) when 
the ECJ’s principles of divorcing free movement from economic migration (Baumbast 
[1999]) and the extension of the right to family members (Metock [2008]) and the ‘right to 
reside’ (Zambrano [2011]) are not subject to the consent of Parliament or a consensus 
among other state institutions.  
  The scope of judicial rights-provision widens into the sphere of legislative and 
executive political decision-making at the recognised helm when the ECJ interacting with 
EU level-rights decides on the operation of the free movement right. It has ‘fenced off’ the 
pervasive disagreement over immigration and recognition of the plurality within a 
community which for Waldron (1999) is fundamental for the recognition of rights. The 
fundamental right in the political sphere is contested and the open-ended politics over the 
freedom of movement in relation to UK as EU citizens will remain contested. A judicial 
power with the previous obligation to give effect to the statutes of Parliament under the 
traditional Westminster model now overlaps at the recognised helm with the provision of 
rights usually reserved for the executive majority-in-Parliament. The judiciary therefore 
further overreaches into the dominant, partisan, Government majority in the House of 
186 
 
Commons who might otherwise expect a consensual, intra-state responsibility in the 
determination of rights.  
 It is precisely because of EU leaders (notably, Chancellor Merkel) informing the 
then Prime Minister, David Cameron, of its status that he finally accepted the free 
movement right as non-negotiable (Mason and Oltermann, 2014; Tisdall, 2014). It 
affirmed that the entrenchment of the written, codified EU right to free movement trumped 
their political contestation through the European Council and in Westminster. The 
assumption that Parliament remains theoretically sovereign has been based on the ultimate 
rule of parliamentary sovereignty resting on the precedential basis that the subordinate 
provision of fundamental rights in the courts is less entrenched than Parliament. But that 
proposition no longer resonates with the political operation of the free movement principle.  
In practice, the EU scheme of fundamental rights, such as broad free movement 
rights have been decided upon without sufficient political legitimacy with respect to the 
consent of the political community. This is why Parliament, being more accountable, 
makes better work of rights provision. It can provide, remedy and balance in line with the 
consent of the governed. Yet the provision of EU free movement rights has proceeded 
under a special legal and political entrenchment, if not only because of supremacy of EU 
law over UK law, the jurisdiction of the ECJ in settling fundamental rights disputes, the 
placement of free movement in the Charter incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty and 
through the progressive framing of that right in ECJ case law. Parliament is practically less 
sovereign – and so too are the people – given that the ultimate rule of parliamentary 
sovereignty no longer operates on its precedented foundation because the provision of the 
fundamental right to free movement is presented as a politically immovable, fully court-
resolved, legally entrenched instrument with finality.  
 
The non-negotiable right and the ‘fencing off’ of politics 
 
At the very most, as the House of Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee Legal adviser 
suggested, the renegotiated package (Miller, 2016) contained a draft declaration by the 
European Commission on issues related to the abuse of the right of free movement of 
persons. It contained only a promise to adopt a proposal to “complement” the 2004 
Directive relating to free movement rights of third country nationals. It promised to clarify 
the scope for member states to deport undesirable EU citizens in guidelines and examine 
future amendment in the 2004 Directive (Ridout, 2016). Its strength has been approached 
as politically insurmontable by the executive in the European Council or the process of 
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resolving contested issues in the national Parliament. The basic right to free movement, 
even since the Maastricht Treaty and the 2004 Directive, is itself firmly entrenched. 
However, the degree of entrenchment of free movement depends not on legality as is often 
assumed but on political legitimacy and the consent of the governed. Since there is jointly 
domestic pervasive disagreement over immigration in UK politics and EU integration 
favours the courts, questions over political legitimacy and the disagreement are 
marginalised by EU legal integration. While the UK accepted as legitimate since the 
European Communities Act 1972 and its 1975 referendum the principle and right to EC 
free movement, the gradually developing conditionality, progressively framed by ECJ case 
law (described by Blauberger and Schmidt, 2017; Ferraro and Carmona, 2015), were made 
in the context of weak political legitimacy i.e. by courts, and ministers at the European 
Council which bypasses elected representatives in legislatures. In so far as that process 
proceeds, it bypasses the consent of the electorate. After all, judges everywhere help to 
shape law but this is “especially true” in the EU where gaps must be filled in its legal 
framework and courts “… have much more manoeuvrability available to them than is 
customary within states.” (Nugent, 2010, p. 225). In short, the Prime Minister could not 
renegotiate the associated, entrenched rights during the 2015-16 period – it was mostly not 
allowed on the renegotiation menu (Fleming, 2013). Parliament remains practically less 
sovereign given that the ultimate rule of parliamentary sovereignty no longer operates on 
the precedented basis that the provision of free movement is at the very least part-
entrenched and deemed politically non-negotiable in relation to the ultimate rule.  
 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the shared responsibility for rights provision  
 
The EU right to free movement has impacted upon parliamentary sovereignty previously 
resting on the historically precedented basis that the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary enjoyed an official consensus in which they all have a shared responsibility for 
rights provision. Domestically, this has been further mediated by recent constitutional 
changes which have removed the official consensus between the arms of government, 
notably by the removal of the old Lord Chancellor’s under the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005, previously acting as a driver to cement that consensus (Gee et al., 2015). The ECJ 
rulings of Baumbast [1999] and Metock [2008] and Zambrano [2011] are court rulings, not 
parliamentary votes. They create claimable rights through ECJ case law, not through 
political debate. That is not a shared responsibility. The principle of ‘direct effect’ more 
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generally, as enshrined by the ECJ, enables individuals to immediately invoke an EU 
provision before a national court or ECJ in relation to certain European acts, independent 
of whether a national law test exists. The executive, as mentioned above is torn, when it is 
elevated through the enforcer role of protecting free movement through passport controls 
and in acting against any barriers – yet where judges marginalise the authority of 
government-in-Parliament by acting above politics when those contested rights and limits 
are provided in the absence of intra-state consensus and the consent of the governed. That 
is not rights provision by consensus. The deference to the courts displaces what Hunt et al. 
(2012) state is the consensus and shared responsibility between the branches of 
government for rights provision. Free movement rights and their limits are deferred almost 
singularly to, the courts. Parliament is practically less sovereign when the incorporation of 
free movement rights unsettles that precedented foundation. The provision of the right to 
free movement is deferred on a skewed basis to the EU and national judiciary first, the torn 
position of the national executive second and only if irresolvable by law, to the ultimate 
loser in European integration, Parliament itself.  
  The right to free movement and its constraints have been, like other EU 
fundamental rights, historically framed progressively by the ECJ, then laid down as 
principle in the Lisbon Treaty and the associated Charter. This process has turned deeply 
political questions of providing for the rights of free movement by shared consensus into 
legalistic, judicial and procedural matters, to be decided almost solely and divisively by 
judges in courts or lawyers serving the executive, not to elected politicians in Parliament.  
The UK has of course voluntarily agreed to the power of the ECJ under the EU 
Treaties. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in Luxembourg – consisting of both the 
ECJ and the General Court – is the EU’s judicial institution and therefore for the UK. It 
interprets EU law to make sure it is applied uniformly in the UK as across all EU countries. 
It aims to ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties (Article 19 TEU; Bradley and Ewing, 2010, p. 122). It also settles legal disputes 
between the UK and all other EU governments and EU institutions. Individuals, companies 
or organisations can also bring cases before the Court if they feel their rights have been 
infringed by an EU institution (European Union, 2014). The UK has one judge in the Court 
as do all other EU member states, helped by nine ‘advocates-general’ (all appointed for a 
renewable term of six years) who present opinions on the cases brought before the Court. 
They insist that they do so publicly and impartially and in line with the Court’s wider 
commitment to European integration. A judge and an advocate general are assigned to each 
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case that comes before the Court. In terms of jurisdiction, the ECJ and General Court have 
substantive jurisdiction on any aspect of EU lawfulness within the Treaties, including a 
fuller jurisdiction on legal questions following the Lisbon treaty, to decide on Union / 
Member states exclusive or shared competences and provision of fundamental rights 
(Ferraro and Carmona, 2015). The Court can pursue infringement proceedings against a 
member state when there is a failure to fulfil binding legal obligations which the state is 
committed to under EU law. In the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
supremacy of EU law is further bolstered by the ECJ adjudicating on EU-member state 
decisions. In the case of a conflict, EU law must prevail over national law. The ECJ 
judgement is legally binding on the national court. The national court is the only one to 
resolve the dispute but it must apply the law provided by Luxembourg (Mayoral, 2016). 
The ECJ also ensures that an interpretation of EU law given in one preliminary ruling has 
binding legal effects in every other member state. The procedure has led towards the 
embedding of EU law in the UK’s and all other national legal structures. The contribution 
of the Court of Justice to further EU integration is notably strong, particularly and 
paradoxically given its role as a court and not a political actor or institution.   
  The resulting marginalisation of politics from the shared consensus is also proven 
by David Cameron’s attempt to renegotiate the fundamental rights of free movement at the 
European Council. This provides evidence of the marginalisation of politics in determining 
rights. It demonstrates that the Prime Minister-led political process of renegotiation at the 
European Council is subverted to the legal process of providing judicial rights under EU 
membership. The very nature of EU rules provides for the constitutional elevation of the 
Prime Ministerial-executive through its fusion with EU governmental machinery being 
made dependent upon the Prime Minister, with other Heads of State and respective 
Presidents of the European Council and Commission interacting to make decisions at the 
highest political level in the European Council (Kassim, 2016a). The legislature clearly has 
no such comparable connection or scrutiny to that of Prime Ministerial power within 
European Council-level institutional decision-making. The system of court-deferred rights 
ends up taking precedence over politically (re)negotiated rights. The transfer of the 
fundamental rights of free movement being subject to ‘shared deferral’ to the more 
singular deferral to the courts after the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent 2004 
Directive is pivotal, reflecting the change in meaning of fundamental rights. In that 
process, EU citizenship provided fertile breeding ground for directly effective claimable 
rights to be brought into operation.  
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  It would be an exaggeration of this claim to suggest that such transformation 
underpinned a path to a popular constitutional state in which fundamental rights were 
elevated and the rule of recognition diminished, as Bogdanor (2009a) argues. The change 
from a ‘shared deferral’ system of fundamental rights to a singular deferral under EU 
membership, suggests the reverse of popular constitutional statism: a more narrowly 
defined power centred on the judiciary-deferred rights in which the relationship with 
popular, elected representatives in Parliament is disassociated from the content of rights. In 
that process, a more shared deferral of rights-making power (which might be expected 
under a written constitutional order) is being replaced, or at least diluted. If there is 
anything suggesting a ‘constitutionalisation’ of EU fundamental rights, it is more akin to 
Loughlin’s (2010) interpretation of Marbury v Madison [1803] in US constitutional history 
(see Loughlin, 2010: 296) in which one might argue a blurred relationship develops 
between UK statute and the fundamental law of the European Communities Act 1972. That 
has meant, instead of a consensus between the arms of government, a formal hierarchy 
begins to develop between the judiciary and the other branches of government for 
deferring constitutional interpretation of political problems where fundamental rights are 
relevant. 
  
Parliamentary sovereignty, the free movement of persons and the House of Commons 
majority  
 
It was first argued that EU free movement has impacted upon Parliament’s sovereignty 
because the subordinate provision of fundamental rights by the courts which previously 
posed only minor limits on the will of the Government’s parliamentary majority 
constituting the ultimate rule, now imposes more substantive limits on the will of that 
majority. In the case of free movement rights, a backbench business debate on stopping 
mass immigration from Romania and Bulgaria in April 2013 and the two Conservative 
rebellions – one on extending restrictions for Romanian and Bulgarian migration, another 
on the deporting of foreign criminals – created systematic political pressure upon the Prime 
Minister by his own colleagues (BBC News, 2014a; Backbench Business Committee, 
2013). While this acted as political pressure, it was not sufficient enough to form a 
parliamentary majority (in all cases). While there was substantial friction created, David 
Cameron in supporting free movement rights did not transgress the will of the 
parliamentary majority – but did impact upon the will of his parliamentary party, which 
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indirectly affects that majority. The Government’s support for the EU fundamental right to 
free movement did not strictly transgress the Government’s parliamentary majority but it 
did unsettle that majority as it interacted with his own party’s messaging and policy. It is 
likely that effect which led David Cameron to incorporate such a message into his General 
Election manifesto of 2015 (Conservative Party manifesto, 2015) and his earlier post-2013 
EU renegotiation demands.  
 The theory that Parliament is sovereign on the basis that the provision of 
fundamental rights by judges is subordinate and poses no major limits on the will of the 
Government’s parliamentary party majority fails to reconcile itself with the 
implementation of EU-level fundamental rights schemes. In that context, the Government’s 
parliamentary party majority has a marginalised place in determining or finalising or 
setting out the operational criteria for such measures. Where the meaning and limitations 
upon free movement rights are subject to pervasive disagreement, there is no forum at the 
democratic level to resolve the disagreement because the Government’s party majority has 
been marginalised in its role seeking the provision of the right. It could ultimately legislate 
against an EU fundamental right measure but not without serious political consequences 
e.g. infringement proceedings. When considering free movement, predominantly 
Conservative government backbench MPs in the above cases were warned by the then 
Home Office ministers that their policies and objectives were ‘illegal’ (Mallett, 2014), 
which reinforces the point that fundamental rights are claimed to be entrenched and that 
the politics and legitimacy of rights is to be marginalised at all costs. The limitations on 
free movement/immigration, previously the subject of parliamentary debate and vote, 
bypass the parliamentary institution and are presented as inarguable legal facts. Yet rights 
should only be taken seriously in a political system on the grounds that the system allows 
majority voting to settle disagreements as to what constitutes rights (Waldron, 1999, p. 
307). Currently, under EU membership, national legislatures have lost traditional 
legislative powers of initiative and approval (Schmidt, 2005). The sheer magnitude of the 
impact of the Treaty of Rome, the 1960s EU legislation, the 1990s legislation, the 
Maastricht Treaty and the 2004 Directive and Regulations have been voluntarily accepted 
by the executive-in-European Council to embrace the free movement of persons principles 
but with a voluntarily accepted cost to Parliament. What is clear is first the more obvious 
governmental recognition of the legislation and Treaty provisions supporting free 
movement rights – because the ministerial executive acquires political legitimacy through 
the Council of Ministers and European Council and Intergovernmental Conferences, 
respectively – including the signing of the Lisbon Treaty along with Article 45(1) of the 
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Charter associated with it. Yet less obvious has been the progressive framing of case law in 
the ECJ such as Baumbast [1999] and Metock [2008] and Zambrano [2011], through a 
process of filling in the gaps (e.g. Blauberger and Schmidt, 2017; Ferraro and Carmona, 
2015). That EU-level judicial process deprives the ultimate rule of the will of the 
Government’s parliamentary majority in significant policy areas in which the provision of 
fundamental rights by judges is superior to the potential provisions afforded by the elected 
majority in the House of Commons. To consider this more fully, an alternative example of 
a fundamental right might be considered where the ECJ has played a significantly 




Parliament remains theoretically sovereign because the ultimate rule of parliamentary 
sovereignty rested on the historically precedented basis in which the provision of 
fundamental rights is more greatly subject to recourse through political, parliamentary and 
privileged mechanisms than the subordinate provision offered by the courts. Under EU 
membership, the UK Parliament had however become practically less sovereign because 
the UK’s helm of state has had EU-level fundamental rights schemes incorporated into it, 
including that of EU free movement of persons. In that process, EU fundamental rights 
schemes protected by the courts become constitutionally elevated, entrenched in codes of 
written and legal form. As such, rights have often been expressed as unchallengeable 
instruments above politics – complete with EU legal supremacy, direct effect and ECJ 
jurisdiction – relative to the precedented and minimalist provision afforded by Parliament. 
The submission of the domestic legislature in that key respect to the courts, along with a 
final binding effect upon the torn executive, impacts upon and unsettles parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
 The historical precedents of the British constitution in which governing at the helm 
is presented as legally distinct but politically contingent upon its capacity to determine and 
respect fundamental rights are severely diluted in the modern governing process. This 
chapter addressed this political contingency through appealing to the ‘political 
constitutionalism’ of Jeremy Waldron (1999), Richard Bellamy (2007) and Adam Tomkins 
(2013). It addresses the primacy of political legitimacy over constitutional entrenchment 
and challenges the contemporary narrow determination of rights by courts in favour of a 
shared responsibility by the executive, legislature and judiciary. It challenges the approach 
of supranational legalism in claiming to determine EU rights through the prism of 
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democratic parliamentary majorities. The case study examining the EU free movement 
right demonstrates that the UK governing helm of state has had EU rights incorporated into 
its constitution through a dependency upon EU-level rights by individuals in the UK, as 
EU citizens, in order to protect their interests to move freely. It has led to the elevation of 
the judiciary as a rights-adjudicating court system as it fuses ever-closer into the 
Luxembourg court system. This has meant the dilution of the domestic legislature as a 
rights-protecting institution. What is seen by mainstream legalist interpretation and 
constitutional state perspectives as EU rights experiencing an enhanced depth of 
constitutional entrenchment of the rights themselves has isolated itself from questions of 
political legitimacy and parliamentary majorities. Its further tendency to disregard the 
disappearing consensus between the arms of state and community in protecting rights has 
neglected this important dimension contributing towards the continued legislative decline 
and judicial advance in the UK, impacting indirectly upon the unsettling of parliamentary 
sovereignty.  
 The subsequent chapter (Chapter 7) will argue that where the UK Parliament has 
become less sovereign due to the incremental removal of parliamentary power over policy 
and law, it provides an executive-legislature accountability gap. David Cameron’s Prime 
Ministerial-led renegotiation ahead of the EU Referendum provided significant evidence of 
such an accountability gap under EU membership. The subsequent EU Referendum of 
June 2016 and Parliament’s subsequent and ultimate power to decide on the UK’s EU 
relationship permits the executive to pursue a constitutional resettlement, if it so chooses, 
to address the historical dilution of parliamentary powers. It signifies the resettlement of 
Parliament with a historically precedented basis – namely, of government pursued through 
the consent of the electorate – in which the operation of Parliament’s ultimate decision-
making power over political decisions was maintained by the Government-in-Parliament 
on behalf of its electors. Subsequent developments in determining the UK Government’s 
‘Brexit’ policy have suggested a major, if not enhanced role for politics in determining the 
character of Parliament’s sovereignty – and with it, the implication that the Referendum 
and subsequent events enhance, not erode, the principle of representative government and 
parliamentary sovereignty.   
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Chapter 7: A further resettling? Parliamentary sovereignty following the EU 
referendum 
 
Following the consideration of three case studies in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 in which EU 
policies have unsettled previous historical constitutional forms of parliamentary 
sovereignty, this final case study considers the UK’s EU referendum as a further resettling 
of past constitutional forms. Where the UK Parliament has become less sovereign due to 
the incremental removal of parliamentary power over policy and law under EU 
membership it provides an executive-legislature accountability gap. David Cameron’s 
Prime Ministerial-led renegotiation ahead of the EU referendum provided significant 
evidence of that accountability gap under EU membership. The Prime Ministerial position 
of David Cameron to establish a ‘best deal for the UK’ removed Parliament’s ultimate 
decision-making power over political decisions, prohibiting it from bridging the divide 
between the executive at the European Council and Westminster’s accountability, its votes 
on the floor of the House of Commons, oversight, scrutiny and potential revisions of the 
best possible deal. 
A consideration of the final case study, namely the EU referendum of June 2016, 
illustrates that Parliament’s ultimate power to decide on the UK’s EU relationship could 
establish a new constitutional resettlement, if it so chooses, to address the historical 
dilution of parliamentary powers. As the UK seeks to un-incorporate EU-level decision-
making by pursuing a policy of leaving the EU, the barebones of parliament’s potential 
regaining of its ultimate decision-making power which reaffirm Parliament as sovereign 
are evident (contra Mabbett, 2017). Such a step signifies a further resettlement of 
Parliament with a historically precedented basis in which the operation of Parliament’s 
ultimate decision-making power over political decisions was maintained by the 
Government through Parliament on behalf of its electorate. 
  This chapter first begins with an analysis of the historical constitutional forms, as 
precedents, presenting a British constitution in which governing at the helm is presented as 
dependent upon both historical form six and eight acting as guiding precedents for 
government by consent. It is both the consent of the people in referendum, like Burke’s 
political parties in elections seeking consent of the people, that enables the alignment of 
power between the executive and the legislature. The sixth constitutional form of the 
balanced constitution depends upon government through the mixed monarchical 
(monarch), aristocratic (Lords) and democratic (Commons representing people) powers, 
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based upon the collective representation of the electorate. The eighth constitutional form of 
sovereignty is exercised by Government through the political elites in Parliament and with 
external bodies, including the EU and on rare occasions, through national referendums. 
The constitutional form works because Parliament’s legitimate exercise of ultimate 
decision-making power over political decisions appears to depend upon a deliberative 
assembly, collectively representing the electorate as a whole, and in which political parties 
exercised their power as a constitutional link between the executive and the parliament 
(Burke, 1774; Burke, 1792). But it exercises that traditional power in a contemporary, 
British constitution in which governing at the helm is frequently dependent upon the 
continuity of political representation by consent through Parliament in addition to 
Parliament ruling through external agencies, commissions or bodies, the EU and if 
parliament wishes, by national referendums. Both the sixth and the eighth historical 
constitutional forms accumulatively act as guiding precedents in that the decisions on vital 
issues as a deliberative assembly in the recognised helm are necessarily interwoven into 
the contemporary powers of Parliament including its ability to outsource that decision-
making capacity over political decisions. They are both strongly dependent upon Dicey’s 
principle of government by consent – and are central to the further resettling of 
parliamentary sovereignty following the EU referendum.   
  There is then a brief consideration of the explanatory theories which undermine the 
relationship of parliamentary decision-making to sovereignty, portraying it instead as 
subsidiary to elements of popular or judicial power (Bogdanor, 2009a), but which can be 
redressed by focusing on politics and political constitutionalism more specifically. By 
considering the UK’s holding of referendum on the EU, several developments suggest a 
central resettlement, if not enhanced role, for politics in determining the character of 
Parliament’s sovereignty:  
• The Prime Ministerial-led renegotiation marginalising parliamentary involvement; 
• Parliament reclaiming of its sovereignty as a legislature (through the EU 
Referendum Act 2015); 
• The voters directly tasking Parliament to exercise its ultimate power to ‘leave the 
EU’;  
• The subsequent championing of parliamentary scrutiny by MPs and Select 
Committees; 
• The gravitational pull for Parliament to act as guardian of fundamental rights and; 
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• The instituting of Parliament’s objectives to vote over the final UK-EU deal and the 
Repeal Bill. 
• The Supreme Court’s judgement in Miller [2017] effectively put Parliament centre-
stage in the decision-making process (Eleftheriadis, 2017) and in which the ‘best 
deal’ required making political decisions in Parliament.  
It is concluded in significant areas, however, that the referendum aftermath, the Supreme 
Court and the Bill triggering Article 50 as well as enacting the Repeal Bill affirms that a 
referendum is an essential complement (not a substitute of) parliamentary votes and 
legislation to exercise ultimate parliamentary decision-making over the UK’s EU 
relationship. It also affirms that the Supreme Court would operate as ‘guardian’ of the 
constitution while confirming Parliament’s ultimate decision-making power over EU 
membership, consistent with some aspects of common law constitutionalism. Overall, this 
suggests the holding of a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU has enhanced, 
not eroded, the principle of representative government and Parliamentary sovereignty 
(contra Mabbett, 2017; McKibbin, 2017, p. 385; Wellings and Vines, 2016). The EU 
referendum has further resettled previous historical constitutional forms of parliamentary 
sovereignty.  
 
Resettling the historical precedent of ultimate parliamentary decision-making power 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty is impacted upon by an unsettling of previous historical 
constitutional forms – and in the case study of the EU referendum, two significant 
constitutional forms have been further resettled. Parliament’s political authority rests upon 
historical constitutional forms, as precedents presenting a British constitution in which 
governing at the helm is presented as dependent upon the Parliament’s sovereign capacity 
to exercise ultimate decision-making power. In particular, Edmund Burke’s ordering of 
historical precedents in the sixth historical mixed constitutional form observes Parliament 
as “a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole” which 
collectively represents the electorate as a whole and in which political parties exercised 
their power as a constitutional link between the executive and parliament (Burke, 1774; 
Burke, 1792). However, a more recent modified precedent – presented in the eighth 
historical constitutional form in the latter part of the twentieth century – provides for a 
British constitution in which the recognised helm is dependent upon the continuity of 
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political representation through Parliament in addition to Parliament ruling through 
external agencies, commissions or bodies, the EU and should it wish, by national 
referendums. Both historical constitutional form six and eight accumulatively act as 
guiding historical precedents in that the capacity for Parliament to make political decisions 
on vital issues as a deliberative assembly in the recognised helm is enmeshed into the 
contemporary powers of Parliament to outsource that decision-making capacity by 
referendum. The sixth form of the balanced constitution depends upon government through 
the mixed monarchical (monarch), aristocratic (Lords) and democratic (Commons 
representing people) powers, largely in the interests however of a parliamentary oligarchy. 
The eighth constitutional form of sovereignty is one exercised by Government through the 
political elites in Parliament and with external bodies, including the EU and on rare 
occasions, through national referendums. Both constitutional forms depend upon Dicey’s 
principle of government by consent of the electorate. Burke himself, in his own tradition, 
would not have countenanced the proposition of a referendum, or any public instruction or 
mandate for Parliament, as it would be wholly irreconcilable with Members, exercising 
their independent judgements as trustees, in the exercise of Parliament’s sovereignty and 
the British constitution (Burke, 1774). Yet Dicey’s cementing of election and of 
referendums, which permit the consent of the people in the last resort, is relevant to 
resettling parliamentary sovereignty following the EU referendum. It is the consent of the 
people in referendum, like Burke’s political parties in elections, seeking consent of the 
people that enables the resettling through Parliament regaining from the EU its centrality 
of political decision-making and a realignment of power between the executive and the 
legislature.  
 The previous case studies presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 demonstrated how 
contemporary understandings have unsettled previous historical constitutional forms of 
parliamentary sovereignty. For example, it has been argued in this thesis that parliamentary 
sovereignty is impacted upon when there is an unsettling of the sixth of the eight historical 
constitutional forms, reflected in ‘What the Crown-in-mixed constitutional Parliament 
enacts is law’ (Chapter 4; Lieberman, 2006, p. 318; Blackstone, 1765, pp. i, 50-2). The 
case study of the EU-level Financial Transaction Tax in Chapter 4 demonstrated that the 
EU institutions incorporated into the UK’s recognised helm have, through the unsettling of 
the historical precedented mixed constitution model, impacted upon the unsettling of 
parliamentary sovereignty. After all, on the very issue of taxation itself, the 1689 Bill of 
Rights established for the House of Commons – not the European Commission – a sole 
right to authorise taxation and the level of financial supply to the Crown. Chapter 5 argued 
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that Parliament became effectively less sovereign when the European Parliament’s high 
level of specialist ‘functional’ representation (Marsh and Norris, 1997, p. 158) unsettles the 
precedent of ‘collective representation’ of the people through a Westminster model of 
representation characterised by both a ‘trustee’ representative status of its elected Members 
of Parliament and a collective parliamentary status by which Parliament acts in the 
common, collective interest. The case study of the Working Time Directive showed that 
the European Parliament’s competition and its shared neo-corporatist emphasis relative to 
Westminster produces a distortion of the historically precedented capacity to collectively 
represent its electors, thereby diluting the strength of parliamentary sovereignty. Chapter 6 
argued that Parliament has become effectively less sovereign because EU-level 
fundamental rights schemes, entrenched in codes of written and legal form, unsettles rights 
made through recourse to precedented political, parliamentary mechanisms rather than the 
subordinate provision offered by the courts. The case study of the EU free movement right 
makes evident that the recognised helm has had EU rights incorporated into its constitution 
through a dependency upon EU-level rights, leading to the dilution of the domestic 
legislature at the helm as a rights-providing institution. In considering the events following 
the EU referendum, two precedented constitutional forms which were unsettled under EU 
membership have now been further resettled. 
Historical constitutional forms define the unsettling of precedented sovereignty. In 
short, when there is an experience of friction or conflict between past, historical 
constitutional forms of the UK constitution, it is helpful to consider the friction or 
unbalancing of past constitutional conventions as ‘unsettling’. When a present day 
constitutional form in the eighth stage is in conflict with a feature from within one of the 
previous seven historical constitutional forms, an unsettling and subsequent resettling 
occurs. The nature of that unsettling centres on the shift from one constitutional form – or 
more likely, a shift in a particular feature of the form – to a newer or different one, 
particularly a past historical form in transition towards the contemporary eighth form. A 
further resettling through the UK’s EU referendum of 2016 itself occurs within the eighth 
constitutional form. 
 
The principle of leaving the EU under the 2016 EU referendum 
 
The case study of the UK’s referendum on EU membership in June 2016 and the resulting 
vote ‘to leave’ the EU demonstrates that the people of the UK voted to leave the EU by a 
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margin of 17.4 million people (52 per cent) to 16.1 million (48 per cent) on a significant 72 
per cent turnout. Leave won the majority of votes in England (53.4 per cent Leave, 46.6 
per cent Remain) and Wales (52.5 per cent Leave, 47.5 per cent Remain), although not in 
Scotland (38 per cent Leave, 62 per cent Remain) or Northern Ireland (44.2 per cent Leave, 
55.8 per cent Remain). After the referendum, most voters were content with the choice that 
they made (Curtice, 2016; Curtice, 2017b; Curtice, 2017c) and were committed to the 
decision they made at the time of the referendum.    
What was the referendum and what did it mean for the individual? On 23 June 
2016, a referendum asked UK voters to vote on the question, ‘Should the United Kingdom 
remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?' The then 
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron believed that voting to remain in the EU 
would be the best decision for the UK and held that he had negotiated a “new settlement” 
with the EU ahead of the referendum (Lang et al., 2016). On 23rd January 2013, when 
David Cameron first announced in a speech at Bloomberg Headquarters that he would hold 
an In-Out referendum, this would take place after his attempted UK-EU renegotiation deal 
(Cameron, 2013b). 
David Cameron and the Conservatives unexpectedly came to power in a post-2015 
majority Government (Russell, 2016, p. 114), which resulted in him personally attempting 
to change the UK’s relationship with the EU to provide for a new settlement in advance of 
the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. He prepared a non-binding settlement 
with the Heads of other EU member state governments at the European Council of 17-19 
February 2016 for the UK within the EU (Cameron, 2016a; Cameron, 2016b; Cameron, 
2016c; Cameron, 2016d; Lang et al., 2016), with minimal, formal involvement of 
Parliament in drafting its terms, providing consent or statute. The Prime Minister and EU 
leaders hoped that such a settlement would convince UK voters to remain in the EU in the 
impending referendum.  
The settlement consisted of a decision that there should be no discrimination 
against non-eurozone countries (such as the UK) because they are outside the eurozone 
(Cameron, 2016d). It confirmed the aims of the single market and free movement of 
people, goods, services and capital. It requested that steps must be taken to lower the 
regulatory burden on businesses. It provided that the concept of “ever closer union” would 
not apply to the UK (Lang et al., 2016). It indicated that 55 per cent of national parliaments 
will be able, if thought necessary, to prevent further discussion in the Council of EU 
legislative proposals. It clarified certain social benefits in relation to free movement such 
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as limiting full access to in-work benefits by newly arrived EU workers in certain 
situations but, ultimately, without the Prime Minister receiving any concessions on limiting 
free movement.  
The day after the EU referendum, Prime Minister David Cameron made a statement 
in Downing Street respecting the vote to leave the EU, ahead of his resignation (Cameron, 
2016e). The common assumption is that the Prime Minister’s ‘gamble’ to call a 
referendum in which the majority of UK voters would favour remaining in the EU 
ultimately failed, making his continued policy and premiership unstable, if not untenable. 
The renegotiation was itself a “great miscalculation” (Glencross, 2016). It not only 
demonstrated inflexibility on the free movement of people but that, in sum, “Cameron 
blundered by promising so much and delivering little when it came to the UK’s position 
within the EU” (Glencross, 2016). He also urged a negotiation with the EU would need to 
begin under a new Prime Minister. He insisted the new Prime Minister would take the 
decision about when to trigger Article 50 – the EU’s own withdrawal mechanism – and 
start the formal and legal process of leaving the EU, which the subsequent Prime Minister, 
Theresa May, remains committed to (May, 2017a). Externally, the official EU institutions’ 
statement regretted the decision of the British people but, ultimately, they respected the 
decision; and the ‘New Settlement’ earlier agreed by David Cameron with the European 
Council in February 2016 ceased to exist (European Parliament, 2016).   
For many, the referendum itself (indirectly) and the decision to leave (directly) 
were attempts to wrest back control – ‘Vote Leave and take back control’ was the 
campaign mantra – over decision-making from EU institutions.  Nearly half of those Leave 
voters surveyed chose to leave in recognition of the “principle that decisions about the UK 
should be taken in the UK” (Ashcroft, 2016), affirming a primacy of government where 
decisions are taken by UK rather than EU decision-making bodies. Sovereignty was 
paramount, expressed as the ability for UK electors to make their own decisions through 
their elected Parliament and not have those decisions presented to them at the EU-level. As 
many as 60 per cent agreed in one survey that the EU had “undermined the powers of the 
UK parliament” while just 17 per cent disagreed (see Curtice, 2017a, p. 11). Further polls 
found that sovereignty had been the main motivation for 53 per cent of Leave voters 
(ComRes, 2016; Clarke et al., 2016). According to the British Election Study, the vast 
majority who described sovereignty (90 per cent) and immigration (88 per cent) as the 
most important issue voted Leave, compared to only a small minority (15 per cent) who 
viewed the economy as the most important (Swales, 2016, p. 13; see also Prosser et al., 
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2016). On the leave side, “…the EU was seen as irredeemable precisely because it erodes 
national sovereignty …” (Geddes, 2016, p. 266). In context, the vote reflected ongoing 
records and surveys which had long demonstrated a Eurosceptic Britishness in the 
electorate which has become politically dominant (Gifford, 2008; Gifford, 2010; Gifford, 
2014). Euroscepticism had become mainstream in British politics, particularly within the 
Conservative Party (Geddes, 2016, p. 265). The relevance of sovereignty to those eventual 
Leave voters who had been waiting for David Cameron’s renegotiation in EU powers was 
pivotal (Curtice, 2017b; Geddes, 2016). There had been a doubling between 1992 and 2014 
of those supporting EU exit (10 per cent to 24 per cent) but importantly, a growth in those 
sceptical and who wanted to see EU powers reduced (30 per cent to 38 percent) (The 
British Election Study, 2016; Geddes, 2016). By 2015, two thirds opposed the UK’s 
existing relationship with the EU, with 22 per cent saying we should leave, 43 per cent 
wanting a reduction in EU powers (Swales, 2016, p. 5; see also Curtice, 2017b). 
Cameron’s renegotiation strategy rested on the need to convince the substantial number of 
‘Remain but reduce powers’ camp that his renegotiation amounted to a substantive change 
and a reduction in EU power (Geddes, 2016, p. 270; Curtice, 2017b) – but it did not. 
Having considered the referendum itself, the precedent of holding a referendum also needs 
to be formally understood alongside its broader resettlement in the current UK-EU context.  
 
The constitutional precedent of referendums  
 
Qvortrup (2015) highlights that a referendum is a vote taken by the whole of a people on a 
policy issue. Under the referendum, the voters do not have the right to initiate legislation – 
they can merely approve or reject proposals put forward by the legislature. The referendum 
is a complement to indirect democracy; an “addendum not an institution that challenged 
the principle of representative government” (Qvortrup, 2015, p. 7). The referendum is 
therefore a complement to representative government, not an instance of popular 
sovereignty. As Dicey put it, a referendum provides formal recognition that the enactment 
of laws depends on the consent of the nationally, represented electorate (Qvortrup, 2015; 
Qvortrup, 1999; Dicey, 1911), not a circumvention of that consent. The historical 
constitutional forms (six and eight) of party political representation and representation by 
referendum reflect Dicey’s view of government through the consent of the represented.   
Although referendums are a highly irregular mechanism in the UK constitution, the 
2016 referendum on EU membership has some precedents in the past 44 years of British 
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politics not only in relation to a European Community referendum but mostly devolution 
referendums. Since 1973, there have been only twelve referendums held in the UK: 
• the first nation-wide referendum on 5 June 1975 on whether the UK should stay 
in the European Community (yes);  
• the Scottish devolution referendum on 11 September 1997 on whether there 
should be a Scottish Parliament and whether the Scottish Parliament should 
have tax varying powers (both referendums received a yes vote);  
• the second nation-wide referendum on 5 May 2011 on whether to change the 
voting system for electing MPs to the House of Commons from first past the 
post to the alternative vote (no) and;  
• the referendum on 18 September 2014 on whether Scotland should become an 
independent country (no).  
• the referendum on 23 June 2016 on whether the UK should remain a member of 
or leave the EU (leave).  
However, the first UK-wide referendum held in 1975 on the UK’s continued membership 
of the European Community was the first British precedent for a national referendum on 
staying in the Community, which was affirmed with 67 per cent of the vote (Swales, 2016, 
p. 4) on a turnout of 64 per cent (Geddes, 2013, p. 65). The third UK-wide referendum in 
2016 was met with a verdict of leaving the EU.   
There have been three distinct occasions for justifying referendums:  
(i) as mechanisms for managing disagreement i.e. to keep a party or a coalition 
together’  
(ii) as a negotiating tactic, as part of a bargaining or negotiating process; 
(iii) as a plebiscitary referendum, to by-pass a legislature by calling a referendum 
(Qvortrup, 2015, pp. 16-17).  
To re-interpret Qvortrup, it is relevant however that in 1975 and 2016, the Prime Minister, 
as party leader, deployed the referendum to both manage coalition and internal party 
disagreement (case i, also corresponding to Opperman’s (2011) domestic/defensive 
typology) and to pursue a broader and longer process of an EU (re)negotiation process 
(case ii). Separately, however, the Parliament, and in particular its EU-critical, 
predominantly Conservative government backbench MPs, arguably legislated for a 
referendum because they wished for the issue in Parliament to bypass the ordinary 
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European-integrationist government policy and legislature as a plebiscitary referendum 
(case iii), combined with cementing their view in a renegotiation to have proper settlement, 
if not an alternative, looser UK-EU resettlement which would address their constituents 
(albeit, not their) concerns (case ii). Qvortrup also tends not to focus on the function that 
“referendums should be a constitutional safeguard” (Qvortrup, 2015, p. 39), yet such a 
function has some relevance in relation to the UK’s experience of continued European 
integration where, without a written constitution, Parliament has few other constitutional 
safeguards or institutional safety-valves outside government to protect its own institution 
or its electors.  
 
The 2016 EU referendum and Parliament resettling the UK’s relationship to the EU 
 
What does the decision to hold the referendum and the referendum decision itself mean for 
the UK’s relationship to the EU? The referendum decision and the proceeding Government 
policy has meant the UK “constitutional settlement is in flux” in relation to that decision 
(The UK in a Changing Europe Initiative and The Political Studies Association, 2016b; 
Young and Gee, 2016), albeit Parliament’s decision-making power over recasting the UK’s 
new EU relationship – led presently by Theresa May’s Government – occupies a renewed, 
elevated and central position in the constitutional resettlement. The relationship between 
the UK and the EU was not settled immediately following the referendum (The UK in a 
Changing Europe Initiative and Political Studies Association, 2016a); but with 
referendums enabling a relationship to be reframed and re-imagined (Oliver, 2015), the 
exit from the EU is now being negotiated. The referendum result indicates that the majority 
of the voting electorate in a UK-wide referendum want to ‘Leave’ the EU, albeit a minority 
wanted to Remain and a wide variety of political actors have frustrations and reservations 
of precisely what the new future settled relationship might look like, politically, legally and 
economically.  
  Historically, after 44 years membership of the EU, the UK’s withdrawal, if 
achieved, will mean Parliament regaining from the EU its centrality to decision-making 
over key political decisions. The resettlement means Parliament will be called upon to 
decide on policies as broad in scope as:  
• the rights of EU nationals presently in the UK and of UK nationals in the other EU 
27 countries;  
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• the future UK-EU trading relationship; deciding on the economy including foreign 
direct investment (FDI);  
• controlling immigration and its effect on the labour market;  
• a business and financial services national regulatory regime;  
• UK employment rights previously based on EU law;  
• replacements following a departure from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and its subsidy and regulatory regime;  
• gaining a policy on fisheries for the UK to obtain exclusive national fishing rights;  
• changes to environmental standards;  
• trading with the European Energy Market;  
• changes to law on aviation, shipping, public transport including rail and bus, and 
road haulage;  
• the UK remaining bound by EU free movement of people laws;  
• arrangements with the EU over policing and criminal justice measures;  
• the human rights obligations of the EU Treaties;  
• entitlement to welfare benefits for people moving between EU member states;  
• reciprocal access to healthcare and the working hours of doctors;  
• provisions for students and research, in terms of research funding, student loans or 
maintenance funding;  
• consumer protection in the UK;  
• deciding on foreign and defence policy;  
• changes to the funds for development cooperation and humanitarian aid, and; 
• potential policy and legislative divergence in areas of devolved competence 
(Newson, 2017; House of Commons Library, 2016).  
There are a whole variety of issues which the Government in Parliament will decide upon 
that determine the future form of UK-EU relationship, including whether to: 
• retain the European Economic Area (EEA) (e.g. Norway) and the single market and 
its position towards Free Trade or locating itself within the Customs Union (e.g. 
Turkey);  
• exiting the EU and into WTO rules (‘no deal’ option); 
• limiting the free movement for goods, services, capital and people (e.g. 
Switzerland);  
• whether the UK wishes to make substantial financial contributions;  
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• the application of EU rules with influence and vote and;  
• its ability to make third-party trade deals (e.g. Singapore and Canada) (The UK in a 
Changing Europe Initiative and Political Studies Association, 2016a).  
In Westminster terms, the earlier role of all political parties – with the exception of the 
SNP – in legislating for a Referendum Bill with the public choice to leave or remain, was 
predicated on an ongoing unease among Westminster’s elected representatives in simply 
supporting the status quo relationship with the EU (even with the Prime Minister’s fudged 
deal) but where its majority of 479 out of 650 MPs were overwhelmingly committed to 
remaining in the EU (Menon, 2016). The majority of MPs therefore accepted the 
legitimacy of legislating for that public choice in order for Government-in-Parliament to 
seek a settlement.  
The current Government’s policy is committed ‘to leave’, having begun the ‘Article 
50’ negotiations in June 2017 with the aim of reaching an agreement about the UK’s future 
partnership by the time the 2-year Article 50 process has concluded in March 2019 (May, 
2017a, 2017b; Davis, 2017; The UK in a Changing Europe Initiative and Political Studies 
Association, 2016a). The expression to leave establishes a number of different options for 
the Government, along with Parliament, to consider for the UK’s relationship to the EU in 
terms of its degree of integration or separation from the existing model, a great deal of 
which is unsettled at this stage. The Prime Minister Theresa May maintains that as the 
British people voted to leave the EU, it is the job of the Government to deliver that 
“instruction” (May, 2017a). The Government are pushing for UK ‘access’ to the single 
market (not membership of it), an ambitious tariff free trade agreement with the EU, and 
negotiate the Customs Union so that the UK can strike its own comprehensive trade 
agreements with other countries, ending the unfettered free movement principle, pulling 
out of the ECJ, while remaining “a fully independent, sovereign nation” with a 
commitment to free trade (May, 2017a, 2017b; Davis, 2017; May, 2016). The Government 
has put before Parliament a Repeal Bill to repeal the European Communities Act and 
convert the relevant ‘acquis’ – the body of existing EU law – into British law (May, 
2017a). The Government have been cautious not to show their hand for the detailed basis 
of Article 50 negotiations. The aftermath of the referendum and subsequent Government 
policy pursuing Brexit led to hardening of opinion against that referendum verdict and 
Government policy both by leading personalities in the EU institutions and by member 
states (see Coleman et al., 2017; Hagemann, 2016). The subsequent Miller judgement in 
the Supreme Court had paradoxically made Parliament itself the single most legally 
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necessary and politically legitimate authority to accept, modify or reject the UK 
Government’s proposed relationship to the EU (Miller [2017]; see Eleftheriadis, 2017). 
The paradox lies in a Supreme Court judgement, deploying common law rights arguments 
yet resettling Parliament as centre-stage – beyond the power of both the courts and the sole 
will of the executive (through prerogative).   
For its part, Parliament legislated for the EU referendum through the European 
Union Referendum Act 2015. The House of Commons voted the Bill through by 544 to 53 
votes at second reading (a ratio of six to one in the Commons), the latter of which only the 
SNP voted against (House of Commons, 2015). If not more fundamentally, electors on 
23rd June 2016 directly tasked Parliament to exercise its ultimate decision-making powers 
to implement the majority decision to ‘leave the EU’. The House of Commons’ held a vote 
on a Motion calling on the Government to invoke Article 50 by 31 March 2017, which 
again was supported by 448 to 75 MPs, with again predominantly SNP MPs opposing 
(House of Commons, 2016a). The House of Commons also passed the formal European 
Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, formally affirming the triggering of Article 
50, by 498 to 114 votes at second reading (House of Commons, 2017a; BBC News, 
2017a), despite being asked by the Supreme Court to take the initiative to do so 
(Miller [2017]).  
 
Parliamentary sovereignty and resettling the contemporary power of Parliament 
The ultimate decision-making power of Parliament over political decisions 
 
It is necessary to recognise the contemporary relationship between parliamentary 
sovereignty and the ultimate decision making-power of Parliament over political decisions 
as impacted upon by EU membership – particularly in contrast to underlying features of 
Bogdanor’s (2009a) constitutional state theory and some of his assumptions which rest 
upon radical common law constitutionalism. Bogdanor’s (2009a) constitutional state 
theory appears to underplay the effective decision-making on EU rules by Government 
and, by emphasising public power, often understates Parliament’s institutional capacity 
with its partisan actors to bring about pressure to accept, reject or change the 
Government’s decision on the UK’s EU relationship. Specifically, also, on an alternative 
radical common law perspective, Bogdanor (2009a) and other theorists partially adopt the 
radical theory of national common law constitutionalism, which directly seeks to affirm the 
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power of a national court-decided, judicial, common law at the expense of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty as settling the final question over the deployment of 
parliamentary decision-making power over the UK-EU relationship. The argument is 
highly apposite when considering the High Court, then Supreme Court, in Miller held that 
an Act of Parliament would be needed before Article 50 could be triggered (Miller [2017]). 
The absence in those explanatory theories draws the thesis towards politics and political 
constitutionalism more specifically. Such a view would enable a sufficient consideration of 
sovereignty as defined by parliamentary decision-making power by adapting Burke’s 
defence of MPs making the ultimate decisions in the political, parliamentary realm because 
of their collectively representing electors in which contested issues are reasoned through 
party competition, bridging the accountability gap between executive and legislative 
powers.  
 In employing the term ‘ultimate’ decision-making power of Parliament of political 
decisions relating to the UK’s relationship with the EU, the contemporary Parliament has 
four overarching and general functions defining its powers:  
(i) To check the work of the Government through questioning government 
ministers, debating and the investigative work of committees pursuing scrutiny 
of Government’s EU policy; 
(ii) To make and change legislation;  
(iii) To secure debates in which members discuss (support or oppose) Government 
policy, legislation and events of the day;  
(iv) To check and approve Government spending and taxation.  
The power is ‘ultimate’ because Parliament has the highest legal authority in the UK to 
create or end any law and which courts cannot overrule, nor Parliament bind its future 
Parliaments. 
 
Constitutional state theory, common law constitutionalism and the undermining of 
parliamentary decision-making power 
 
From a constitutional state perspective, Bogdanor’s (2009a) theory has insufficiently 
reconciled parliamentary sovereignty and the ultimate power to make political decisions 
over policy and law. Part of the assumed segregation arises from overlooking the historical 
precedent of how parliamentary sovereignty reconciled itself with asserting its ultimate 
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political decision-making power in support or opposition to policy and law. It suffers from 
assuming that the popular power in a referendum equates with popular sovereignty which 
in turn supposedly trumps Parliament’s sovereignty. Bogdanor’s (2009a) assumption that 
Britain's era of constitutional reform after 1997, together with its 1973 entry into the 
European Communities, has paved the way for a new constitution is particularly 
concerning when it is considered to rest, unconvincingly, upon the shift from parliamentary 
sovereignty to a constitutional state based upon popular sovereignty (Bogdanor, 2009a, p. 
xiii). In its analysis, it underplays the effective power of decision-making on EU 
rules/membership by the Government by: 
• overstating public power in relation to Government authority and Parliament’s 
sovereignty.  
• understating Parliament's own capacity to force an executive decision and therefore 
its implicit political will and power in deciding on EU rules.  
Bogdanor achieves this objective by first, insisting, in line with radical common law 
constitutionalism that the effect of the European Communities Act 1972 is to bind future 
Parliaments. He holds it is a ‘constitutional statute’ (Bogdanor 2009a, p. 278); it could not 
be simply repealed. In consequence, Parliament cannot simply repeal the European 
Communities Act (Bogdanor 2009a, p. 278) but now, seemingly it can, armed with the 
people’s instruction. The radical outcome of ultra-common law constitutionalism which 
Bogdanor relies upon to make his argument is that Parliament cannot decide on EU laws, 
or its membership, or repeal the European Communities Act – which the Government, 
after the 2016 EU referendum, is now proposing it do (May, 2017a). Bogdanor (2009a) 
adopts the radical theory of national common law constitutionalism which directly seeks to 
affirm the primacy of a national, court-decided common law at the expense of politics as 
settling the final question over the deployment of parliamentary decision-making power in 
relation to the EU. However, it is possible Bogdanor might accept that the European 
Communities Act being entrenched in this way in no way affects the ability of a 
Government to finally decide on EU rules, or categorically, the rules which compose its 
membership.  
  Bogdanor also sets out to achieve his objective by second, in line with his broader 
constitutional statist theory, consigning the referendum of the people to an exercise in 
popular sovereignty, a check upon the ‘elective dictatorship’ in British politics (Bogdanor 
2009a, p. 275), rather than a discretionary act of parliamentary sovereignty, outsourcing its 
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decision-making capacity on a narrow question. In 2016, Bogdanor reaffirms that the 
referendum on EU membership crystallised the introduction of a new principle, the 
sovereignty of the people, into the British constitution, which supersedes the sovereignty of 
parliament (Bogdanor, 2016a; Bogdanor, 2016b). For Bogdanor, the referendum creates in 
effect “an extra chamber of parliament comprising in addition to the Queen, the Lords and 
the Commons, the people.” (Bogdanor, 2009a, p. 280). It resembles Dicey’s 
mischaracterisation of the referendum as an “alternative second chamber” (Dicey, 1911). 
The referendum, however, is not an exercise in popular sovereignty but popular decision-
making power, which in turn, instructs the sovereign power. The power is limited only to 
the question in hand. It is a decision-making power only and it is, as Bogdanor accepts, 
‘advisory’, not prescriptive. For Bogdanor, though, the instrument knowingly removes the 
centrality of Parliament. That is a difficult conclusion to draw given that Parliament is the 
only political actor to legislate for one and the joint-in-command (with Government) in 
deciding policy strategy in light of a referendum outcome (contra Bogdanor, 2016a, p. 
348). Referendums if anything reinvigorate Parliament’s public power. The referendum is 
an addendum, not a challenge, to representative government (Qvortrup, 2015).   
 Parliament occupies a political centrality. Referendums on EU membership or EU 
rules cannot express the sovereignty of the people as this does not take into account the 
role of Parliament in triggering, asking the question, and providing a coherent policy after 
the referendum, consistent with the public instruction to Parliament by referendum. The 
people at no point have that ultimate decision-making power but they do have the decision-
making power to support or oppose a specific policy which has been put before Parliament. 
This action confirms, not denies, Burke’s views of ultimate parliamentary power resting on 
party competition, exercised between the executive and legislature; yet, contrary to Burke, 
that parliamentary power is now more greatly subject to the will of the people.  
However, constitutional state theory persuasively identifies mainstream parties in 
Parliament as central to justifying referendums: the 1975 referendum on the EC was called 
to reconcile opposition factions in the Labour Party (Bogdanor 2009a, p. 180, 185) in a 
situation whereby all three mainstream parties were committed to EEC membership. 
Again, ahead of the 2016 referendum, all mainstream parties in the 2015 general election 
had been committed to Remaining with EU membership (Bogdanor, 2016b) but the issue 
could not be resolved through the normal working of the party system. Furthermore, this 
impasse in party government advances the legitimacy question: a referendum is necessary 
on an issue of fundamental importance where the parliamentary vote is insufficient to 
ensure legitimacy (Bogdanor, 2009, p. 185). In making that claim, Bogdanor rightly 
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protects legitimacy as relevant. However, Bogdanor chooses to sidestep the referendum 
question by not addressing Parliament’s power in Burke’s sense whereby party 
competition in Parliament is exercised to bridge the executive-legislature divide.  
The facets of radical common law constitutionalism and constitutional statism 
engendered in Bogdanor’s view have more broadly overemphasised judicial and people 
power, respectively, as finalising what constitutes ultimate decision-making power in the 
British political tradition. Yet the British constitution provides neither the people or the 
common law court with an ultimate decision-making power in respect of making, altering 
and reversing political decisions. The dual tendency in this theory has troublingly sought to 
institutionally bypass the role of ongoing contestation in politics and that the way in which 
decisions are made, resolved and resettled serves to explain how Parliament maintains its 
sovereignty.  
 
Political constitutionalism: addressing the vacuum in explaining parliamentary power 
 
There is a notable absence in explanatory theories linking Parliament’s decision-making 
power over political decisions in relation to parliamentary sovereignty, portraying it 
instead as subsidiary to popular power, or to judicial power (Bogdanor, 2009a). A focus on 
politics and political constitutionalism can redress this absence. Such a view would enable 
a sufficient consideration of sovereignty as parliamentary decision-making power by 
adapting Burke’s defence of political representation in the sixth constitutional form as both 
(i) a collective parliamentary status by which Parliament acts as a deliberative assembly 
(Burke, 1774), and (ii) competing parties doing the representing act, when effective, as a 
constitutional link with strength and consistency between executive and legislature (Burke, 
1770). The model of political constitutionalism on this basis helps to locate parliamentary 
sovereignty in the political realm since it assumes, there is an inherent and ongoing 
disagreement about substantive outcomes that society should achieve, and yet a recognised 
legitimate and effective parliamentary process for resolving these disagreements (see 
Bellamy, 2007; Waldron, 1999). Thus, no parliament may bind its successor. A recognised 
legitimate process to resolve disagreements and make policy and law requires the 
recognition of decision-making powers involved in that process.  
  Political constitutionalism might better address the absence in explanatory theories 
of Parliament’s power in relation to parliamentary sovereignty because it looks beyond law 
and legal institutions and towards the legitimacy of political institutions as sites of 
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contestation (Waldron, 1999; Bellamy, 2007). A legitimate process of resolution could not 
be achieved via an appeal to the legal machinery and the judicial component alone. 
Although Richard Bellamy (2007) persuasively draws that model into a democratic 
tradition and the political constitutionalist tradition does at the very least inquire into 
political conditions in relation to Parliament’s sovereignty, legal constitutionalists look 
only to identify judicially enforceable, external substantive limits on Parliament, grounded 
in the common law or the rule of law (Delaney, 2014). The inherent, institutionalised 
disagreement to seek alternative resettlement, as contained by backbench party 
competition, has an important part to play in bridging Government and Parliament’s 
decision-making power both in conventional government and when outsourcing and 
regaining/reorienting policy after a referendum.  
In an environment, particularly under EU membership in which there is a 
misalignment between the executive and the demoted legislature to scrutinise the executive 
(Hix and Goetz, 2000, p. 11), it is MPs in the House of Commons from their respective 
political parties which represent a constitutional link between executive and parliament in 
the recognised helm. Adapting Burke’s observation is prescient because in describing 
Parliament’s powers vis-a-vis the EU institutions as separate from the position of the 
executives-in-Parliament across Europe, a notable phenomenon is the specific and 
organised independence of party backbencher positions adopted in parliamentary chambers 
(Raunio and Hix, 2000), notably in the UK. Sufficient numbers of the government’s 
majority backbench MPs within political parties are free (or not) to reorient, as Burke 
describes, forming a bridge between the executive and parliament. Such an approach 
preserves the centrality of parliamentary decision-making, via parties, and referendums as 
providing instruction to Parliament, beyond parties, as features which have otherwise been 
resisted in constitutional state ‘popular sovereignty’ approaches or the common law 
tradition. 
Given the part European integration played in the diminished ability of parliaments 
to regulate executives (Raunio, 2011; Raunio and Hix, 2000; Schmidt, 1999), executives 
were provided with an arena for action away from domestic parliamentary scrutiny, and a 
near monopoly on information in a significant public policy space (Raunio and Hix, 2000, 
p. 163). By reaction rather than design, the parliaments of Europe since the 1990s 
established institutions and mechanisms that forced governments to explain their EU 
policies and actions in the European arena to parliaments. The real “driving force” behind 
this reasserted power has been the desire by backbench parliamentarians to “redress the 
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‘information gap’” between governing elites and the parliamentary rank-and-file (Raunio 
and Hix, 2000, p. 163). Backbench MPs confronted with European agendas, laws or 
politics, which can often be reduced or suppressed when open debates in Chamber sessions 
are avoided by the executive as far as possible, have the power to induce the minister, or 
Prime Minister, to act as a representative of the electorate, or act via its parliamentary 
committee (Benz, 2004, p. 887), particularly the European Scrutiny Committee in the 
House of Commons. The House and the Select Committees have opportunities to make 
ministers indirectly aware of their views on EU proposals, albeit ex ante controls and 
which in no way define Government mandates (Benz, 2004). Despite the considerable lack 
of involvement of Parliaments, backbench MPs and Select Committees in the EU 
governance process, and their apparent absence of contemporary direct decision-making 
powers, in Westminster they can still collectively and vigorously supply crucial rationales 
and articulate policy views to informally require ministers to reorient and augment that 
existing EU policy.  
  Political constitutionalism can better reformulate the absence in explanatory 
theories of Parliament’s power over political decisions in relation to parliamentary 
sovereignty through the incorporation of party competition into Parliament. As described 
in Chapter 5, it is political parties that are the primary vehicles that articulate citizens’ 
policy beliefs and convert them into public policies (Adams, 2001, p. 3). Voters’ choices of 
parties then provide them with a method of exercising indirect control over the actions of 
individual legislators and through these over the affairs of government (Adams, 2001, p. 
4). Parties invariably vote as a bloc in Parliament – with few regular exceptions – and they 
exercise control over the government agenda and policy-making process in Parliament. 
The electorate use party policies as the basis for their voting decisions and provide 
effective vehicles for representing the electorate’s political beliefs (Adams, 2001, p. 5). 
Understanding the relationship between public opinion and party competition on Europe is 
important for domestic political contestation in the member states (Down and Wilson, 
2010, p. 62).   
  The political constitutionalist tradition might better reconsider the absence in 
explanatory theories of Parliament’s power over political decisions in relation to 
parliamentary sovereignty because it conceives of the political environment of dissensus in 
which the legislature and its electors hold the Prime Minister to account. Hooghe and 
Marks (2009, p. 5) argue that prior to 1991, EU politics occupied a period of permissive 
consensus in which negotiated “deals” were “cut by insulated elites” and “public opinion 
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was quiescent”. After 1991, EU contemporary politics is occupied by a “constraining 
dissensus” in which party leaders must look to public opinion when negotiating European 
issues and where referendums have “shifted the initiative to citizens and single-issue 
groups, and “disarm party elites” (Hooghe and Marks, 2009, p. 20; see also Geddes, 2016; 
De Wilde, 2012; Franklin et al., 1994). The assumption that Prime Ministerial executives 
are constrained through government under EU membership relies upon the dissensus by 
some public groups and particularly from predominantly, government-aligned backbench 
MPs. The dissensus in the UK-EU context and the role of parties in Parliament, rather than 
exercised from the viewpoint of the Prime Minister’s executive, affirms (not denies) the 
political disagreement between the executive, the legislature and the electorate which 
support parliamentary sovereignty. The exercise of parliamentary sovereignty is now 
dependent upon the Prime Minister’s broad accountability to Parliament and the electorate 
over all EU negotiations. The Prime Minister’s failure to recognise the dissensus would 
undermine the accountability of executive policy to the legislature and the electorate and 
therefore the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the contemporary resettling of parliamentary power under 
EU membership: the principle of leaving the EU under the 2016 EU referendum 
  
In understanding the resettling of the Parliament’s power in deciding the UK’s relationship 
to the EU through its referendum in June 2016, it is crucial to recognise the referendum not 
as an instance of popular sovereignty but as a discretionary exercise of Parliament’s 
outsourcing of its own essential decision-making capacity (to Remain or Leave). Before 
the referendum itself, David Cameron’s renegotiation, without sufficiently consulting 
Parliament on preparing the settlement, demonstrated a crucial demotion of Parliament to 
the executive which can be understood as a Prime Ministerial-led exercise in permissive 
consensus (Hooghe and Marks, 2009, p. 5). It generated the claim of a final, non-
contestable package but which lacked parliamentary and public legitimacy before and 
during the referendum.  
David Cameron’s Prime Ministerial-led renegotiation ahead of the EU referendum 
is, to a large degree, bound by those broader EU rules which provide for a constitutional 
elevation of the Prime Ministerial-led executive through its fusion with EU governmental 
machinery. Those rules are grounded in the Prime Minister, with other heads of 
government and respective Presidents of the European Council and Commission 
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interacting to make decisions at the highest political level in the European Council 
(Kassim, 2016a). The legislature has no comparable connection to that of the Prime 
Ministerial-led executive within European Council-level institutional decision-making. The 
high-level UK-EU negotiation ahead of the referendum took place between David 
Cameron, as UK Prime Minister, and the European Council President Donald Tusk after 
months of negotiations between their officials. Parliament had no effective place in taking 
the ultimate decision on the renegotiation.  
The removal of Parliament’s ultimate decision-making power over political 
decisions prohibits it from building a bridge with the executive agreeing to the ‘best deal 
for the UK’ (i.e. the permissive consensus) at a level defined by less open decision-making 
at the EU-level which is far removed from Westminster’s accountability, votes on the floor 
of the House of Commons, oversight, scrutiny or revision of those policies/laws. It is not 
so much an “information gap” between executive and the parliamentary rank-and-file, as 
Raunio and Hix (2000) describe but a broader legislative-executive gap of legitimacy. The 
party MPs in Parliament seek to bridge the ‘information gap’ which might better be 
referred to as the legitimacy or accountability gap. 
Parliament’s subsequent and parallel task in legislating for a Referendum Act 
became an indirect reclaiming of its sovereignty because the referendum is, on Dicey’s 
terms, a formal recognition that the enactment/repeal of UK’s laws and position depends 
upon the consent of the nationally, represented electorate (Dicey, 1911; Qvortrup, 1999, 
2015). By legislating for one, Parliament remedies their own and their voters’ acquiescence 
to a demotion under an executive policy which accumulatively developed under EU 
membership.  
The referendum aftermath, the Supreme Court judgement, the Bill triggering 
Article 50 and the Repeal Bill, repealing the European Communities Act, affirm both: 
(i) an adaptation of Bogdanor’s (2009a) assumption, whereby a referendum 
becomes an essential complement (not a substitute of) parliamentary votes 
and legislation to exercise ultimate parliamentary decision-making over the 
UK’s EU relationship; 
(ii) the Supreme Court in Miller [2017] operated as ‘guardian’ of the 
constitution and of Parliament’s ultimate decision-making power over EU 
membership, consistent with some aspects of common law 
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constitutionalism, but ultimately having the effect of putting Parliament 
centre-stage (Eleftheriadis, 2017).  
Further parliamentary scrutiny and the capacity for party competition to exploit the 
executive-legislative accountability gap in deploying scrutiny in key areas demonstrated 
that accountability gap could be occupied by the crystallising of cleavages by political 
parties contesting issues in the political sphere, upon which parliamentary sovereignty, in 
practice, depends.   
 
Before the referendum: Prime Ministerial EU renegotiation as marginalisation of 
Parliament’s sovereignty  
 
To a broad extent, David Cameron and the European Council President entered those EU-
level negotiations in which Parliament had little effective place in taking the ultimate 
decision on the renegotiation, only because they were committed to those EU rules. The 
UK and the other member states of the European Council set the EU's general political 
direction and priorities. As an institution, the European Council: 
• Enables the UK’s participation in the agenda-setting, Treaty-making, non-law-
making meetings, or summits, where the UK and all other EU 27 leaders meet to 
decide by consensus (except where the Treaties provide otherwise via unanimity or 
qualified majority) on broad political priorities (European Union, 2014).  
• Deals with issues that cannot be resolved at the level of intergovernmental 
cooperation through supranational means.  
• “…functions as the principal agenda-setter, the ultimate arbiter in decision-making, 
and the motor behind European integration” (van de Steeg, 2010, p. 118).  
• “…steers the EU” towards achieving EU presidency goals (Miller and Clark, 2014, 
p. 6).  
• Tends to provide political leadership on all EU affairs (de Schoutheete, 2012).  
• Determines treaty reform and in all circumstances, the trigger for treaty revision is 
by unanimous decision of the European Council – a unanimity which necessarily 
depends upon the UK’s consent.  
• Is followed after its meetings, domestically, by the UK Prime Minister specifically 
giving an oral statement reporting back to the House of Commons on European 
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Council meetings (both ex ante and ex post), but debates on the meetings are rare 
(Auel and Raunio, 2014, p. 20).  
The negotiations led by David Cameron for the UK had been determined and conducted on 
the footing of Prime Ministerial power, without intervention of statute – the settlement was 
not written into UK law (see Lang et al., 2016). Such a move was visible to both 
parliamentarians and prospective referendum voters, who reflected that in its negative view 
of his overall negotiated package (Stone, 2016; Vote Leave, 2016). In hindsight, the 
renegotiated proposals were unconvincing and unpersuasive to many during the 
referendum and as a result only marginal debates in the referendum focused on the 
supposed new settlement (Begg, 2016, p. 30; Curtice, 2017a). It specifically left a “reform-
shaped hole in the case for Remain…” (Mosbacher and Wiseman, 2016, p. 76). It was of 
major political significance to the executive-legislative fracture that the day the David 
Cameron made a statement at the steps of 10 Downing Street, following his Cabinet 
meeting on the renegotiated settlement and calling the referendum date, six of his own 
Cabinet members, within moments, announced their support for ‘Vote Leave’ (Cameron, 
2016b; Wilkinson, 2016). This had been made possible by the Prime Minister’s relaxing of 
collective Cabinet responsibility. Most Cabinet ministers, the majority of Westminster MPs 
as a whole, most industry leaders and trade associations and trade unions favoured the 
‘Remain’ position on the referendum campaign trail in order to convince voters for the UK 
to remain within the EU, but scant details were ever given of the Prime Minister’s 
renegotiated deal.  
  It is highly relevant also that David Cameron’s settlement on ‘sovereignty’ 
unconvincingly specified that the UK will not be committed to further political integration 
in the EU and the concept of “ever closer union” will not apply to the UK. However, EU 
parliamentary scrutiny in the Commons held it “...does not and cannot change the Treaty” 
and some considered it to be “largely symbolic and of limited legal importance” (European 
Scrutiny Committee, 2016). The underwhelming renegotiation outcome on sovereignty 
measures, coupled with David Cameron’s lacklustre performance in negotiations over 
sovereignty and immigration issues, all amounted to inflexibility and non-negotiability in 
relation to the question on the ballot paper for many prospective referendum voters, Leave 
or Remain. The Prime Minister’s negotiations in 2015-16 entirely marginalised 
parliamentary power to decide on EU rules/membership in his renegotiations with Donald 
Tusk and in bilateral meetings with the other 27 EU leaders; and Parliament, by legislating 
to outsource a decision to the people themselves by referendum, itself symbolised a 
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wresting back of control. It corresponded neatly with the leave ‘Vote Leave and take back 
control’ referendum campaign mantra, which launched its ministerial campaign only 
moments after Cameron presented his final package (Dearden, 2016; Wilkinson, 2016).  
  The renegotiated settlement for the UK within the EU was not produced in 
consultation with Parliament or its parties. However, it did not wholly reject the 
expectations of the political constitutionalist tradition because the Prime Ministerial-led 
agreement was still subject to accountability to parliament. The House of Commons went 
on to scrutinise his settlement on 3rd and 22nd February over the content of that agreement 
(House of Commons, 2016b; House of Commons, 2016c; Cameron, 2016c) but more 
importantly, it fell to the judgement of the people in the broad, sphere of contestation in the 
referendum itself. Parliament had attempted to act accountably over the Prime Ministerial 
agreement – through critical Select Committee reports and responding to his post-
European Council statements in the House of Commons – but ultimately it was resigned to 
the renegotiated settlement forming the muddled basis for the ‘Remain’ position in the 
referendum campaign. Although Cameron’s negotiation features “were not major 
reforms”, he declared nonetheless that they were sufficient to justify recommending that 
Britain remain as a member of the EU (Ford and Goodwin, 2017, p. 23).  
  The Prime Ministerial-legislative chasm in the negotiation was mirrored if not 
exacerbated by the Prime Ministerial negotiation-elector divide. The British public were 
not confident of David Cameron’s deal for Britain in his EU renegotiations, which he had 
referred to at the time as the “strongest package ever”. One snap poll conducted by Sky 
News found 69 per cent of people thought the deal was “bad for Britain” while only 31 per 
cent said it was “good for Britain” (Stone, 2016). Later polling indicated that only 13 per 
cent thought it was a ‘good deal for the country’, 42 per cent thought it was a ‘poor deal’ 
while 45 per cent said they don’t know, highlighting a lack of understanding amongst the 
public of what the deal actually meant for Britain (Evening Standard/BMG Research Poll, 
2016). This strongly suggests there were a high proportion of both those who thought it 
was a poor deal and those who did not understand the negotiated package only days before 
the official referendum campaign began. Alongside factors such as the neutrality of the 
referendum question, the Prime Minister and Conservative-in-Government’s tenure and the 
high turnout all tilted towards a structural referendum advantage for the Leave vote 
(Qvortrup, 2016, p. 67), so also did the unpopular Prime Ministerial negotiation. 
  David Cameron’s Prime Ministerial-led renegotiation preceding the EU referendum 
provided significant evidence of an executive-legislature and executive-elector relationship 
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accountability breakdown impacting upon the majority vote to leave. The renegotiation 
was fundamental to most Leave voters. In particular, there had been a substantial growth in 
those sceptical and who wanted to see EU powers reduced (The British Election Study, 
2016; Geddes, 2016), well beyond those who directly supported simply leaving. By 2015, 
two thirds opposed the UK’s existing relationship with the EU, with only 22 per cent 
saying we should leave yet 43 per cent wanting a reduction in EU powers (Swales, 2016, p. 
5). The proportion of electors as a whole who were waiting on a form of ‘fundamental 
renegotiation’ was significant. Those seeking a reduction in EU powers, despite having a 
Remain orientation, were clearly unconvinced by the renegotiation. A renegotiation which 
had been determined outside any contested, popular or parliamentary sphere, or beyond a 
political sphere of public accountability, did not resonate with electors seeking 
renegotiation. The referendum environment for a large portion of voters gave Leave an 
electoral advantage because the Leave choice and campaign gave those voters the 
opportunity to vote for a reoriented Government and Parliament to take control of freedom 
of movement from EU decision-making bodies who viewed such policies as inflexible, 
non-negotiable and indisputable EU commitments. The renegotiation had disentangled its 
proceedings from contemporary modes of political representation. The Prime Minister had 
marginalised the collective parliamentary status by which Parliament acts as a deliberative 
assembly in having its say on ‘the deal’. Furthermore, no political party itself as a whole 
had been involved in negotiations to the point it could form a sufficient and informed 
constitutional link between executive and parliament in the claimed representative interest 
of electors.  
  At the presentation of the final package, the referendum had already been enacted 
so, to a large degree, it affirmed Bogdanor’s beginning principle: that the UK-EU 
negotiation issue could not be resolved through the ordinary, working of the party system. 
More importantly, it resurrects Bogdanor’s legitimacy question where a referendum 
becomes necessary on an issue of fundamental importance because the parliamentary vote 
is insufficient to ensure legitimacy (Bogdanor 2009a, p. 185). There had been no 
parliamentary vote on the deal. There had been no genuine, parliamentary consultation, 
merely presented as a ‘take it or leave it’ package. It was led by (Prime) ministerial 
agreement. The (re)negotiation was insufficient to ensure legitimacy. Yet, unlike Bogdanor 
(2009a), it is evident that parliamentary sovereignty rests upon the capacity for the political 
realm of contestation to express the ongoing disagreement about substantive outcomes that 
society should achieve – Leave or renegotiated Remain – through the recognised legitimate 
and effective process for electors at resolving these disagreements, which began and ended 
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with Parliament legislating for public choice and implementing the majority’s wishes. In 
many respects, this conforms with the earlier reinterpretation of Qvortrup (2015) – that the 
Prime Minister thought the referendum would cement a high-level renegotiation; for most 
others, including the parliamentary vote and public, the referendum he had offered 
knowingly had to bypass the legislature’s impasse over the European issue. 
  
Parliament’s resettling of its sovereignty: legislating for a referendum through the 
European Union Referendum Act 2015  
 
Parliament’s act of legislating for a popular EU referendum through the European Union 
Referendum Act 2015 was an equally important mechanism in the exercise of its ultimate 
decision-making power. Despite 479 of 650 MPs eventually favouring Remain in the 
referendum itself (Menon, 2016), the legislative Act was by its very nature a statute 
asserting Parliament’s ability to outsource its ultimate decision-making power by 544 to 53 
MP votes (at second reading) and which addressed a vast swathe of public concerns, not 
simply leaving the EU. In that trial, Parliament became judge (of the Act) and executioner 
(of the result) in which people acted as jury. The emphasis placed upon the UK resettling 
its sovereignty by those who eventually voted to Leave, as they waited for David 
Cameron’s renegotiation to deliver a reduction in EU powers, was central.   
  A significant part of resolving the contested European issue was an attempt to find 
some form of political settlement. MPs knew from their own constituents, from external 
campaigns and the UKIP threat how deeply contested the issues were in the political realm. 
Those concerns had not been historically addressed, they generated uncertainty and 
required political settlement. On the second reading of the Bill, the then Foreign Secretary 
(Philip Hammond) referred to the need for settlement and the then Shadow Foreign 
Secretary (Hilary Benn) on the urgency to make a decision to address the ‘uncertainty in 
Britain’s place in Europe’ (House of Commons, 2015). Parliament enacted the referendum 
law in the UK political system to provide for valid political settlement on that matter. It 
acts in reference to historical constitutional form six and eight, guiding as precedents in the 
creation of the 2016 referendum, because Parliament’s legitimate exercise of ultimate 
decision-making power depends upon consent. That is Members of Parliament sought to 
collectively represent electors through the European Union Referendum Act 2015 and yet 
where governing at the helm is frequently dependent upon Parliament ruling through 
external agencies, commissions or bodies, the EU and national referendums.  
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  Difficulties in interpretation are obvious in that referendums are irregular under the 
constitution and they are ‘advisory’ by law and legislation, yet seriously and very much 
instructive by nature of UK electoral politics – never once ignored, with all results 
implemented – and their triggering occurs only by the action of Government in Parliament. 
But Bogdanor’s (2009a) analysis of public power on the EC/EU need not be overstated. 
Qvortrup’s (2015) claims that referendum works as an additive to representative 
government, not a compartmentalised aspect of the constitution seem more appropriate. 
The people’s final result of 23rd June is still triggered and returned for resolution and 
implementation by the Government-in-Parliament. The process in which a referendum, by 
its triggering and its consequential impact on Government policy implementing the result 
affirms, not denies, parliamentary sovereignty (contra Mabbett, 2017, p. 169; McKibbin, 
2017, p. 385).  
In making that claim, however, is also to affirm that the rule enabling parliamentary 
enactment, as Allan (2013) and the common law constitutionalist school argue, serves 
deeper principles of political and public morality – and that the fundamental rule takes its 
meaning from the underlying political theory to which it belongs. Parliamentary 
sovereignty relies upon Dicey’s broad terms that the referendum provides formal 
recognition that the enactment of laws depends on the consent of the nationally, 
represented electorate (Dicey, 1911). Yet, the rule of the recognised helm does exist, 
justified by its past, justifying historical precedents which determine its form – through 
political representation and Parliament ruling through external institutions, such as 
referendums, to provide law and further resettlement on the European issue.  
 
Voters on 23rd June 2016: directly tasking Parliament to resettle its ultimate decision-
making powers to ‘leave the EU’  
 
Electors on 23rd June 2016 directly tasked Parliament to resettle its ultimate decision-
making powers to implement the majority decision to ‘leave the EU’. Neither Cameron, 
nor most MPs, nor the leading Remain or Leave campaign opinion, nor the opinion polls, 
precisely predicted a ‘leave’ result. The result had been “…larger than any of the late 
polling had expected” (Ford and Goodwin, 2017, p. 25). But by nature of the referendum 
result, the majority of electors tasked Parliament to implement their decision. The 
subsequent Prime Minister, Theresa May, despite being a low key Remain participant in 
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the referendum, subsequently pledged to implement the result and has officially pursued an 
Article 50 policy and pledges to leave the single market, end the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
and repeal the European Communities Act, consistent with doing so (May, 2017a; May, 
2017b). The ultimate decision-making power of Parliament on its EU relationship defers to 
Westminster’s collective and tribal capacity to represent electors. Electors directly tasked 
Parliament to thereby resettle that ultimate power by nature of the referendum’s majority 
verdict. The ‘Remain-majority’ Parliament on the whole reoriented their position towards 
the majority verdict because of Parliament’s primary instinct to collectively represent 
electors.  
  It is after the electors have spoken and Parliament is instructed that the then 
secondary role of post-referendum party competition (De Vries, 2009), jockeying between 
one another to realign executive as against legislative positions, enables decision-making 
in Parliament to then be exercised. In that internal sphere of the party competition, it is the 
party political realm which creates positions, concentrated around the terms of ‘leaving the 
EU’ in which there are no holds barred – on Article 50 negotiations, the single market, on 
repealing the European Communities Act 1972 or the transposition of EU law into UK 
law, on passing the ‘final deal’, wholescale blocking of Treaty ratification, voting over 
immigration legislation, holding of a second referendum or another election (Bogdanor, 
2017; Miller et al., 2017; Renwick, 2017a; Caird, 2017). Enabling ordinary, parliamentary 
politics in this sense permits the competition between the separate arms of government and 
their interests to moderate the risk of one (namely, the Prime Minister) dominating the 
other (the House of Commons) (consistent with Bellamy, 2007). 
  As MPs, the majority of Conservatives mostly respected and accepted the result. 
Very few frustrated Remain participant Conservative MPs have rebelled against their own 
Government’s position on Article 50 notification and the Article 50 Bill. Labour is divided, 
claiming it respects the majority decision but seeks deeper parliamentary scrutiny rights 
over the terms of exit and some of its MPs do not accept the result – 47 Labour MPs, 
including 10 Shadow ministers, voted against Jeremy Corbyn’s instruction to vote for the 
Article 50 Bill (Chaplain, 2017). Again, 49 Labour MPs backed an amendment to the 
Queen’s speech, requiring the UK to stay in the single market and customs union (Stone, 
2017). MPs voted through the Article 50 Bill at Second Reading by 498 to 114 (House of 
Commons, 2017a; BBC News, 2017a). The separatist SNP wholeheartedly rejects the 
decision, as it rejected the Referendum Act itself but more importantly, as it rejects the 
collective representation at Westminster. The Scottish and Welsh assemblies do not 
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wholeheartedly accept implementing the result and Westminster MPs from those devolved 
regions are expected to be critical of the implementation of leaving the single market. One 
minor opposition party did not reconcile with the result because of its wish to represent the 
referendum’s minority supporters (Liberal Democrats; see Goodwin, 2016), along with a 
larger, Scottish nationalist, opposition party which believed purely in the representation of 
a devolved part of the UK which felt mandated to Remain (SNP; see Hunt and Keating, 
2016). The Brexit process will have political and institutional implications for the external 
affairs of the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as a 
consequence of the devolution of power that has taken place within the UK since it joined 
the EU (Whitman, 2017).  
Despite internal division in the Labour Party on the issue, the House of Commons 
nonetheless asserted its authority by holding a vote to call on the Government to invoke 
Article 50 by 31 March 2017 on the basis of a Labour Motion. The Motion passed by 448 
to 75 claimed to “respect” the decision of the British people to leave the EU (House of 
Commons, 2016a), and successfully secured the release and scrutiny of the Government’s 
plan. The legitimacy of that vote rested upon Parliament’s exercise of ultimate decision-
making power which depended upon Members of Parliament who collectively represent 
electors in the deliberative assembly. It committed MPs no further than providing the basis 
for the ability for Government to enter EU-level negotiations based on the referendum 
result at that stage, while providing broad scope for reviewing the terms of leaving the EU.  
While competitive party jockeying and realignment enabled the executive-
legislature chasm to be filled, as might be expected in adapting Burke’s assumption, the 
reasons were founded on directly enhancing their party position vis-a-vis Parliament’s 
political representative role. Labour remained “in disarray” (Menon, 2016; Curtice, 2017c, 
p. 13) as two thirds of its voters voted Remain yet 70 per cent of Labour constituencies 
voted Leave, many by wide margins (Gamble, 2017). The result disoriented the party itself 
but they found a strategy in scrutiny of Government negotiations and amendments to 
statutes reflecting more favourable terms upon which the UK leaves the EU. Scrutiny 
formed a practical, parliamentary link, but required party competition and votes to be held, 
or even cross-party support, which had the potential to form a political mandate for the 
Prime Minster and the Government. The Conservatives as a party were strikingly quick to 
reorient toward the referendum result itself and thereby implementing the majority verdict 
(Menon, 2016; Curtice, 2017c, p. 13), but it chose to do so through fast-track prerogative-
led negotiation that only exacerbated the executive- legislature rupture and which, in the 
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spirit of David Cameron’s renegotiation, had been defined under EU membership. In 
electoral terms, whereas Labour embraced the social liberal values of its Remain voters but 
nearly 70 per cent of Labour seats voted for Brexit, Conservatives had also put at risk the 
support of liberal, Remain-voting Conservatives (Ford and Goodwin, 2017, p. 27; 
Goodwin, 2016). While no straightforward party partisan realignment took place after the 
referendum, the British Election Study data suggested the Leave/Remain option had a 
potential role to play in future British elections (British Election Study, 2016). The 
subsequent election in 2017 put Parliament in a stronger position to exert scrutiny over the 
Government’s Brexit negotiations (Cygan, 2017, p. 18) and with nine tenths of elected 
MPs in the House of Commons to have pledged their party’s position of respecting the 
referendum result (Rose, 2017).  
As sovereignty depends upon parliament which depends upon parties to act as 
representatives between executive and legislative powers, the enhanced party-elector 
convergence over EU-leaving and restricting immigration through party realignment 
brought about by the referendum verdict may have the potential to bridge the executive-
legislature relationship. The referendum choices are crystallised in the party system at the 
point of the referendum around the most salient political issues such as EU-leaving, self-
government, restricted immigration or preserving economic trading relationships, on which 
voters and successful parties align their issue preferences. Yet, simply because the 
referendum has a crystallising effect on salient issues can hardly be said to undermine 
representative government (consistent with Qvortrup, 2015, p. 7), or parliamentary 
sovereignty.    
Parliament’s decision-making power by implementing policy in pursuit of the result 
of the 2016 EU referendum itself was itself elevated but through the interpretations of 
common law judges in the Supreme Court (Miller). Throughout the High Court 
proceedings (Miller [2016]) and the subsequent Supreme Court appeal (Miller [2017]; 
Supreme Court, 2017), the Government maintained it did not need to consult Parliament 
formally through a vote on legislation, so the judgement gave Parliament a centrality in the 
political decision-making process (Eleftheriadis, 2017). The Supreme Court primarily held 
that an Act of Parliament is required to authorise ministers to give Notice of the decision of 
the UK to withdraw from the EU under Article 50. Ministers could not solely authorise the 
decision themselves. The UK constitution required such a fundamental change to be 
effected by Parliamentary legislation (Miller [2017], 82). It also judged that the decision to 
withdraw is reserved to the UK Government and Westminster Parliament, not to the 
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devolved institutions, and that the devolved legislatures did not therefore “have a veto” on 
the UK’s decision (Miller [2017], 136-151).  
The ruling also affirmed a greatly enhanced role of the judiciary in respect of 
adjudicating over ministerial power and parliamentary power in leaving the EU. It 
confirmed some aspects of common law constitutionalism in that the Supreme Court very 
much acted as guardian of the constitution, in which the “UK’s constitutional 
requirements”, being a matter of domestic law, “should be determined by UK judges” 
(Supreme Court, 2017). Despite the Court’s dissenting judges in Miller wishing for the 
Court to leave it to the political sphere to constrain executive power and the claims of 
Parliament (McHarg, 2017), the ruling put Parliament centre-stage of defining the UK-EU 
relationship including the relevant constitutional issues (Eleftheriadis, 2017) and the UK’s 
constitutional resettlement, if not the Supreme Court as guardian of their role in making 
political decisions. The ruling by implication began to debunk the myth of executive 
authority over Parliament to find the “best deal” and that the “best deal” required making 
political decisions in Parliament (Eeckhout, 2017).  
 
House of Commons resettling of its sovereignty: triggering the Article 50 negotiations 
 
More significant to Parliament’s substantive power was the passing of the formal European 
Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill formally affirming the Government’s triggering of 
Article 50, despite Government needing the Supreme Court to tell it to enact legislation in 
Parliament. The intervention of the court led to a Bill being presented by the Secretary of 
State, David Davis in the House of Commons – the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Bill – within two days of the Supreme Court judgement to empower the 
Prime Minister to notify the EU of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU. MPs 
voted the Bill through the House of Commons by a majority of 384 (498 votes to 114), to 
allow Theresa May to begin Article 50 negotiations (BBC News, 2017a). The cleavage in 
the party system has been crystallised at the point of the Referendum leave result only, in 
which voters indirectly tasked parliamentary parties, as collective representatives, to align 
their issue preferences to a nuanced/conditional leave majority, as against their older 
preferences towards continued EU integration. Through the referendum aftermath, the 
Supreme Court ruling in Miller, the Bill triggering Article 50 and the Bill repealing the 
European Communities Act, Parliament has eventually provided the essential ingredient of 
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legitimacy in exercising ultimate decision-making power. It is a remarkable adaptation of 
Bogdanor’s assumption: whereas Bogdanor (2009a) established that a referendum is 
important where the parliamentary vote is insufficient, the practice after the referendum 
and the Miller ruling is that a referendum is essentially complementary to the preceding 
and implementing parliamentary votes and legislation. That resettling surely confirms that 
referendums are additive, not substitutive, of the legitimacy (contra Wellings and Vines, 
2016; Bodgdanor, 2009; Bodgdanor, 2016b), which predicates parliamentary sovereignty.  
   
Conclusion 
 
The narrative of the UK’s commitment to leaving the EU and Parliament’s resettling 
within that decision-making process is unfinished. Parliament’s ultimate decision-making 
power on the UK-EU relationship remains dependent upon effective all-party scrutiny of 
proposals, legislation, events and the capacity for party competition to exploit the 
executive-legislative accountability gap in the deployment of scrutiny. The MPs’ and 
peers’ intense engagement in questions, debates, and statements and through Select 
Committees championed Parliament’s inherent ‘scrutiny reserve’ and voting rights over 
renegotiation aims and outcomes, including alternative trade deals/arrangements (Renwick, 
2017a, p. 2). The newly established Exiting the European Union Committee (tasked with 
examining the Department for Exiting the EU), combined with the International Trade 
Committee (tasked with examining the Department for International Trade) began to fulfil 
this role, in addition to the existing European Committees in the House of Commons and 
Lords (EU Committee, 2016a). It adds to Raunio and Hix’ (2000) thesis that backbench 
parliamentarians work to redress the gap between Government and Parliament on EU 
policies (Winzen, 2012; Raunio and Hix, 2000, p. 163). By the end of January 2017, 44 
Committee Brexit-related inquiries had been launched by 28 different committees across 
Parliament (UK Parliament, 2017; Renwick, 2017a, p. 21).  
In the Commons, the Exiting the European Union Committee, chaired by Labour 
MP Hilary Benn, and wider parliamentary scrutiny in the Lords and Commons over the 
Government’s plan for Brexit has “already induced multiple concessions” from the 
government (Renwick, 2017a, p. 2), including:  
• requiring the government to prepare a White Paper on its negotiating plan ahead of 




• committing to giving MPs a proper vote on the final withdrawal agreement, which 
Theresa May effectively committed to in the following days (May, 2017a).  
• requiring the government’s negotiating plan to outline its position in relation to 
membership of the single market and the customs union, which, again the Prime 
Minister broadly responded to by insisting it did not seek membership of the single 
market but would seek to renegotiate an alternative relationship to the customs 
union (May, 2017a, 2017b; Department for Exiting the European Union, 2017).  
• the government making it their “first priority” in negotiations to reach agreement 
on safeguarding the residency rights of 3.2 million EU citizens who are already 
living in Britain (Hawkins, 2017), and the rights of 1.2 British nationals in the other 
member states (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2017; Newson 2017; 
May, 2017a; May, 2017b; McGuinness, 2017) before and after triggering Article 
50, following persistent scrutiny by Select Committees (see Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, 2016), Labour (BBC News, 2016a), SNP, the LibDems (House of 
Commons, 2016d) and her fellow Conservative MPs, settling their residency rights 
position. 
The absorption of scrutiny into Labour and SNP party competition on the floor of the 
House has produced notable results, albeit without direct constraints upon the Prime 
Minister. While the scrutineers were not able to directly mandate the Government 
preceding Article 50 negotiations, as Benz (2004) concurs, their vigorous supply of policy 
and legislative views directly impacted upon, moderated, conditioned and nuanced the 
Government’s delivery of the terms by which the UK might leave the EU.  
Parliament and the Exiting the European Union Committee will have a central 
place in passing or amending the Repeal Bill for the day the UK officially leaves the EU. 
The legislation aimed to repeal the European Communities Act 1972 – bringing to an end 
supremacy of EU law over UK law – and to ensure that, wherever possible, the same rules 
and laws would apply the day after UK’s exit as they did before (May, 2017a). The Repeal 
Bill will also contain delegated powers enabling Ministers to make changes to the statute 
book to give effect to the outcome of the withdrawal negotiations (Caird, 2017, p. 6), 
which will receive intense scrutiny, if not opposition by leading Opposition 
parties. MPs broadly voted in favour of the government’s Repeal Bill at its second reading 
by 326 votes to 290 (House of Commons, 2017b). In that vote, most Labour MPs, as well 
as LibDem and SNP MPs voted against the legislation – opposing and scrutinising the 
Bill’s “power grab” Henry VIII provisions which it argued gave ministers broad powers to 
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make legislative changes (rather than Parliament) to address the problems arising out of the 
UK leaving the EU. Through party competition, Labour had begun to reorient its Brexit 
policy away from both the referendum result and the Conservative Government’s agenda 
and towards UK membership of the EU single market and the customs union for a 
transitional period. If Miller [2017] taught the Government anything, it is that agreement 
by ministerial power in altering EU law or membership is absent of legitimacy, 
accountability and consent, whereby the agreement by Parliament and statute is not.  
However the Government chooses to progress, new realignments in the party 
system will continue to crystallise during the Article 50 negotiations, and during the 
scrutiny of the Repeal Bill, or over the final agreement, in which voters might retask 
parliamentary parties to align, resonate or review their EU, immigration or trading 
preferences. For example, the intervening snap General Election in 2017 called by the 
Conservative Prime Minister to strengthen her party’s majority in Parliament and provide it 
with a stronger Brexit mandate in the Article 50 negotiations had the unintended effect of 
creating greater uncertainty (Cygan, 2017). It produced a hung Parliament with a minority 
Conservative government with the implication that they presented in a weaker position at 
the commencement of Brexit negotiations which immediately followed the election 
(Cygan, 2017, p. 18; see also Ford et al., 2017; Renwick, 2017b). The effect however was 
for nine tenths of elected parliamentarians to consolidate their party’s commitment towards 
the referendum result (Rose, 2017) and provide consent towards some form of Brexit 
negotiation – with some divisions still remaining on retaining the single market and 
customs union. A further consequence was the amplified power of accountability influence 
and scrutiny of Parliament over the Brexit negotiating policy of the Conservative 
Government of the day (Cygan, 2017, p. 18), left with only a wafer-thin parliamentary 
majority of 13, maintained by a Conservative-Democratic Unionist Party agreement. 
 The overall view presented in this chapter first indicates that David Cameron’s 
renegotiation preceding the EU referendum, without consulting Parliament, demonstrated a 
demotion of Parliament to the executive which can be understood as a Prime Ministerial 
exercise in permissive consensus (Hooghe and Marks, 2009, p. 5; Geddes, 2016; Franklin 
et al., 1994). It generated the claim of a final, non-contestable package but which lacked 
public legitimacy during the referendum. Second, Parliament’s parallel task in legislating 
for a Referendum Act became an indirect resettling of its sovereignty because the 
referendum is, on Dicey’s terms, a formal recognition that the enactment/repeal of UK and 
EU-derived laws depends upon the consent of the nationally, represented electorate. By 
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legislating for one, Parliament remedies their own and their voters’ choice of demotion 
under the executive, which has accumulatively developed under EU membership. Third, 
voters in the referendum on 23rd June directly tasked Parliament to resettle its ultimate 
decision-making power to implement the majority decision to ‘leave the EU’. This tasking 
of Parliament has had the effect, evidenced by ‘Article 50 votes’, of creating cleavages in 
the party system crystallised at the point of the referendum result. Fourth, the referendum 
aftermath, the Supreme Court judgement in Miller and the Bill triggering Article 50 and 
the Repeal Bill affirm that a referendum becomes an essential complement (not a 
substitute) of parliamentary votes and legislation to exercise ultimate parliamentary 
decision-making over the UK’s EU relationship. Fifthly, the nature of parliamentary 
scrutiny and the capacity for party competition to exploit the executive-legislature 
accountability gap in deploying scrutiny has enabled the partisan sphere of contestation to 
inhabit the political sphere, upon which parliamentary sovereignty depends. All this 
suggests a major, if not enhanced role for Parliament in making political decisions and 
thereby in resettling parliamentary sovereignty. This resettling indicates the holding of a 
referendum on the UK's membership of the EU has enhanced, not eroded, the principle of 
representative government and Parliamentary sovereignty (contra McKibbin, 2017, p. 385; 
Mabbett, 2017, p. 169). After all, after 44 years of EU membership, the UK’s withdrawal 
will mean the Parliament regaining from the EU its centrality of decision-making over key 
political decisions.  
There are clear implications of the approach taken. The view presented of the ‘rule 
of the recognised helm’ contrasts with other leading legal and political theories placing 
popular and legal limitations upon Parliament’s sovereignty. The rule of the recognised 
helm is both a fundamental rule of government and a helm which defines the settlement 
and resettlement of multiple political actors at the helm. It explains the unsettling and 
resettling of uncodified relations and conventions between the executive, the legislature, 
the judiciary and the electorate in their tacit consent/recognition of a rule having the 
capacity to steer and direct. Other approaches within a popular sovereigntist and common 
law paradigm have accorded inconsiderable significance and weight to the eight historical 
constitutional forms defining Parliament’s political supremacy, institutional relationships 
and inter-linkages. By attaching less significance to the eight historical constitutional 
forms, the gravity of the impact of EU membership on the unsettling of the UK 
constitution has often been misunderstood if not underestimated.  
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 The identifying of eight innovative developmental, historical constitutional forms 
enable political and constitutional studies to more widely rethink the shifting and unsettling 
that occurs between those forms. That experience of a further resettling is particularly 
relevant to today’s understandings of constitutional change. Through the incorporation of 
the EU at the realigned recognised helm, the sovereignty formed in Parliament 
incorporates the inter-relationships between the other parts of government but those 
complex inter-relationships have intensified under EU membership, unsettling the powers 
at the helm, including the concentration of powers within the helm itself. In the final case 
study, events since the EU referendum illustrate that Parliament’s ultimate power can be 
further resettled, namely by addressing the historical dilution of its powers.  
The thesis has tended more broadly to concentrate therefore on the EU’s unsettling 
of the features belonging to ‘What the Crown-with-magnates enacts is law’ (1200-1350), 
‘What the Crown-in-regulating Parliament enacts is law’ (1688-1689), ‘What the Crown-
in-mixed constitutional Parliament enacts is law’ (1690-1790s) and ‘What the Crown-
through-Parliamentary political elite with external bodies enacts is law’ (1973-present). 
Potential further study need not be restricted to those constitutional forms, nor the role of 
the EU itself, but other challenges to parliamentary sovereignty including the growth of the 
devolved bodies and the introduction of the Supreme Court.  
Today, an executive-led Parliament delegates its law-making capacity to other 
institutions who then impose external control, steerage and direction upon that law, so that 
those representatives who are elected to the House of Commons by the political 
community to make law no longer have that practical capacity, since its everyday capacity 
or competency, but not ultimate right, was voluntarily ceded under the European 
Communities Act 1972 to navigate the ship of state with a hand on the helm. Parliament 
retains its ultimate sovereignty because it has the power to terminate or change that 
membership by repealing or amending the European Communities Act 1972 (Tomkins, 
2010) and yet the 44-year practice of choosing not to terminate or change substantial 
aspects of its Parliament-diminishing EU membership has been said to have left 
parliamentary sovereignty intact. This final chapter indicates that a sovereignty once 
shared with the EU does not mean it could not be resettled; to the contrary, it has voluntary 
and politically shared sovereignty which can be returned if it so chooses.  
The constitutional ‘unsettling’ occurs when new events transgress the rules set out 
in previous precedented relationships as understood through historical constitutional forms. 
The EU contributes, with its competitive hand on the helm, to steering and directing the 
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Government and Parliament, giving it a greater role in navigating state policies. At the 
recognised helm, successive governments, through Parliaments, have adopted practices 
which whilst preserving the fundamental rule, are at odds with past historical precedents. 
This process has led to a fusion of the executive with EU machinery, the dilution of the 
domestic legislature and the fusion of the elevated judiciary with the Luxembourg court 
system, which unsettles those historical precedents of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Parliament can, if it chooses, place a stronger hand at the helm. 
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